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EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY AND SOME OF ITS MISUNDERSTANDERS

By Douglas Clyde Macintosh

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I

Some few readers of this magazine may recall that about two years ago a number of my former students did me the honor of dedicating to me a volume of essays under the title, *The Nature of Religious Experience* (Harpers, 1937). When the project was first broached in my presence I ventured to recount to my kind friends the story of what the late Professor Howison, of California, said to a junior colleague who had been congratulating him on the large number of his former students who were occupying important positions in philosophy in the universities of America. "Yes," remarked Howison, "but not one of them is teaching the truth!" It was not that I was inclined to complain about any more or less similar situation among those who had in years long past listened to an exposition of principles of theological method which I then believed and still believed to be essentially valid. I had always insisted that my students do their own thinking. It was not unmindful of the dictum of Caird that the days of discipleship are past, and possibly had I given the matter any thought I might have found myself sympathetic in some degree with Barth in his prayer to be delivered from the crowning calamity of having a disciple.

Notwithstanding the invitation of my former students, an invitation thrice repeated in the foreword to the above-mentioned volume, that I respond to the stimulus of their friendly criticisms and, by commenting upon their essays, renew the relationship of co-operative discussion formerly enjoyed in the classroom, I was not at all disposed at first to accede to the suggestion. I was reluctant to let slip the dangerous dogs of controversy. I was loath moreover to disobey the adage against looking a gift horse in the mouth, and I chose rather to enjoy the handsome presentation volume for a while, without looking into it too critically. It is true that a cursory glance at some of the essays confirmed the half-formed suspicion that here might be a

Brutus who, while he honored me for my theological courage, was resolved to slay me for my ambition in seeking for theology the kingly crown of scientific status; or perchance indeed, an Antony, come to bury me, not to praise me. But even so, I confess that I felt, for the time being, a satisfaction something like Tom Sawyer's, when, present at his own obsequies, he felt that this was indeed the proudest moment of his life, in spite of any time of reckoning which might be yet to come.

I might have been roused from my pleasant lethargy, if not indeed by a more careful perusal of the gift-volume itself, then by the somewhat disturbing declarations of certain other former students who reviewed the volume, that some of the criticisms expressed in the book were "devastating," "all but unanswerable," and such as to make out "a good case" against my position! (Dr. Howard B. Jefferson, in *The Journal of Religion*, July, 1937; Dr. Randolph C. Miller, in *The Review of Religion*, May, 1938). But what has fully roused me at length from my perhaps not very dogmatic and not too sound slumber has been the resounding crash after crash of Dr. H. N. Wieman's confidently damnatory judgment. There is today, he claims, "a turning away from this theology of religious experience"; it is "waning and failing"; its "requiescat is pronounced" in the volume, *The Nature of Religious Experience*, certain of the authors of which "have delivered a smashing blow at that method of inquiry"; in short, he claims that "the volume demonstrates that the day of the centrality of religious experience has passed" (Review in *Christendom*, Summer, 1937; *The Growth of Religion*, Willett, Clark & Co., 1938, p. 424). Furthermore, even as I write there comes the publication of Professor W. M. Urban's presidential address, delivered before the American Theological Society last Spring, in which he avers that, as for "perception in a complex" and its application in religious epistemology, so far from accepting the claim for it, he can frame no clear idea of just what the phrase is intended to mean (*The Journal of Religion*, Jan., 1939, p. 18). Finally, I see that Professor John Bennett, in undertaking to show us how a liberal can change some of his spots and be a liberal still, admits that he is "not averse to a broad type of empiricism . . . so long as there is no pretense that religious empiricism can be in any strict sense scientific" (*The Christian Century*, Feb. 8, 1939, p. 179). Thus many things conspire to spur my reluctant will, far from desiring controversy, to attempt once more to

clear up misunderstanding as to what I mean when I defend the view that theology can and should be fundamentally empirical, and that such a theology can have at its heart and center a certain body of amply verified religious knowledge.

I shall have to deal mainly with two principal criticisms, namely, first, that the project of a theology of religious experience in general and an empirically scientific theology in particular must inevitably fail of realization, and second, that any attempt to construct a theology on the basis of values, religious, moral, or other, must be abandoned as bound to prove unsatisfactory, both intellectually and religiously. From my point of view these are serious charges, in view of which I the more readily stir myself to engage in what seems to myself, as I fear it must seem to others, the ungrateful task of engaging in public controversy with distinguished former students who have so freely united to do me signal honor. But, as it seems to me, the fact is that, if we can legitimately have neither a theology of religious experience nor a theology fundamentally conditioned by considerations of value, for the theologian there is nothing for it but to "take to the woods" of irrationalism, external authority and obscurantism—a course which, I regret to see, is being followed at present by all too many religious leaders, including some who ought to know better.

II

Before undertaking these two major tasks, however, I will give brief attention to such other points in the essays under consideration as seem to call for some critical or explanatory comment. Professor Bewkes's paper on "Common Sense Realism" naturally interests, and in general pleases me, but in view of the reference to Thomas Reid's work in connection with the "historical background" I think I should reinforce Bewkes's remark that the "affinities" and "coincidence" with Reid's views are "due not at all to conscious following." Further than that I think I can say that it is not a case of traceable following in any sense involving causal influence, since my early philosophical training along idealistic lines was such as to prejudice me against the whole Scottish school of common-sense realism as being not important enough to demand any particular examination. This prejudice determined my attitude toward Thomas Reid and his followers until some time after all the main features of my theory of knowledge

had taken definite shape. So far as I can recall or discover, I have not been influenced by Thomas Reid, at least directly, at a single point.

Dr. Bewkes also refers to the rather close agreement between Professor Norman Kemp Smith's theory of knowledge and my own, and suggests that both treatments of the subject have resulted from a synthesis of elements from the Kantian criticism on one side and from Reid's type of realism on the other. When Professor Kemp Smith's book on the subject first appeared, I myself was at once struck with the extensive identity between his views and my own as contained in *The Problem of Knowledge*, and while pleased with his important support, was a little disappointed not to find any reference to my presentation of the point of view, which I had called critical realistic monism, or critical monism. I wondered at this, especially as I had had a letter from Professor Smith a few months after my book was published, informing me that he had read it and expressing cordial appreciation of it. It seems to me desirable, in Professor Kemp Smith's interest as well as my own, that the convenient opportunity afforded by the present occasion be used to clear up, once and for all, this relationship which has caused more than one student to wonder. The fact is that Professor Smith, according to his letter to me, read my book late in 1915, intending to review it for the *Yale Review*. He was then Professor of Philosophy in Princeton University, but having decided at about that time to return to Scotland to engage in war work, he wrote me that he was leaving the book with his colleague, Professor Spaulding, with the request that he write the review. Thus, from the time he read my book in 1915 until his own work on the subject appeared in 1923, he was presumably without a copy of the former, especially as I am informed by a former student of mine, recently a graduate student at the University of Edinburgh, that there is no copy of *The Problem of Knowledge*, or of any other book of mine in the library of that university in which Dr. Smith has been Professor of Philosophy since the end of the War. Thus while I like to think, in view of Professor Smith's letter to me, that he may have been subconsciously influenced to some extent by his previous reading of my book, in view of all the circumstances there is every reason to suppose that he worked out his essentially identical theory, with all its further elaborations and amplifications of the view, without any conscious dependence upon, and with little or no clear

memory of what I had published and he had read some eight years before. The years spent in war work, followed by the years of other reading and of teaching and writing amply account for everything. However, as I say, I have been grateful for the support of so able a philosopher, and was interested to note that when Professor Whitehead brought out his little book on the knowledge problem he acknowledged his indebtedness, in working out his own essentially similar theory, to suggestions derived from reading the book of Dr. Kemp Smith to which I have referred.

Before going on to the two main controversial topics referred to above, I may say that, for one reason or another, the last five essays in the volume do not seem to me to call for any extended discussion on my part at this time. With Professor Krusé's criticism of subjectivism in value theory I find myself in almost complete agreement, although I think he might go further than he does toward admitting the relativity of value and the pure subjectivity of many values, without impairing the strength of his argument that if there be no objectivity of values there can be no God. He tends habitually to use the term values in the sense of objectively valid values, a procedure which is almost as awkward for mutual understanding as is the opposite extreme of regarding all truth as a mere aggregate of more or less serviceable, and more or less lasting individual or group opinions, or instruments of thought for the reconstruction of experience.

With Professor Calhoun's metaphysical argument for "a semi-detached knower" I find myself in about as close agreement as I am with Professor Krusé in his objectivist value-theory. This agreement extends also to the theory of religious knowledge briefly indicated in the last few pages of Dr. Calhoun's essay, at least so far as the realistic doctrine that God is an independent reality is concerned. I agree that "each man stands over against God as a real other self." However, I have reason to believe that, if Dr. Calhoun had elaborated his religious epistemology in detail, marked differences would have come to light. This is indicated in Calhoun's endorsement of the opinion that "religious awareness has an incurable dualism in it," whereas, in my opinion, in religious experience at its best certain aspects of divine reality are so directly revealed and immediately perceived as to make amply verified religious (i.e., theological) knowledge a genuine human possibility. An "incurable dualism" in religious ex-

perience would make religious agnosticism logically inevitable and likewise incurable. But more of this anon.

The paper of Professor Northrop, who is a specialist in the philosophy of science, deserves a much more extended and critical review than can be given it here. The somewhat technical discussion leads up to what looks to me like a plea for the *authority* of a speculative philosophy of science in questions of epistemology, both general and religious. Now, it is a fact that the scientific specialist has, in his own special sphere, a certain expert authority which outsiders do well to recognize; but the same thing cannot be said for the speculative philosopher, even when he is a philosopher of science, and there are certain prominent speculative features of Dr. Northrop's own thought-system which other philosophers of science are very far from finding it necessary to accept. It is true enough, however, that his familiarity with scientific concepts and scientific results tends to gain for him a certain relative authority among thinkers less scientifically informed than himself.

Dr. Hartshorne's "Psychological Approach to Reality" is a strong, not to say a super-saturated, solution of such materials as are to be found current in the streams of thought which for a generation or more have marked the widening influence of such radical empiricists and social psychologists as Dewey, Mead, Ames, Coe and, more recently, Wieman. The very first sentence challenges attention and stimulates incipient dissent: "It is impossible to move empirically out of the cross-section of immediately present reality." Have we no empirically scientific knowledge through memory or through adequately criticized expert testimony? Is it not with a realistic "critical common sense," rather than with the disguised psychologism or immediate empiricism which would ultimately reduce all branches of philosophy to functional or social psychology, that science in general is continuous? But such questions would lead us far beyond the necessary limits of the present paper.

Professor D. S. Robinson's paper in definition and defense of "religious liberalism" invites comment, but further than to remark that I am more in sympathy with contemporary criticisms of recent liberalism than he seems to be, I can afford space only to correct, for the sake of the record, two or three unimportant errors as to matters of fact. Professor Wobbermin's Taylor Lecture on "The Theology of

Albrecht Ritschl" was delivered at Yale in 1907, not 1909, and, as I was not at that time a member of the Yale Faculty, my direct personal acquaintance with Dr. Wobbermin did not begin until I met him in Germany in 1911. And it was Professor Karl Bornhausen, rather than Professor Wobbermin, who did something to facilitate arrangements for presenting my book, *The Reasonableness of Christianity,* to German readers in their own language. It is true, nevertheless, that I have been glad to count both of these German theologians among my friends throughout the past twenty-five years and more, although I cannot but regret their lining up so definitely with the dictator-ridden "German Christians" in opposition to the heroically protesting Confessional Synod, even if I can understand it in part, in view of the extreme theological conservatism generally characteristic of these evangelicals.

III

I turn now to the criticism, made by several of the essayists and probably concurred in by most of the others, that a theology of religious experience having any knowledge-value at all comparable with the scientific knowledge-value of sense-perception is quite impossible of attainment, and that the project should be abandoned as outside the bounds of reasonable consideration. Dr. Bewkes approves my projected "common sense realism," "both in general knowledge theory and in religion," but he feels that, when the right religious adjustment is treated as if it were a means of gaining verified religious knowledge comparable as to certainty with the results of the recognized sciences, we are trying to prove too much (p. 24). Drs. Thomas, Ferm, and Bixler carry the criticism further. Dr. Thomas concedes that the experimental method may be used to establish a science of religious experience which "may be of great practical value in guiding our religious efforts" (p. 47); but he agrees with F. R. Tennant in the view that religious experience has no knowledge value (p. 51; cf. Ferm, pp. 39-41). "We can never wholly verify our religious beliefs," he holds (p. 65; cf. Bixler, p. 76).

Now it seems to me a very serious objection to make against religion, that it has and can have no cognitive value. From the beginning religion has been practical and experimental adjustment, and not contemplation merely. The history of religion may be regarded as a prolonged "trial-and-error" process, aimed at finding out just what

religion is instrumentally good for, or, in other words, what kind or kinds of religious adjustment are dependably effective, and for what ends. Is the whole experimental investigation destined to end in negation and failure, in the discovery that there are no valid ends toward which any theoretically permissible and practically possible religious adjustment is dependably instrumental? Is this the "possible loss to religion" which Dr. Bixler fears may result from what he calls "too slavish an imitation of science" (p. 71)? It seems impossible wholly to separate the question of the practical value of experimental religion from that of its value for knowledge. If some special type of practical religious adjustment, otherwise defensible, has dependable desirable results, this means that there is in reality a factor or factors which can be depended upon to respond to that kind of religion, and it is just that factor in which, on the one hand, practical religion is interested, and which, on the other hand, constitutes the religious object concerning which empirical theology is correspondingly entitled to say that it exists and has whatever qualities are necessarily involved in that dependable desirable response. When Dr. Bixler objects that "the 'right religious adjustment' is often made without positive results" (p. 76), the answer can be made that this is not so, since the right religious adjustment, as defined, includes as one of its essential features *persistence* in the adjustment long enough and intensely enough to overcome all inhibition and resistance, and thus to cross the threshold into overt actuality. Spiritual aspiration, concentration upon divine Reality (God) as adequate to meet imperative religious need, self-surrender to God and to the good as God's will, faith which decisively appropriates the needed divine assistance, and a willed responsiveness to whatever practical meanings are presented to the mind and conscience as involved in the good will of God—all this, *persisted in* long enough and intensively enough to bring perceptible results, constitutes the "right religious adjustment" of our definition. And it is an adequately verified religious hypothesis, or in other words, a law of religious experience, that such an adjustment tends dependably toward deliverance from evil and achievement of good—primarily in the inner life of the individual of course, but also ultimately in his overt behavior and in the outer world.

When this scientific generalization is expressed in terms of the religious subject, i.e., the adjusting factor, the result is a law of (norma-

tive) psychology of religion. And when it is stated in terms of the religious object, that is, in terms of the responding reality and what it can be depended upon to effect, the result is a law of empirical theology, since it is just that dependably responding reality or factor which is, or must come to be, the functioning God of scientifically experimental religion. The religious adjustment is not an adjustment of the religious self to itself, but to an other, and it will hardly be contended that the self-conscious religious self, as it knows itself, is the only factor in the ensuing religious experience.

It will not do to reduce the religious consciousness to the æsthetic phase of that consciousness and then conclude that religion has no more need of experimental knowledge than the admiration of beauty has (cf. Bixler, p. 85). It belongs to the very essence of religion to be interested in the truth of its beliefs; it is rooted not in the appreciation of values alone, but also and equally in the experience and knowledge of existent reality. It is true, as Dr. Bixler contends, that religion needs to "take its form from the ideal as well as the real" (p. 72), but it is equally important to insist that it needs to find empirical support for its postulate of the reality of an ideal object, or, in other words, of the existence of ideality in the real, whether transcendently or immanently or both. Bixler's definition of religion in terms of a sense of what ought to be ("the Sollen"), as "a response to an essential rightness in the realm of truth, beauty, and goodness," as being concerned with an intuition of values, or abstract essences, freed from empirical considerations,[1] is inadequate, because, unless more is meant than is clearly said, it is so one-sided. It is but a half-religion. It specifies *what* God is, but implies that it is unimportant to believe *that* God is. When in philosophy the real God disappears, the half-Gods of absolute ideals appear. An emphasis upon the ideal as universal is indeed the contribution of the idealistic "great tradition" (Bixler, in *The Nature of Religious Experience*, p. 78), but there is another perhaps equally great tradition of empirical realism, and both have their importance for vital religion. Our philosophy of religion should be an idealistic realism or realistic idealism, rationally idealistic as to ideals and as to what God must be believed to be, but empirically realistic in its resolution to get from experience with reality

1. Pp. 79, 80, 82; cf. "The Spirit and the Life," *The Review of Religion*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Jan. 1937), pp. 116, 118, 127, 129, 131, 135.

whatever confirmation is possible as to the actual existence of an adequate Reality for our absolute devotion and trust.

Professor Bixler thinks of religion too exclusively in terms of its feeling aspect (p. 85). On this basis he excuses himself from undertaking the quest for empirical religious knowledge. He objects to any such standardizing of religious experience, or arriving at agreement in religious thought as would seem to be aimed at in the attempt to verify religious hypotheses in religious experience (p. 76). But this, as has been suggested, ignores the consideration that the question of the truth of belief in God is a question of the vitality, and ultimately of the life or death of practical religion. We cannot go on indefinitely acting as if God were, and believing that he is not.

Dr. Ferm similarly finds the essence of religion in feeling (pp. 38, 39, 40, 41). His philosophy of religion would be greatly improved if, instead of defining the religious object as whatever is taken as being of "serious and ulterior concern," he would define it as that which is seriously felt to be of ultimate concern. This would leave room for including in the religious object both ultimate values and ultimate reality, with interest centered in the relation of ultimate reality to ultimate values—a relation upon which experimental religion might be expected ultimately to throw considerable light. But, defining religion as he does, and remaining sceptical if not indifferent as to the possible knowledge-value of any possible religious experience, Dr. Ferm seems content to leave religion to the subjectivity of individual feeling, uncontrolled by theological belief, and to make of theology a purely philosophical discipline, a rational speculative system making some use of the natural sciences, it may be, but related to experiential religion neither as beneficiary nor, it would seem, as benefactor (pp. 40-43).

Whether in the thought systems of Messrs. Ferm and Bixler the rejection of empirical theology be viewed as cause or as effect, it is at any rate closely associated in both instances with a theology and a view of religion which lie open to serious criticism. Dr. Ferm seems to have no criterion of value to apply to religion, and, so far as his essay is concerned, his rational philosophical theology is a mere project, not a *fait accompli*. His religion without theology is blind feeling; his theology without religious experience is an empty concept. Dr. Bixler's God is ideally perfect, but apparently as such he does not exist;

what exists is a very imperfect realization of an eternal ideal. Obviously, then, in these two instances, the rejection of the empirical theological method is an appropriate part of a larger whole. Whether it should be explained after the analogy of the punishment which fits the crime or of the crime which has received its fitting punishment, it might be invidious for me to try to decide.

Some of my critics seem not to realize that I am very far from claiming that the whole of theology can be set forth in the form of a descriptive empirical science. Most of the defensible interesting propositions of theology must remain, I readily admit, in such form and with such certainty as they can have in a normative theological science based upon a critical philosophy of values, or in a metaphysical theology integrated into a general philosophical system. Dr. Bixler seems not to remember this when he complains that in my theology "the stage has been set for an interpretation in terms of feeling and will," but that "the players have retreated so far into their epistemological background that their distinctive features scarcely appear" (p. 75). Dr. Thomas seems to imply a similar criticism and to be involved in a similar partial misunderstanding, when he protests that "faith must outrun the evidence if it is to be faith at all" (pp. 66, 67). In his opinion, religion and constructive philosophy must alike "spring from a governing intuition, verify that intuition by reflection upon experience, go beyond the evidence by faith, and yield conclusions for practical life." "In any case," he adds, "faith, once questioned, must be transformed into practical belief, or it will be lost" (p. 66). With this program for religion and philosophy I find myself in full agreement. I only insist that the verification of religious intuitions in the light of experience can become to some extent, and should become as far as possible, inductively logical and scientific.

Dr. Thomas is right enough in pointing out that religious belief is not to be treated forever as a *mere* plausible hypothesis. Normally there is in religious belief, as he insists, a certain "fateful choice," a "commitment to attitudes and actions required by belief" (*ibid*). This is true of a religious faith as an organic whole; but, as Dr. Thomas himself admits, this commitment "may open up evidence" in support of the belief "that would otherwise pass unnoticed" (*ibid*). But when he maintains that "we can rationally justify our intuition of a cosmic purpose akin to our own spiritual ideals only by means of a philosophy

of nature and of man" (p. 64), I would point out that partial empirical verification of the idea of a divinely functioning teleological factor may be found in the experience of development toward a universally valid ideal of moral conduct and character, and of spiritual personality, with the help of reality's response to a persistent cultivation of a certain discoverable, dependably effective religious adjustment.

Here we have the answer to one of Dr. Thomas's very pertinent questions with regard to empirical theology. "How are we to know what adjustment or response is 'right'?" he asks (p. 48). Fundamentally the answer is similar to the chemist's answer to the question, How may we know what procedure is the right one for producing a certain chemical substance? The answer is that we can apply certain tests to the product resulting from our experiment, and we can judge the procedure by its effectiveness in producing the desired substance. Similarly, we can judge the religious adjustment by its effectiveness in tending to produce in the human will, and in the resulting behavior and experience, effects which are qualitatively in accord with divine, or absolute, ideals. This contains the answer to the further question, as to how "the *divine source* of the response to man's adjustment" may be established scientifically (Thomas, p. 48). The divine is the absolutely worshipful and trustworthy, the spiritually ideal; and the adequate cause of a qualitatively divine effect is or includes a functionally divine cause. Divine is that divinely does.

The objection that "descriptive science knows nothing of norms" (Thomas, p. 48) is not well founded. Science does not cease to be descriptive when it is made a part of an applied science. As a matter of fact, many of the most objective of scientific investigations have been the expression of very definite practical interests. Indeed, the importance of the practical problem to be solved has often led to even greater care and objectivity in experiment and observation than would otherwise have been shown. And there is no reason why this should not be the case in religious adjustment for the realization of imperatively needed spiritual effects in individual will, behavior, and character. It simply is not true that such "volitional and emotional attitudes," as are "vital conditions of religious experiment," are necessarily "factors disturbing to scientific experiment" (Thomas, p. 50).

In Professor Bixler's very suggestive presidential address before

the American Theological Society in 1936, taking the form of a dialogue between a modernized Cebes and Simmias (*Review of Religion*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Jan. 1937), he urges as a criticism of the empirical scientific method that it cannot solve universal problems of value nor answer the question how the ideal may be realized (*ibid;* p. 114). There seems to be a confusion here. Science cannot set ultimate standards; it cannot say what values are intrinsic, what ideals are ultimately valid. But, once the end has been selected, it can give information as to how it may be most effectively brought to realization. Similarly it can report in what experiences, and on what conditions, the value in question is actually realized. It can do this no less in the case of such ethico-religious values as are realized in practical Christian religious experience, and so it can furnish data for empirical theology. Appreciation of valid religious value involves an interested though not uncritical attitude, but determination whether, and to what extent, and on what conditions such value has been and presumably may again be made actual in human experience is a question to be determined with scientific disinterestedness.

Before bringing to a close this part of my rejoinder I must correct what seems to be a partial misunderstanding of my position by Dr. Bixler. In contrasting my view of religious perception with Professor Wieman's, he asserts that while the data of such perception, in Dr. Wieman's view, are "strictly sensuous," the religious data to which I refer are "not sensuous" (*The Nature of Religious Experience*, p. 70). Professor Urban follows Professor Bixler in this misunderstanding of my position (*Journal of Religion*, Jan., 1939, p. 18). It is not to be denied that there is a difference between Dr. Wieman and myself with regard to the data for religious knowledge, but Dr. Bixler has not stated it precisely. I would accept, I think, as religious data all the empirical facts to which Dr. Wieman points as having such significance. In addition to those, if not included therein, among the data of empirical theology I would give a prominent place to regenerative and spiritually renewing changes of will, even as introspectively cognized, as also to their consequences in behavior and its effects, as externally observed.

IV

This gives me the opportunity of explaining (to Professor Urban and others) what I mean by "perception in a complex," particularly

in relation to religious experience. An equivalent term would be *perceptual intuition*, both terms being used in a very broad sense. By intuition I mean immediate awareness, not in any such exclusive sense as would necessarily deny all mediating or representational elements, but in the sense that the cognition of truth or of present reality is, or is felt to be, not indirect or tentative, but essentially self-authenticating and direct. Intuition, in this broad definition of the term, may exist in any one of four varieties: rational, appreciative, imaginal, and perceptual. The first two have to do with the apprehension of axiomatic truth and intrinsic value, respectively. Imaginal and perceptual intuition differ from each other in that the latter is certitude of reality as present, whereas the former is certitude of truth about reality not presented sufficiently for perception. Imaginal intuition, while frequently fruitful, is notoriously fallible, and even perceptual intuition is sometimes illusory, needing to be tested in further perceptual intuition.

It will be seen that there is nothing in the foregoing definition of intuition which requires the limiting of the application of the term "perceptual intuition" to the physical. In both the physical and the psychical realm there may be "perception in a complex." We apprehend such physical process as walking, striking and lifting in various complexes of sensory and other elements of experience; and we also apprehend empirically, or perceive, such psychical processes as perceiving, remembering and desiring in various complexes of elemental *sensa*, revived images and constructs, such as may be distinguished in introspective and behavioristic analysis. Furthermore, it may be maintained that we apprehend, with comparable directness, physical objects in the complexes of physical qualities and processes, and the psychical subject in complexes of psychical processes, such as perceiving, remembering, thinking, and willing. It is not necessary to *reason* that I am because I think. I apprehend myself intuitively in the very processes of thinking, feeling and acting which I also apprehend perceptually, whether introspectively or behavioristically or both.

Essentially the same things may be said with reference to religious experience and what it enables us to apprehend. There is an element of appreciative intuition involved in the marking off of valid religious content from other contents of the experienced. Religious value is a complex category, including the objectively valid spiritual ideal (e.g.,

the absolutely good and true) as well as the subjectively numinous (at least potentially). But the apprehension of divine reality involves not only the appreciation of holiness, divineness; it involves also the empirical intuition or perception of actual process and participating existential cause, whether this be interpreted ultimately in subjective or objective terms, whether as many or one, and whether as personal, impersonal or superpersonal. Perhaps this may serve to indicate what I mean by perception of divine reality in the complex of religious experience.

The criteria of religious perception, or in other words of non-miraculous religious revelation, are the criteria at once of divine value and of actuality. Without such religious perception there can be, of course, no empirical religious knowledge, no even fractionally scientific empirical theology. But it is also questionable whether in the long run it will be possible to maintain the validity of religion, if there be no accessible religious experience with such universally dependable and scientifically verifiable revelation or knowledge-value. The essential truth of theology as (centrally, or fundamentally) an empirical science is logically bound up, it seems to me, with the essential truth of a modern evangelical Christianity, or, in other words, of ethical redemption-religion at its best. That Christianity is not essentially true it is impossible for me to believe, and this not on grounds of mere tradition, or external authority. I am still very certain that "theology as an empirical science" is both important and essentially true, and I have enough of optimism, or faith, left in me to enable me to believe that very important truth must ultimately prevail.

It may be that some readers of the chapter on "The Laws of Empirical Theology" in my book, *Theology as an Empirical Science,* encountered a stumbling block in the use of the term "the Holy Spirit" to designate the dependable, divinely functioning factor responding to the right religious adjustment and producing upon that condition the various specified phases of spiritual religious experience. The theory that the dependably responding factor is indeed an intelligent, spiritual being is not, of course, fully demonstrated, scientifically speaking, in the experience itself. Rather is it, as I believe, a belief which may be shown by philosophy to be theoretically permissible and even positively reasonable. This possible source of misunderstanding I have been careful to avoid in recent restatements of my position,

but I doubt not that a more important element in the explanation of the cool reception my views have generally received lies much deeper down than that. Indeed, I sometimes think that the project of a scientifically empirical theology was proposed too soon for some (the Fundamentalists, for instance), and too late for others (the more or less sceptical religious liberals and the very mildly religious typical products of our modern religious education). But I am not dismayed by the lack of any widespread acceptance as yet of the main thesis of my theological methodology. Even if I stood alone in this matter, I should be confident that I am faced in the right direction. If it be not true that there is a reasonably practicable religious adjustment to which reality dependably responds in the promotion of absolutely desirable results, Christianity is not revelation and our ethico-religious faith is in vain. But if an essentially Christian practical religion is valid, a scientifically formulated Christian empirical theology must be expected ultimately to gain general recognition.

I will not mince words in this connection. The matter is of serious importance, and I will make one further attempt to be very plain. If in proclaiming the Christian gospel we can predict and promise that whosoever will fulfill the prescribed conditions of repentance and faith (or, in other words, of the right religious adjustment, specified more particularly above) will experience ethico-religious salvation, then it cannot be denied that there is in the Christian message a nucleus of essentially or potentially scientific generalization. Successful prediction is the mark of scientific knowledge of law-abiding process. If, on the other hand, we have to conclude that such prediction is impossible in the sphere of Christian religious experience, we cut the nerve of Christian evangelism and of all really *religious* "religious education." What is meant here by scientific prediction, once more, is of course not exact mathematical prediction as to time and quantitative realization of results, but rather the promise of a dependable tendency in the direction of absolutely desirable results, primarily in the will and ultimately in the life and experience more generally. Generalizations do not need to be mathematically exact in order to be "strictly scientific."

Theological empiricism, then, seems to me to be the golden mean between the extreme rationalism of much of the older liberalism and the extreme irrationalism toward which present-day reactionary the-

ology is rapidly moving. This theological empiricism, as form, with the modern evangelicalism which is its proper content, offers a way of escape from the lukewarm, semi-secular, semi-religious liberalism, without requiring that we fall into the pseudo-evangelicalism which is being offered us today, and which has so much to say of grace and even imputed righteousness, and so little or even nothing to say about evangelical conversion or holiness of life. I am not a Methodist, but, as I see it, our need is for a modern version of the Wesleyan synthesis of the Protestant emphasis on grace with the emphasis on holiness characteristic of Catholicism at its best. In other words, what the present situation demands of the religious thinker is a normative evangelical Christian theology with a nucleus of verified evangelical religious knowledge, the whole being developed ultimately into a philosophical theology such as might be expected to issue from a soundly critical philosophy of religion, phenomenological, axiological, epistemological, and metaphysical.

My rejoinder to criticisms, explicit and implicit, in *The Nature of Religious Experience* will not be complete until I shall have dealt with the essays of the Niebuhr brothers. This will call for a discussion of valuational and existential theology, and for some treatment of religious symbolism and mythology in connection with the task of theology. Consideration of these problems must be postponed to a later occasion.

THE TIBETAN "WHEEL OF LIFE"

By Theos Bernard

Tibetan tradition as to the origin of the *Sipa-khorlo*, or symbol of the Wheel of Life, as told to me by a Buddhist monk, goes back to the Buddha himself. On one occasion, so the legend runs, he plucked a stalk of rice, and with its grains illustrated to his disciples his doctrines of the twelve causes of existnce, and the continuous cycle of existences of all animate beings. Later, it is said, he personally directed the preparation of the picture in what is known as the "new" style, intended especially for the conversion of King U-traya-na (eleventh century). It was introduced into Tibet by an Indian monk, Atisha, who had received it from the followers of Phagpa Thogs-med (or Arya Asanga). An "older" Wheel of Life, supposed to have been sanctioned by Dopon Lu-tub (Nagarjuna), founder of the Madhyamika school of Mahayana Buddhism, was brought to Tibet in the eighth century by Bande Ye-shi, and reproduced in the Monastery of Sam-ye. The present Wheel of Life in this monastery measures fifteen by twenty feet, and differs from the "new" style chiefly in the absence of the figure of the Buddha in the upper right hand corner, and the Munis in each of the six realms.

The symbol of the Wheel of Life now occupies an important position in the temple of every Tibetan monastery, usually in the left-hand corner of a small entrance porch, and opposite a drawing of the Buddhist conception of the universe. The size of these pictures varies with the size of the temple, the largest that I saw during my travels being the one in the great hall at Sa-kya, in Western Tibet, which measured eight paces in diameter. Besides these wall paintings there are also the *thangkas*, small paintings on canvas, bordered with silk. These are owned by individual lamas, and lay persons who keep them before their house-shrines. Frequently one sees such a painting hung up outside a bazaar, or by the side of a road, with a lama explaining its meaning to an interested group of passers-by, eager to learn of the strange destinies in store for them.

The pictures vary somewhat in detail, due to lack of knowledge or skill on the part of the lamas who paint them, but in general they follow the same formula. In the example from my collection which

is reproduced here, the chain of causation begins at the bottom of the wheel (instead of at the top which is more usual), which is conceived to be revolving clockwise. Other variations are due to the use of different symbols in different sections of the country. It is the U-Province, in central Tibet, however, which sets the standards of literary form. The colors used in the present example, unfortunately lost in the reproduction, are exceptionally brilliant and pleasing, and the execution clear-cut and vigorous.

NOTES ON THE "WHEEL OF LIFE"

By Gerda Hartmann

Kipling's old Lama in *Kim* is a master in drawing and expounding for the benefit of his disciple the "Great Wheel," with its six spokes whose compartments are "all the heavens and hells, and all the chances of human life." An illustration of such a "Wheel of Life" we have in the Tibetan painting here reproduced through the courtesy of Mr. Theos Bernard. In the centre of the wheel we see a pig, a snake, and a dove linked by grasping each other's tail. They symbolize in mutual connection "lust," "anger," and "stupidity," the cardinal sins of Buddhism. Around this, in a smaller circle painted half white, half black, the effects are shown of "white," or good, and "black," or bad, Karma—the white path leading upwards to honorable conditions, the black path leading to Hell.

The next circle is separated by means of six spokes into the six Gatis, or "Destinies," places to be obtained for a certain period according to one's actions: (1) Heaven; (2) realm of the "demi-gods"; (3) human world; (4) animal world; (5) realm of the "ghosts"; (6) Hells—enumerated here according to rank.

Heaven, at the top of the circle, shows gods enjoying themselves with bathing and music, midst birds and flowers. One of them seems to be plucking fruit from the heavenly wishing-tree which fulfills all desires. On the right, the eternal battle is waged between gods and demi-gods (*Asuras*), the god Indra, on his white elephant, leading the heavenly army. The *Asuras*, however, are losing the fight; Indra invades their realm, and, head first, they fall down, slain by the gods. The heavenly tree is painted here as having its root in the Asura world. On the right is the lake in which, according to the Tibetans,[1] the wives of the demons see their own and their husbands' fate reflected.

The *world of men* (depicted here on the left of Heaven) shows people busily toiling in their various occupations: laborers, women working before their houses, men ploughing and trading, men with books and various tools, and officials on horseback.

1. Cf. L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism in Tibet* (London, 1895), p. 82.

The *world of animals* (on the lower right of the circle), is still lower in rank. Here are the animals of land and sea, as well as the half-human monsters inhabiting the waters, most of them turned towards the Bodhisattva on their left.

Worse than this destiny is that of the *Pretas* ("Ghosts"), beings who are tortured by eternal hunger and thirst (lower left of the circle). For, although they have fruit and water in plenty, their pinpoint mouths are too small to take in nourishment, and the flames of their thirst change cooling water into fire. Hāritī, their queen, is seated in the upper left, with a lotus flower in her hand.

The worst destinies of all are the *Hells* (lower center), eight hot ones for sins of anger, and eight cold ones for sins of stupidity, according to the Tibetans. In the painting here, we see Yama, king and judge of the dead, with mirror and sword. His animal helpers are occupied with weighing the black and white pebbles representing good and bad actions, and with applying torture to those already judged. Although the stay in Hell is limited, there is no escape from it before the apportioned time is up; a forest with sword-like leaves, and a lake full of pus bar the exit (top left and right of the hell in the painting).

A Bodhisattva is placed in each of these Gatis, and some of them also contain some Tibetan divinity as their particular guardian.

The rim of the wheel is taken up by the twelve symbols representing the twelve mutually connected "causes" of suffering and evil: *ignorance*, symbolised by a blind woman led on by a man, causes the *Saṃskāras* (see explanation below) to arise, which are represented by potters forming vessels. They in their turn cause *consciousness*, monkeys in a fruit tree. Consciousness is the cause of *name-and-form*, or individual existence made up of material and immaterial aggregates; it is represented by two men in a boat. Name-and-form cause the *six senses* whose symbol is a house. The six senses cause *contact*, symbolised by a woman with a child in her arms. Contact is the cause of *sensation*, a man with an arrow in his eye. Sensation causes *thirst*, here represented by a man apparently in high position being offered some drink. Thirst causes *grasping*, symbolised by a man plucking fruit from a tree. *Becoming*, caused by grasping, shows a man and woman embracing. Then follow *birth*, pictured by a woman giving birth, and *old age and death*, in the image of a corpse on a stretcher.

The whole wheel of existence is held in the claws of a monster, said to represent "Impermanence," or sometimes Tanha, the demon of desire, who typifies the passionate clinging to existence which binds the soul to the wheel of re-birth. The body of this monster is in the form of a tortoise, symbolising the creative, cosmic energy which alternately puts forth and withdraws the world of appearances, as the tortoise alternately puts forth and withdraws its legs. Buddha himself is seated outside of the wheel, his right arm pointing to the "wheel" of his doctrine.

Our object here is to dwell briefly on certain divergencies between the Indian and the Tibetan conceptions of the "Wheel of Life," and then to discuss in some detail the outer rim of the wheel, depicting in twelve stages the famous Pratītya-Samutpāda ("Dependent Origination"), the origin and suppression of suffering.

The "Wheel of Life," now so popular in Tibet, must at one time have been very much in use by the Indian Buddhists also, at least in the sect of the Mūla-Sarvāstivādins.[2] According to them, the "Wheel of Life" (*bhava-cakra*) was to be drawn with a figure of Buddha in the centre, in a white circle representing Nirvāṇa. Around this came the three animals: the pigeon representing lust (*kāma*), the serpent, hatred (*dveṣa*) and the pig, stupidity (*moha*). By means of five spokes, the wheel was then to be divided into five Gatis, or "Destinies": gods, men, Pretas ("Ghosts"), hells, and animals, the gods in the circle being directly opposite to the hells. Around the five Gatis there was to be a water-wheel (*ghaṭīyantra*), representing beings about to be born or to die by means of numerous buckets filled with creatures who have either their heads or their feet sticking out. The outer rim of the wheel was to give in twelve[3] pictures the twelve "causes" (*nidānas*) of suffering, which will be discussed in detail below. Above the wheel

2. This is the conclusion drawn by Jean Przyluski ("La Roue de la vie à Ajanta," *Journal Asiatique* XVI, 1920, pp. 313 ff.) from the canonical texts of this school preserved in China. The elaborate instruction here, said to be given by Buddha himself, as to how the wheel is to be drawn and set up at the entrance of monasteries, supplements a much shorter one in the *Divyāvadāna* (ed. Cowell, XXI, pp. 289-300). This is a Sanskrit compilation of Buddhist legends, edited about A.D. 300, and, incidentally, taking most of its stories from the canon of the Sarvāstivādins. These descriptions, and a pictorial fragment of a wheel of life in the caves of Ajanta, discovered and ascribed to the sixth century A.D. by L. A. Waddell (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1894, pp. 367 f.), are up to the present the only sources of information on depictions of the "Wheel of Life" in India.

3. *Divyāv.*; the Chinese, however, describes eighteen, see below.

there was to be a picture of the demon (*yakṣa*) "Impermanence" (*anityatā*) with open mouth, holding the wheel of life in his arms. Above this demon there should be painted a round white mound symbolising the perfect purity of Nirvāna. This latter is lacking in the Tibetan picture, as is the Buddha-figure in the centre of the wheel. Przyluski believes it to be a logical development to remove Buddha from the centre of existence. He is replaced, in the more recent Tibetan pictures, by a Bodhisattva in each of the six Gatis, the idea being that there is a savior from each, even the worst destiny.

The peculiar symbolism of the water-wheel, which Przyluski[4] supposes to have represented originally "le mouvement des êtres attirés dans un corps nouveau (naissance), puis rejetés hors de ce corps (mort)," soon lost its meaning, and in the Divyāvadāna already refers only to "beings of miraculous birth" (*aupapādukāḥ sattvā*). Is it this symbolism, perhaps, which lies at the bottom of the Tibetan reproduction of a half-white, half-black circle with ascending and descending figures, representing the workings of "white" and "black" Karma?

The Gatis, or "Destinies," in the more orthodox Buddhist systems are enumerated as five, while the others, like the Tibetans, added the destiny of Asuras or "Demi-Gods." These are the eternal antagonists of the gods, always fighting against them and always being defeated, although often only after much struggle. But, whereas in Indian mythology the object of their battle usually is the drink of immortality, of which the gods robbed the Asuras when together they churned the world ocean in order to obtain it, the battle in the Tibetan drawing seems to concern the heavenly wish-fulfilling tree, which, although rooted in the Asura world, yields its fruit only to the gods.[5]

The Pretas, or "Ghosts," in common superstition are the souls of

4. *Op. cit.*, p. 317, note 1.

5. This is the Pārijāta tree, identified with the Coral tree, and said to be Indra's particular property. I do not know why it should be rooted in the Asura world, which is elsewhere said to have a wishing-tree of its own. Cf. W. Kirfel, *Die Kosmographie der Inder* (Leipzig, 1920, p. 198). The connection between the two myths may be the Jātaka story, I, no. 31, where it is told how Indra makes the Asuras drunk and throws them, senseless from intoxication, down into the Asura world. There they find a tree exactly like Indra's, the "pied trumpet-tree"; yet from its flowers they see that it is not the Pārijāta tree, and that, therefore, they are no longer in Heaven. For this reason they fight the gods. Kirfel (*op. cit.*, p. 196) mentions also a heavenly tree of knowledge in Buddhist mythology, which by its blossoming, fading, etc., informs the gods of the major incidents in a Buddha's life.

dead men who have not yet entered a new existence and have to be fed and appeased by the living. As "destiny" they represent the existence of those punished for minor crimes, especially gluttony, where the punishment is made exactly to fit the crime, inasmuch as they are tortured by continual hunger and thirst.

Of hells there are eight hot ones affirmed by all Buddhists, surrounded by at least four, and at most sixteen, smaller hells, while only the North knows of eight more cold hells.[6] The names of the latter are known to the Southern Buddhists also, meaning there, however, numerical expressions for the stay in Avīci, the worst of the hot hells. M. Feer, by comparing Chinese, Tibetan and Indian sources, comes to the conclusion that everywhere the hells increase as to intensity of pain and to duration of punishment and crime to be punished, but that nowhere is this increase agreed upon uniformly. Even in the same texts, identical crimes often are punished in different hells.

We give here a comparative list of criminals to be punished in the different hells, according to the Indian (*Pañcagati*) and Tibetan (*Kandjour*) sources collected by Feer.[7]

Hot Hells	*Criminals (Indian)*	*Criminals (Tibetan)*
1) Sañjīva	violent persons, murderers	murderers
2) Kālasūtra	liars, bad sons and friends	liars
3) Sañghāta	killers of animals	killers of animals
4) Raurava	tyrants	thieves
5) Mahā-Raurava	embezzlers	adulterers
6) Tapana	incendiaries of forests	drunkards
7) Pratāpana	opponents of the Law, nihilists, oppressors	opponents of the Law, etc.
8) Avīci	offenders against their superiors (parents, teachers, etc.)	offenders against their superiors[8]

6. Cf. on this and the following Leon Feer, "L'Enfer indien," *Journal Asiatique*, 1892 (20), pp. 185 f., and Kirfel, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

7. *Op. cit.*, p. 197.

8. M. Feer emphasizes that only the Tibetans appoint five hells for the punishment of "ordinary" crimes,—murder, theft, lying, adultery, drunkenness, while they reserve the other three (3, 7, and 8) for "extra-ordinary" crimes. With regard to the smaller hells there is the same confusion, it being not at all clear from the texts whether the crimes punished there are the same as or different from those of the great hells. The names for the cold hells of Northern Buddhism, Arbuda, etc., express the 8th-17th powers of 10,000,000, and originally meant—and still mean in Southern Buddhism—the numerical expression for the length of stay in Avīci (cf. Kirfel, *loc. cit.*). They differ only in the degree of coldness, and do not inflict special punishments.

The stay in each of the hells is limited, bearing a certain proportion to the stay in heaven. The god presiding over the hells in the Tibetan pictures seems to be, judging him by his attributes, the same as the monster which holds the wheel in its claws. This monster, according to the Indian sources, is the demon "Impermanence" (*anityatā*), usually identified with Māra, and bears in the Tibetan picture attributes well-known from Śiva: wreath of skulls, black color, tiger skin, third eye on the forehead.

The outer rim of the "Wheel of Life" depicts in a series of causally connected stages the "dependent origination" (*pratītya-samutpāda*) of suffering. Its traditional formula in twelve stages runs: "Dependent on ignorance are the Saṁskāras, dependent on the Saṁskāras consciousness, dependent on consciousness are name-and-form, dependent on name-and-form the sphere of the six (i.e., senses), dependent on the sphere of the six contact, dependent on contact sensation, dependent on sensation craving, dependent on craving grasping, dependent on grasping becoming, dependent on becoming birth, dependent on birth old age, death, grief, lamentation, physical and mental pain, afflictions; that is the origin of this whole great bulk of pain."

Probably meant by Buddha himself only as a practical illustration of the second noble truth, the origin of suffering, a logical explanation of the Pratītya-Samutpāda has always been a sore puzzle to Oriental as well as Occidental philosophers. Moreover, the wheel with twelve spokes representing "dependent origination" is but a late compilation of something which originally seems to have been conceived as a series rather than an uninterrupted chain, with not twelve, but various numbers of "causes" or *nidānas*. There even exists a text which lets each of the links be caused directly by "ignorance" and end in "old age and death."[9] The numerous problems connected with the Pratītya-Samutpāda and the origin of its terms do not concern us here. But in order to show the wide divergence between its philosophical conception and that expressed in the depictions, we shall give some examples of scholastic interpretation in Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna, and Tāntric systems, based on original translations from the collection of texts by Louis de La Vallée Poussin.[10]

9. *Suttanipāta*, verse 724.

10. *Bouddhisme: Études et matcriaux. Théorie des douze causes* (Ghent, 1913). For a detailed discussion of the whole problem connected with the Pratītya-Samutpāda

According to our texts, the single links of "dependent origination" are defined as follows:[11]

(1) *Ignorance* (*avidyā*) is the "non-recognition of (Buddhist) truth," the "notion of unity, conglomeration, eternal, permanent, non-perishable, joyful, a 'Self,' . . . an individual, an 'I,' a 'Mine,' with regard to these six elements" constituting our individuality (*ŚS*). It is the "state of infection in a former birth" (*AK*), which, together with the Saṃskāras, the activation of these infections, is the inheritance of the present existence.

(2) The *Saṃskāras*, a term for which an adequate translation has not yet been found. A literal translation would be "confections"; but that does not express the idea that the *Saṃskāras* are that which *conficit* as well as that which is *confectus*. In the latter meaning, and taken in the widest sense, the *Saṃskāras* are that which is formed or fashioned by the mind, i.e., the whole world of phenomena according to Buddhist ideas. But they are also that which forms, or shapes, body, speech, and mind, for example: *Saṃskāras* of the body being inhalation

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and its single links, see the same book, and likewise Paul Oltramare, *La Formule bouddhique des douze causes* (Geneva, 1909) who also gives an account of the various interpretations by Western scholars. The newest discussions on the subject will be found in Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine* (London, 1932), p. 238, and in Edward J. Thomas, *History of Buddhist Thought* (London, 1933), p. 58. The texts here used are: (1) the *Śālistamba-Sūtra*, the Sanskrit text of which has been re-established by de La Vallée Poussin by quotations in Indian authors and by its Tibetan version (it is a Mahāyāna Sūtra only superficially, being in fact a compendium of ancient as well as of modern scholasticism); (2) *Abhidharmakośa* (III, 20-24) with commentary, a passage of Vasubandhu's important work of about the fourth century A.D., which has been translated from the Tibetan by de La Vallée Poussin (Paris, 1925) (though belonging to the Sarvāstivāda School, it is an authority for Mahāyānists as well); a résumé of the two former texts is given in (3) *the Suklavidarśaṇā;* (4) the sixth chapter of the *Daśabhūmika-Sūtra*, a real Mahāyāna-Sūtra which describes the ten "stages" (*bhūmi*) through which a Bodhisattva passes on the way to Buddhahood. The whole Sūtra is discussed by Har Dayal (*op. cit.*, pp. 283 f.). The sixth chapter describes the sixth stage in which the Bodhisattva examines "dependent origination." Tāntric views are represented by (6) an extract of the sixteenth chapter of the *Caṇḍamahāroṣaṇa-Tantra*, discussed by de La Vallée Poussin in "Deux Notes sur le Pratītya-Samutpāda," Fourteenth International Congress of Orientalists 1905, Acts 1, paragraph 1, pp. 193 ff.

11. List of abbreviations:

T D C	Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Théorie des douze causes.*
Ś S	*Śālistamba-Sūtra*
A K	Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*
Ś V	Śuklavidarśaṇā
D S	Daśabhūmika-Sūtra
C T	Caṇḍamahāroṣaṇa-Tantra

and exhalation, of speech, reflection and deliberation, of the mind, lust, anger and stupidity (*CT*). Enumerated as good, bad and indifferent *Saṃskāras*, their meaning comes close to that of moral action; Warren accordingly, like the Tibetan translators, substitutes *karman* for *saṃskāras* as links of the twelvefold chain.[12] Scholasticism usually understands them as "actions in a former life" (*AK, ŚV*) and says that they are called "*Saṃskāras*" because they "fashion" re-birth (*abhi-saṃskārāt*). The *Saṃskāras* appear a second time in the chain among the immaterial "aggregates" constituting individual existence and there may be understood as the faculty of impression (cf. in German "Einbildung"). Their double meaning of forming and being formed is very well expressed by the image of the potter shaping pots, which, perhaps, even implies the idea of the fragility of created things.

(3) *Consciousness* (*vijñāna*) is that "principe vital et spirituel"[13] which descends into the mother's womb and there causes, and later affects, the destiny of (4) "*name-and-form*" (*nāma-rūpa*), or body and soul, the intellectual and physical organism. This process is explained as follows: "At the union of father and mother, proper time (*ṛtu*) and other conditions concurring, the consciousness-germ bound to enjoyment, here and there descending into a birthplace, causes the name-and-form-shoot to be born in the mother's womb . . ." (*ŚS*). Consciousness is the "five aggregates (*skandha*) at the moment of conception" (*AK*), the "aggregates" being the individual or name-and-form composed of material and immaterial skandhas. Four aggregates make up the immaterial part, namely sensation (*vedanā*), perception (*saṃjñā*), *Saṃskāras*, and consciousness. The material part is said to be formed by the elements. Consciousness is, however, nothing permanent, but, "like a monkey roaming in the forest or in the woods grasps a branch, leaves it, and grasps another, thus that which is called thought (*citta*), or mind (*manas*), or consciousness (*vijñāna*), by day and by night appears as a different one, disappears as a different one."[14] It is furthermore defined as "information as to an object" (*ŚS*), and

12. H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1896), and *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 1893, p. xxvii. Cf. also *Dictionary of the Pali Text Society*, s.v. *sankhāra*, and the exhaustive discussion of the *Saṃskāras* in R. Otto Franke's *Dīghanikāya* (Göttingen, 1913), pp. 307 f.

13. *TDC* p. 13.

14. *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, II, p. 95; cf. consciousness represented by a monkey in the depictions.

by the Mahāyānists as the "thought which together with passion arises in a thing" (*DS*).

(5) The *Sphere of the Six* (*ṣaḍāyatana*) are the six sense-organs, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and the mind whose objects are ideas.

(6) *Contact* (*sparśa*) arises when the sense-organs meet with their objects. This process with regard to the eye is explained as follows: "Depending on the eye and in consequence of visible object, light, space and appropriate attention, eye-consciousness arises. . . . The meeting of the three (i.e., eye, visible object and eye-consciousness) is 'contact' " (*ŚS*).

(7) *Sensation* (vedanā) is explained as the "experiencing of contact" (*ŚS*), or "the state (in the growing child) of feeling pleasure, pain, etc., before there is desire for sexual intercourse" (*AK*). Its meaning sometimes comes close to that of "feeling."

(8) *Craving* (*tṛṣṇā*), literally "thirst," is the "perseverance of" (*ŚS*) or the "attachment to" (*DS*) sensation, the "state of active desire for pleasurable objects and sexual intercourse" (*AK*). It is followed by:

(9) *Grasping* (*upādāna*), "abundance of craving" (*ŚS*), the state of "running after the objects" (of craving, *AK*).

(10) "*Becoming*," or "existence" (*bhava*), at this place in the chain presents a difficulty which scholasticism overcame by explaining it as *karma-bhava*, "act-existence," the "act (*karman*) resulting from grasping (understood as intense desire) and leading to re-birth" (*ŚS*).

(11) "*Birth*" (*jāti*), accordingly, was understood as re-birth in another life. It is birth proper, the "emerging (or coming into existence) of the five *Skandhas*" (*ŚS*).

The following links from "old age" to "afflictions" are mostly given in full, though some of the texts have "old age and death" only. They are defined as follows: *old age* (*jarā*) is ripeness of the "aggregates" (*skandha*); "*death*" (*maraṇa*), their destruction. "*Grief*" (*śoka*) is inner burning of the foolish and intensely attached dying person; "*lamentation*" (*parideva*) is wailing springing from grief; (physical) *pain* (*duḥkha*) is disagreeable experience in connection with the five (material) senses; *mental pain* (*daurmanasya*), that in connection with the mind (the immaterial sense); the "*afflictions*" (*upayāsa*) are either "other miseries of the same kind" (*ŚS*) or "the abundance of physical and mental pain" (*DS*).

These "links of existence" (*bhavāṇga*), scholasticism distributes over three "phases" (*vartman*) which, as it were, hold the chain together. Birth, old age, death, and other sufferings are the "ripening" (*vipāka*) of an "act" (*karman*), which, in its turn, is caused by "infections" (*kleśa*). The "infections" in the *Pratītya-Samutpāda* are ignorance (1), craving (8), and grasping (9); they cause an "act" which, although not stated literally in the chain, is easily found in *Saṃskāras* (2), and *Becoming* (10); all the rest is the "ripening" of this act and at the same time a "base" (*vastu*) for new infections.

A further distinction was made as to the time covered by the *Pratītya-Samutpāda:* ignorance (1) and *Saṃskāras* (2) refer to the past; from consciousness (3) to becoming (10) to the present; birth (11) and old-age-and-death (12) to the future. We thus get the following distribution:

Past	infections:	ignorance (1)
	act:	*Saṃskāras* (2)
Present	ripenings:	consciousness (3), name-and-form (4), six senses (5), sensation (6), contact (7)
	infections:	craving (8) and grasping (9)
	act:	becoming (10)
Future	ripenings:	birth (11), old age and death (12); at the same time "base" for new "ignorance."

This structure of the "wheel of life," with three revolutions in the past, present, and future, through three phases described in twelve spokes or mutually dependent "causes" (*nidānas*), was generally adopted by Buddhist scholastics and modified only according to the school of thought they represent. Thus the *ŚS* transfers "dependent origination" from the individual to general evolution, illustrating the latter or "external *Pratītya-Samutpāda*" by the origin of the shoot from the germ, the stem from the shoot, etc. Besides on engendering causes (*hetu*) expressed by the successive links of the chain, it makes external as well as internal "dependent origination" dependent also on the concurring of auxiliary causes (*pratyaya*) which it finds in the six elements earth, water, fire, wind, space (or ether), and season (or consciousness in the case of the internal *Pratītya-Samutpāda*).

The *DS*, in accordance with Mahāyānist views, regards all material or "compound" (*saṃskṛta*) things as unreal, of the nature of an il-

lusion, produced by thought alone. "Dependent origination" shows but the development and infection of the original thought (*citta* = *vijñāna*) in a "thing-compound." It therefore says: "Thought only is this threefold world; these twelve links of existence which have been distinguished and proclaimed by the Tathāgata, they are all dependent on thought alone. How is that? The thought which together with passion arises in (or with regard to) a thing, that is 'consciousness'; delusion in (or with regard to) this thing (which actually is a) compound (*vastu-saṃskāra*) is 'ignorance'; born together with thought and ignorance is 'name-and-form.' "

The *CT* has its own explanation of the *Pratītya-Samutpāda*, and one which agrees more closely with its depictions than the usual scholastic theories. It is based on old popular notions, Hindu as well as Buddhist, of an "intermediate state" (*antarābhava*) between death and a new existence, in which the soul, in a semi-corporeal state and called *Gandharva* or simply "being" (*sattva*) looks for a new birth-place.[15]

According to the *CT*, this "being of the intermediate state" is made up of ignorance, the *Saṃskāras*, consciousness, name-and-form, and the six senses. While looking upon the world it sees a woman and man in love. Then, "urged by the actions done in a former existence and seeing in love a man and a woman of that existence (human, animal, etc.) into which he is to be born, 'contact' with them arises in him. And when he is to become a man, he sees himself in the shape of the man and becomes highly enamoured of his future mother, but full of hatred against his future father. This love and hatred are the two 'feelings' (*vedanā*) of pleasure and pain"; his bewildered state while seeing them corresponds to the neutral "feeling." Then, "driven by the winds of his former actions" and "craving" for his future mother, he "enters . . . by way of his future father's head, occupies his thought sitting in the semen . . . and 'grasps' the instrument of pleasure." Then conception takes place, here understood by *bhava*. After passing through the different embryonic states, there is "birth" of this new individual,

15. Cf. Ernst Windisch, *Buddha's Geburt* (Leipzig, 1908). The Gandharva is mentioned in medical textbooks as one of the three factors of conception: union of father and mother, proper time of the mother, descent of a Gandharva. It enters directly into the mother's womb according to Buddhist theories, or by way of the father's semen according to the Upanishads, which latter corresponds to the Tāntric theories quoted below. In Buddhist philosophical analysis, this *Gandharva* is made to correspond to "consciousness" which alone transmigrates when a man dies.

followed in due time by "old age and death." If the being of the intermediate state is to become a woman, it loves its future father and hates its future mother, enters directly into the mother, and is finally born.

This explanation of the *Pratītya-Samutpāda*, making use of popular speculations on the fate of the soul after death and on conception, brings us back to the popular, rather than scholastic, depictions of the twelve "causes" of suffering. Here we find a striking correspondence to Tāntric theories in the symbols used for "contact" (lovers embracing), and especially "becoming" (conception), which latter is referred by the Tibetans, however, to the conception of a child by the individual whose life-history is being outlined in the "wheel of life."[16]

Of the other symbols of which I shall give a comparative list below, "ignorance," as expressed by blindness, or, in its active sense, by a demon, is obvious. The potter's wheel without the potter for "*Saṃskāras*" corresponds better to Buddhist ideology, which rejects the idea of a personal agent. The often-used simile for "consciousness" as a monkey I have given above. The two men in the boat for "name-and-form" are the individual split up into material and immaterial qualities crossing the ocean of life. The house representing the six senses, or the "sphere of the six" (*ṣaḍāyatana*), probably refers to the literal meaning of *āyatana*, "abode." "Sensation" here, as well as in the quotations from the *CT* above, and sometimes also in other scholastic works, has been conceived rather like "feeling." "Craving" is represented in its literal meaning, "thirst." "Grasping" depicts the clinging to objects and persons. "Becoming," as represented by the great god Fan (Braḥmā) obviously refers to the god's function as creator of world and man. It is surprising, however, to find a god figuring in a Buddhist conception of existence, and it may be due to Chinese influence. The remaining symbols are clear.

A word remains to be said on the full list of eighteen "causes" given in the Chinese canon of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-School* which, according to Przyluski, is represented at Ajanta.[17] Waddell, when he discovered the "wheel of life" in the fragments at Ajanta, had difficulties in explaining the divergence between ignorance being represented by "a

16. Cf. Waddell, *Buddhism in Tibet*, p. 117.

17. *Loc. cit.*, with a translation of the Chinese text in question. Cf. also Waddell, *Buddhism in Tibet*, p. 113.

blind she-camel led by a driver" at Ajanta, and by a blind woman in Tibetan representations. He supposed it to be due to a misunderstanding by the Tibetan Lamas of the Indian word for "camel." If, however, as Przyluski believes, a fuller list of eighteen links is represented at Ajanta, then the camel does not represent the first link, "ignorance," at all, but, in accordance with the Chinese list, "mental pain" as the last link in the chain. "Mental pain" (*daurmanasya*) symbolised by "a man and a woman drawing a hard-to-be-tamed camel" might then be explained by the literal meaning of the word *dur-manas*, "having a bad (or unhappy) mind."

The "wheel of life" in India, though we have found so far only one depiction of it at Ajanta, has, nevertheless, largely occupied Buddhist minds. Closely connected as it was felt to be with Buddhist ideas on causation and the workings of Karma, its explanation has been a difficult and much attempted problem to Oriental as well as Occidental scholars. The difficulties of "dependent origination" are said to have been recognized already by Buddha himself, for when Ānanda told him that it was very clear to him, he reproved him with the words: "Profound, oh Ānanda, is 'dependent origination,' and very profound of appearance."

Nidāna	SYMBOLS		
	Tibetan Waddell	Ajanta Przyluski	Chinese *(Mulasarvāstivādins)*
1. Ignorance *(avidyā)*	Blind woman or man with a stick, alone or led by another.	———	Demon (rakṣas).
2. *Saṃskāras*	Wheel and pots, with or without potter.	Potter making pots on a wheel.	Potter's wheel.
3. Consciousness *(vijñāna)*	Monkey roaming in a tree.	Monkey.	Monkey.
4. Name-and-Form *(nāmarūpa)*	Boat crossing water with or without persons in it.	Persons in boat.	Man going into a boat.
5. Six Senses *(Ṣaḍāyatana)*	House with man; house with six windows.	Human face (Przyluski); mask (Waddell).	Picture of the six sense-organs.
6. Contact *(Sparśa)*	Woman with child; lovers embracing.*	———	Man and woman embracing.
7. Sensation *(vedanā)*	Man with arrow in his eye.*	———	Man and woman showing pleasure and pain.
8. Craving *(tṛṣṇā)*	Man receiving a jewel (?); man drinking.	———	Man drinking.*
9. Grasping *(upadāna)*	Man picking fruit or flowers.	———	Woman embracing her children.*
10. Becoming *(bhava)*	Lovers embracing; pragnant woman.	———	Picture of the great god Fan (Braḥmā).
11. Birth *(jāti)*	Woman giving birth.	———	Woman giving birth.
12. Old age and death *(jarāmaraṇa)*	Corpse on a stretcher.		
	12. Old age	———	Old man and woman.
	13. Sickness	———	Sick man and woman.
	14. Death	———	Corpse on a stretcher.
	15. Grief	Person begging on his knees.	Man and woman grieving.
	16. Lamentation	Man beating another.*	Man and woman lamenting.
	17. Physical pain	Person bowed down by grief.*	Man and woman unhappy.
	18. Mental pain	Man and woman drawing a camel.	Man and woman drawing a hard-to-be-tamed camel.
	* often reversed	* apparently reversed	* reserved

MYSTICISM AND EXPERIMENTALISM

By Ruth Farran

During the progress of the centuries two theories or hypotheses have been developed side by side in explanation of the operations of the universe. Philosophically, these two doctrines are known as mechanism and vitalism. Under the mechanistic concept it is held that all phenomena are subject to specific laws, and that through the proper scientific procedures, these laws may be determined and arranged in tabular form. In agreement with this hypothesis, any particular phenomenon is the result of definite relationships among the various parts constituting the totality of events which enter into its manifestation. Under the mechanistic principle a single system of events is held sufficient to explain the activities of the entire cosmos. Conversely, the basis of the vitalistic theory lies in the concept of duality. While it is conceded that events operate in conformity with universal laws, the laws themselves, it is argued, are under the control of a force external to the events; and the manner in which the manifestation of phenomena takes place is determined by this external agency. According to this doctrine the directive factor (*soul* or *mind* force), is the ultimate reality; the phenomenal world of events taking shape only upon the necessity of the soul to manifest in tangible form.

In psychology the mechanistic principle is best exemplified by the *reaction* hypothesis. Under the concepts of the reactionists mind is held to be the *product* of the activities that occur within the living organism. Opposing this theory is the vitalistic contention that mind *determines* the operations of the organism. Methods of demonstration of the latter theory proving inconclusive, the psychologists resolved to set aside the claims of the vitalists until such time as sufficient data could be obtained under experimental control to evaluate the accumulated facts. While in theory this procedure is thoroughly scientific, in practice the task is discovered to be encompassed with unexpected difficulties. During the past century the major conditioning factor has been that of the mechanistic interpretation, and as a result the greater portion of scientific data has been organized around this concept. Consequently, when challenged by a series of investigations where the

mechanistic principle does not seem to be readily applicable, the psychologists appear unable to reach beyond their initial bias in seeking explanations of the phenomena encountered.

Through rigidly controlled experiments, carried on during a period of seven years by Professor J. B. Rhine and his colleagues at Duke University, it is held by the investigators that the data indicate there are certain individuals who possess the ability of extra-sensory perception; or more specifically, the powers of thought transference and clairvoyance. Historically, the concept of these abilities carries the stigma of the principle of vitalism. To complicate the problem, the Duke experiments signify that the methods asserted to prove the correctness of the mechanistic interpretation may be used just as effectively in demonstrating the presence of a knowledge within the mind of the percipient, unmediated by any known sense organ. Already, the findings are being hailed as substantiating the vitalistic claim that the organism can respond to stimuli of an immaterial (soul) character projected from without. The experimenters themselves are withholding their conclusions until more data have accumulated.

In consternation at the unexpectedness of the attack, the reactionists at first sought refuge in refutation of the applicability of the techniques to the problem; but the soundness of the statistical basis of the procedures was found difficult to refute. With voluminous amounts of data at their command the investigators are finding that, through the exclusion of the philosophical concept of vitalism from psychology, they are inadequately equipped properly to evaluate the evidence submitted in connection with phenomena of an extra-sensory character. The effect has been largely a retreat into an exasperated silence. Fortunately, however, upon having the nature of the problem brought forcibly to their attention, here and there pioneer minds are attempting to develop a more comprehensive viewpoint by which the question under debate may be examined more closely.

The problem under consideration appears to be of a *different order* of thinking than the type to which science is accustomed. Thus, it may prove of value to investigate another form of approach, which, in conjunction with science, may lead eventually to the resolution of the difficulty. I refer to the utilization of the principles of *mysticism.*

To many, the concepts of mysticism are considered synonymous with those of vitalism, with the result that often the more scientifically

trained do not investigate deeply enough to discover their mistake. The misconception is due largely to the fact that so much of the literature on mysticism, aside from that obtained from Oriental sources, deals with the religious mysticism of the Middle Ages. Naturally, medieval mysticism reflects the transcendental character of the period. More modern adherents to the theories of vitalism have seized upon this medieval literature in the endeavor to support their contentions, failing to discover, in their eagerness to prove their theories, that hidden under the nomenclature lies a deeper interpretation than is apparent upon a cursory perusal of the subject. Under the impression that they have found justification for their beliefs, persons with a vitalistic bias have hastened to place their mistaken conclusions before the world; with the result that, side by side with science, there have grown up a number of pseudo-mysticisms maintaining the vitalistic character of the universe.

Meanwhile, without ostentation, the more critically minded students of the principles of mysticism have continued their investigations into the true concepts of the subject. In the verification of mystical truths, experimentation is utilized as in science. In mysticism, direct participation in the experiment is introduced, and the investigator reaches his conclusions through the attempt to interpret his experiences. Philosophical concepts are admitted and weighed against the experience of the investigator. Often scientific experimentation is necessary to supply the evidence with which to verify the conclusions. If the verification is not forthcoming, the entire process must be repeated, many times if necessary, with a re-evaluation of the data. To say that through "mystical" experiences the student *knows intuitively* the solution of a problem is misleading. Through participation he is led to look into the problem more closely, upon which he may be able to obtain a solution more quickly than otherwise, because he recognizes better where to apply further investigation.

Actually, then, mysticism is not a doctrine, as many people imagine, but a *method*. But it is not hampered, as is scientific method, by a single mode of approach—that of analysis. Mysticism takes the analyses of science and throws them together into a single synthesis, and later proceeds to reassemble the elements into new configurations in the endeavor to discover more ultimate meanings of the whole. This synthesis and reorganization is not only attempted within single fields of

endeavor, as are the analyses of science, but several fields may be combined for the purpose of reorganizing the concepts more nearly to harmonize with reality. The goal of this process is the development of a synthesis of the entire universe to permit a greater coincidence of knowledge, from the point of view of the intellect in the outer world of sensation, with the intuitional responses of the inner world of experience.

Under the methods of mystical investigation, there may be as many interpretations of the universe as with science; in fact, the possibilities are increased immeasurably by the admission of the processes of synthesis and reorganization. For the individual in search of "certainty" the practice of mystical development, if correctly followed, offers no abiding peace. Perforce, upon gaining new levels of apprehension, the earlier patterns of thought must be reorganized to fit the level of the new attainment. To remain permanently at a specified level would indicate the inability of further growth or unfoldment. Thus, with the mystic, the ideas accepted as temporary truth today may be cast aside, or held in abeyance tomorrow, as the result of a new and more penetrating insight. This does not mean necessarily that the mystic is inconsistent. The old is not cast aside until the new has been tested; but, on the same count, the old is not retained merely because through its familiarity the student feels more *comfortable*. Through constant adaptation to new viewpoints the mystic derives as much "comfort" at one level as at any other.

Perhaps an outstanding difficulty with students of mysticism has been the failure to state their conclusions in scientific terms. Too often the student fails to recognize the "scrambled" effect upon the data necessitated under the method of synthesis, with the result that his expressions but inadequately denote the meaning he wishes to convey. The effect leads to confusion on the part of the reader, and the suspicion, all too often substantiated, that the writer lacks the ability to grasp fully the significance of the subject under discussion. This inability of expression results from a very common experience with those who practice the principles which lead to mystical development. In mysticism, as in science, the investigator is subject to original biases. Through mystical training it is expected that these biases will gradually be eliminated by the constant reorganization of the elements which enter into the thinking processes. In developmental mysticism, certain prac-

tices or exercises are utilized to produce more rapid changes in the nervous system than under ordinary circumstances. Further explanation will be given later of this phase of mysticism. It is sufficient now to indicate that it is through these exercises that the organism becomes more flexible, permitting a more rapid reorganization of thought patterns than otherwise would be possible.

During the early periods of mystical development, before the student has become accustomed to this increase in tempo within his nervous system, the ability of close analysis is largely in abeyance. The situation is somewhat analogous to that of the radio when the attempt is made to shift from one station to another. Between the two stations lies a "no-man's land," where the wave-lengths do not belong clearly to one station or the other. While passing through this phase, the radio listener recognizes that the sounds reaching his ears are *distortions*, which result from the unequal blending of the two series of wave-lengths as they are being transmitted simultaneously. No surprise is experienced at this condition; the listener merely continues to dial until he succeeds in "tuning out" the disturbing wave-lengths.

In the practice of mysticism, with individuals who have had previous scientific training, the distortion through which the nervous system passes is recognized as such, and time is given for the processes of readjustment. The test of the control of the nervous system is the degree to which analytical thinking may be resumed. Through the processes of reorganization biases are removed, and the student emerges equipped with the ability to regard pertinent data *impersonally*, without respect to the source. Material may come from the same field as that in which the investigation is being carried on, or from different fields; all is grist for the mill of the awakened mystic. In the review of the subject matter the criterion of acceptability is determined by the degree of "best fits" among the parts which enter into the reamalgamated data. Deductively, through the utilization of the best fits, an hypothesis is developed, which is now ready to be tested according to accredited scientific methods of experimentation. From this step on, the procedure is identical with that of science.

Where the student is possessed of scientific training, it is to be expected that the conclusions reached through mystical methods will be as thoroughly scientific as those of the scientific investigator. Indeed, through the advantage of a wider area of observation, the judgments

of the mystic should be more scientific than those of the investigator whose training is limited to that of the scientific alone. Thus, at its best, mysticism may well become the epitome of the scientific method.

Until recently, there has been a serious drawback to the idyllic picture I have painted. As a result of the highly symbolic and allegorical character of the writings of the earlier mystics, persons with a strong bias toward the vitalistic interpretation of reality have been the type usually drawn to the investigation of the concepts. Through participation in the exercises for the readjustment of the nervous system, the loss of analytic ability is met by such persons, just as described in the case of the more scientifically minded. But there is this difference: the study has been entered upon for the purpose of proving a bias. Unacquainted with the analytical methods of science, the individual is unable adequately to determine the fallacies in his reasoning. The material, therefore, is distorted to coincide with the original bias.

This unfortunate distortion is further enhanced by the individual's inordinate preoccupation, as a rule, with the "phenomenal" activities aroused through the practices alluded to above to bring about a change in the nerve currents of the body. Reference was made to the effect of the shift from one wave-length to another in the change of stations on the radio. Upon reaching the "half-way" point, where distortions are rife, the seeker of "wonders" in mysticism is tempted to remain lodged at this juncture, without the attempt or desire to continue the processes of nervous readjustment until he has passed into the new wave-length where events again become rationalized. Through a slight maladjustment of the sensory apparatus, the individual perceives a greater variety of sensory material than under normal conditions: his senses having become hypersensitive, he "sees" and "hears" more than formerly. Instead of following the example of his more analytical scientific brother and attempting to discover the relationship of these events to the natural order of phenomena, the experiences are accepted a priori as proof of the existence of a supernatural order of events, above and disconnected from the activities of the natural world. Not content with mere personal observations of the distortions thus produced, the unscientifically trained students of mysticism upon numerous occasions have proceeded to develop their conclusions into systems of thought. The result often has been a caricature of the true principles involved. Until very recently, scientifically trained investiga-

tors have refused to enter upon experimental determination of the significance of the phenomena encountered, because of the absurd nature of the assumptions of untrained investigators.

The attempt to evaluate scientifically the possibility of so-called extra-sensory phenomena constitutes the opening wedge in the investigation of supernormal phenomena. Even now, however, it is with great unwillingness that science is entering upon this phase of experimentation. The stigma of "unscientific" has clung too persistently about activities of an extra-sensory type for the doors readily to be thrown open to investigations along this line. But, in spite of continued denials of the significance of the alleged event, statistical evidence as to the increasing indications of its presence is steadily piling up, making it daily more necessary to enter upon a concerted investigation to determine the true explanation of the response. Silence on the part of the mechanists may not be maintained much longer, under the suspicion that, after all, they do not altogether trust their earlier assertion that all phenomena may be subsumed under one continuous order of events. The dilemma of the psychologists consists in the fact that, through the exclusion of the activities under consideration from scientific inquiry, no suitable methods have been developed by which to evaluate the phenomena thrust unexpectedly upon their attention.

From the nature of the extra-sensory response, it is to be doubted that through scientific investigation alone the explanation of the activity will be achieved. Through mystical training in the development of the nervous system it is held the phenomena in question may be observed directly. This would indicate that, if science becomes interested sufficiently in the interpretation of extra-sensory perception, scientifically trained individuals will proceed in increasing numbers upon training in the special methods of mysticism, in order to equip themselves with the tools by which more adequately to evaluate the response.

Modern experimental mysticism operates by methods as amenable to proof as those developed for the guidance of those who undertake scientific investigation. The main difference between the two procedures is that, in mysticism, "hypotheses" are formulated *after* the experiment instead of *before*. In scientific experimentation, it is necessary in most cases for the subject to be naïve toward the problem under investigation. The experiment itself, however, has been set up by an

investigator who wishes to discover the truth or falsity of certain preconceived hypotheses, the outcome of which the experimenter is in doubt. Under experimental mysticism, the experimenter and the subject are one and the same individual, and the attitude of mind is one of complete naïveté toward the response to be obtained. Here the experiments have been devised by individuals who earlier have been investigators of the principles they are now setting out to demonstrate, and who, through their training, have reached a level far enough in advance of the beginner to mark out a pathway by which the novice may most quickly and easily reach the level attained by the adept. No marked deviations from the responses obtained by the adepts are expected upon the part of the beginner, for the responses have been checked and rechecked in hundreds of cases to discover the direction of their trends according to the data. Thus, the aim of the investigation is not to "prove" anything to the individual who has reached the state of adepthood. Instead, the experiments are entered into by the student to discover for himself the effect upon his organism of the particular practices undertaken by way of investigation. By comparison of his responses after the practice with those before he entered upon the experiment, it is expected he will discover the extent to which changes have been effected in his nervous system.

The question well may be asked as to the necessity of the experimentation if the results are already known. The answer is very important from the standpoint of science as well as of mysticism. In accord with the tenets of mysticism, no one may become an adept until, through *participation* in the various exercises, he is enabled to prove to himself the nature of the forces under which the universe operates. This does not mean identical conclusions necessarily, as one might judge too hastily; but it means that the center of reference for the judgment of "truth" is transferred from an *outer* to an *inner* criterion—that of the self. Until the inner intuitions are confirmed by outer "proofs," however, the task of the mystic is incomplete. This is why scientific method plays such an important role in the development of mystical concepts, scientific results often necessitating complete changes in the interpretations of intuitional responses developed through the practices of experimental mysticism. Thus, through direct experience with reality, the proper sphere of mysticism is to discover problems worthy of scientific investigation; while the purpose of science, in turn, is to

serve as a check upon these same experiences. Under this view, each procedure necessitates the other for its evaluation and the justification of its existence.

A peculiarity of mysticism, however, is that through its practices, if persisted in long enough—and from the point of view of impartiality toward the outcome—the conclusions reached invariably will be proved justified when science reaches the point in its evolution where it may investigate the deductions of the adept. In this manner, true mysticism may be distinguished from the false. Thus, scientific investigation into the nature of the universe is now proving deductions reached much earlier by the mystic, the statements of which have often been misinterpreted through the necessity of the mystic to utilize the terminology of the times in which he lived. A reinvestigation of the writings of the mystics of the Middle Ages, and earlier times, with the dissociation of their statements from the elaborate symbolisms in which the concepts are expressed, will demonstrate a remarkable coincidence of views in regard to the nature of the universe between these early adepts and those of the mathematical physicists of the present day. Mysticism will profit greatly from the development of an adequate language in which to express itself; and to the extent that it is a true mysticism, it will adopt the nomenclature of modern science. In this way, the pronouncements of mysticism will be indistinguishable from those of science, except that its conclusions will continue to be reached through a different experimental process.

In the light of the above explanations regarding the nature of mysticism, it will be of interest to discover the manner in which the student who utilizes the methods of mysticism would proceed in the resolution of the difficulties encountered in the evaluation of the concepts of mechanism and of vitalism. As indicated earlier in the discussion, instead of placing the two theories side by side after the manner of inductive science, the first step would be to throw all the ideas entailed in both concepts together, producing one group of observed events in place of two. It is probable that this procedure would be objected to by science, on the ground that in the process the identities of the original concepts would be lost. This is the purpose of the procedure. So far, science has not demonstrated conclusively the applicability of the mechanistic hypothesis; otherwise, it would not be an hypothesis, but a *law*. The inability to establish the mechanistic prin-

ciple indicates that, somewhere along the line, the vitalistic view has points in its favor. Through the amalgamation of the ideas that enter into the two concepts their diversity disappears, temporarily, and leaves the way open for the reorganization of the entire group of ideas in accord with the method of *best fits.*

With the radio-active substances, such as radium, the spontaneous emission of energy particles is observed, and where the process continues for a sufficient length of time, radium becomes ordinary lead. Further investigation has led to the concept that perhaps all substances constantly are giving out energy in the form of vibrations or radiations. Through the use of perfected measuring instruments (and other methods) a range of vibrations which covers at least 70 octaves has been discovered. (The *octave* is a concept of the chemist, and is so named from the discovery that the 92 chemical elements possess corresponding characteristics in periods of seven, similar to the succeeding periods of seven fundamental tones in the musical scale.) The demonstration of the convertibility of matter into energy constitutes the proof sought by the physicists in their contention that the two phenomena actually belong to a single series of events. This indicates that, at the level of physical manifestation, a force *external* to the formulation of events is unnecessary. Under continued observation and experimentation, it remains to be shown whether an extraneous force is any more a requirement in the animate world of thought and idea than in the inanimate world of physics.

In the case of the living organism, sensory responses have been developed in correspondence with numerous vibratory rates possessed by energy. At the lowest level of frequencies is the sense of touch, which extends through the range of from 2 vibrations per second at the base of the series, to around 1,500 at the top. Directly above this, and overlapping at the lower end with that of touch, is found the series which comprises the auditory frequencies, and which ranges approximately from 30 to 30,000 vibrations per second. The range of frequencies immediately following this series consists of Hertzian electrical waves. There is uncertainty as to the ability of the organism to respond directly to this group. An indirect response is obtained at a frequency range of between approximately 10 million and 1 billion oscillations per second, which have been made available to the organism through the sense of audition by the mechanical appliance of

the radio. It is possible that, with further experimentation, a number of responses with apparently no localized sense organs, such as kinesthetic, or muscular sensations, and the sensations of pain, will be found to be comprehended within this range.

The next higher level at which awareness is present is that of the infra-red waves, with an approximate range of from 1 trillion to 400 trillion vibrations per second. This series is apprehended by the nervous system by what may be termed the temperature sense, the localization of which is also somewhat indefinite, but not to the extent as that of the kinesthetic sensations. Irregular areas, some of which report sensations of heat and some of cold, are found upon the surface of the skin. Above the infra-red range of oscillations, and merging into it at the lower end, is the chromatic scale of visible light, which extends from about 400 trillion to 800 trillion vibrations per second. The organism is aware of this series of frequencies through the sense of sight. As yet, there is insufficient experimentation to determine exactly the location of the gustatory and olfactory senses, but through the chemical nature of their activities it is apparent that they extend along the vibratory scale of responses into the range of ultra-violet light; or possibly into that of the X-ray. Ultra-violet emanations range approximately from 800 trillion to 6 quadrillion, and X-rays from 6 quadrillion to 30 quadrillion vibrations per second. Above the 30 quadrillion level is found the gamma ray of the atom; and beyond this, at a still more inconceivably short oscillation, is that of the cosmic ray. No known sensory organs have been developed to intercept frequencies at these high levels.

It is often claimed by individuals whose interest has been aroused by phenomena of a reputed telepathic character that knowledge from a distance may be apprehended by the organism without recourse to the usual senses. Sometimes the reception of such knowledge is held to be by a "sixth" sense, a sense *above* those known ordinarily. Under the table of vibrations just cited, this could be taken to mean that the sixth sense functions at the infinitely short-wave frequencies beyond the ultra-violet. On the other hand, through adherence to the vitalistic principle, the reception of these alleged impressions is held to be from a source *outside* and transcendent to that of the material universe.

Upon scrutiny, the logic of the vitalistic argument proves dubious. If the extraneous attribute postulated under the vitalistic concept dif-

fers from matter, the only other known factor in the universe is that of energy. From the nature of vibratory energy emanations of even a more rarefied nature than those of the cosmic ray eventually may be detected with the development of more delicate measuring devices. If the additional attribute is a mover of matter, regardless of how rarefied the force, it still should partake of the nature of energy. Under this condition, the postulated factor would remain a part of the single series of events which manifests sometimes as matter and sometimes as energy, and the supposition of *another* force would be superfluous. However, since the mystic wishes to be guided not by logic but by experience, the investigator does not proceed to eliminate the concept of an extraneous attribute, but holds the idea in suspension until such time as he may feel justified in making use of the concept in explanation of the phenomena observed.

If it is held that the stimulus in alleged telepathic communication originates in radiant energy of an exceedingly high vibratory rate, the hypothesis is in harmony with the mechanistic view of the nature of reality. Under this concept the major problem would be to discover the manner in which the frequencies are received by the nervous system. A difficulty in connection with the concept that the activity held accountable for extra-sensory perception is connected with the higher vibratory frequencies, is the apparent absence of a sensory apparatus through which the stimuli may be apprehended. It is contended, sometimes, that this response is perceived generally throughout the body without a specialized sensory organ for its reception. According to this view, the question arises whether the sixth sense, if it exists, may not be an extension of the undifferentiated senses already mentioned. The definite knowledge that the temperature sense, perhaps the best developed of these responses, is located at a level below that of light raises the proposition that the hypothetical sixth sense may be located at this lower level also, possibly in the Hertzian electrical gap, rather than at the apex of the vibratory series. This latter view is only a supposition in harmony with present thought—under mystical methods another explanation of the hypothecated sense emerges.

In the attempt to resolve the sensory difficulties encountered, the student of the principles of mysticism has the advantage over the scientifically trained investigator because, through mystical methods, he is enabled to obtain information of a character which possesses a

direct bearing upon the problem. I am referring to the ability of *participation*, available in this type of investigation. Through a simple method of forced breathing, the mystic has discovered it possible to lower the sensory threshold of the nervous system to produce a greater acuity of audition, vision, and other activities within the sensory field. The exact procedures which lead to the development of this experience are not attainable readily outside of mystical instruction. In the growth of mystical perception, a careful gradation of exercises is desirable to prevent a too sudden change of nerve currents in the body, with the consequent loss of control of the activities aroused. Through the opposite exercise of relaxation the investigator learns how to adjust his experiences, much as the radio listener manipulates the pointer on the dial, until he obtains the type of reception he desires. With the reception under control, it becomes a comparatively simple matter to scrutinize the effects under varying conditions.

From a descriptive standpoint, the comparison of the activities of the mystic to those of the radio listener is most apt. The veriest tyro in the use of the radio is unsatisfied until counter-frequencies have been tuned out, and the adjustment is such as to permit unhampered reception. With the scientific mystic, a similar attitude is maintained; except that in this case, instead of tuning out counter-frequencies, the aim is gradually to let in additional wave-lengths, and bring about a readjustment of the receptors (the sense organs) so that a clear reception will be maintained.

Under the procedure described, old habit patterns are broken up and replaced by new forms. By the methods of scientific mysticism, these processes may be observed, introspectively, the earlier distortions gradually disappearing as the patterns come more completely under the new control. It is essential that the investigator shall be trained to withhold his conclusions until the development of the new patterns of thought under which the judgments are to be made. Otherwise, the condition would be similar to that of the radio listener who should attempt to interpret the distorted reception from improper tuning as representative of *actuality*. While the elements are factual, and have been broadcast under proper conditions, the manner of the reception is defective, and without recognition of the true nature of the conditions, it would be expected that the interpretations would be faulty.

In the accentuation of responses to stimuli, perhaps the sense where changes are noted most readily is that of vision. At first, there is a progressive increase in the length of time the phenomenon of after-imagery remains. Eventually, an after-image may be obtained through *recall*, without an immediate stimulation to bring about the response. This activity is not confined to the image obtained by looking at a light, but gradually transfers to other objects which possess less degrees of brightness. A similar effect may be observed in the auditory response, the perseveration of sounds increasing until an auditory image may be called up in the absence of previous immediate stimulation.

Another experience is that of the enhancement of numerous bodily sensations, such as those of movement and of balance. It is generally held that these sensations are mediated by the labyrinth of the internal ear, which serves as the organ of equilibrium. Under mystical training, these activities may become so strong that motion may appear present, when objectively the organism remains stationary, somewhat after the manner of imagined motion following the rotation of the body. This would appear to be due to a readjustment of the equilibrium necessitated by the shifting of the nerve currents. A point of interest is that, with sufficient habituation, the sensations take on the character of mild electrical stimulation, such as that obtained by the use of electrical devices for the treatment of disease. This experience leads to the idea that perhaps the sensation of equilibrium is connected with at least some of the manifestations in the electrical gap between the sense of hearing and that of the awareness of heat—the range spoken of earlier as a possible level for the manifestations of the *sixth* sense.

With continued training, it is possible to obtain responses that are not mediated wholly by a single sense organ. For example, vision and audition may merge, so that certain tones are accompanied by certain colors; i.e., the association of middle C with red, D above middle C with orange, and so forth. This condition is known scientifically as a synesthesia, but the cause is unknown in scientific investigation. Occasionally, tastes and colors, or odors and colors, or odors and sounds may be associated in a similar manner.

Until within the past ten or fifteen years, the phenomena described above have been subsumed under abnormal psychology; and anyone unwary enough to admit hearing "voices" or seeing objects not physi-

cally present was considered to be suffering from *hallucinations*, with the implication that he should be isolated for observation and treatment. This attitude was due to the inability, under the scientific methods then available, to differentiate between activities which were actually abnormal, and those subject to the control of the individual. With better methods of scientific evaluation, this distinction now may be made readily. The result will be an increase in the investigation of phenomena at this level of experience by the utilization of scientific methods of control.

Under conditions of an increase in sensitivity, according to the reports of those who practice the methods of mysticism, it is as though around each sensory response there is a halo, or fringe, of activity, comparable to the fringe of activity between the stations in radio transmission. By the attempt to control these activities, a knowledge of the operation of the sensory apparatus is built up gradually by the investigator. Observation of these responses leads to the tentative conclusion that the sixth sense, in reality, is not another sense at all, but an extension of the senses already present. Through this extension, there appears to be a greater overlapping than originally felt between the senses as thy pass from one modality to another.

It is unfortunate, perhaps, that the term *extra*-sensory perception has been employed in the description of the phenomena under observation, with the connotation of an activity *above* the ordinary senses. The concept of a higher sense may result from the observation of the synesthesias, in which, as mentioned earlier, several responses appear to merge into activities occurring in correspondence with each other. This observation would lead to the conclusion that, under sufficient development, all the senses would merge into a unitary response. Specifically, the merging of the activities of the different sense organs, as described, would signify an increased mediation on the part of the brain. But, even under this condition, the activity scarcely could be termed a "higher" response, in the sense that it appears exclusively at the short-wave end of the frequency spectrum. This does not preclude the idea that, with mystical development, shorter waves would be utilized under certain conditions. The increase in ability to respond to a wider range of stimulation by any sense organ would result, theoretically, in an extension of this sense modality in both an upward and downward direction along the frequency range of activities. With

continued practice, it should be possible for the student to produce responses extending farther than under ordinary conditions in the direction of the short-wave end of the spectrum if desired.

Through experience in the development of the control of the enhanced sensory activities aroused by his mystical practices, it becomes evident to the investigator that the problem of the nature of the operative principle in the universe is stated inadequately. No necessity for an extraneous force to bring about the increase in the exchange of activities between the various sense modalities is apparent; a greater development of the functions already present would seem an adequate explanation of the observed responses. The discovery of vibratory rates beyond those of the chemical reactions indicates that physical activity does not stop, necessarily, at the ultra-violet level of response. Thus, the earlier question in regard to an intangible force from without, which activates the organism, changes into the search for the conditions under which an increase of the activities of the special sense modalities may be obtained, together with the manner in which the organism may be developed to respond to scientifically determined radiations beyond those comprised within the photo-chemical range.

With continued investigation, it becomes apparent that the postulation of a "soul" by the vitalists arose from the sense of need to protect the ego from annihilation at the loss of the body through death. The demonstration of the interchangeability of matter and energy, and the consequent determination of the inability to *destroy* either, has led to a change of emphasis in regard to the significance of the ego. Regardless of the fate of the individual body, the continuity of existence is observed to be carried on without a break through generation after generation of living organisms. Uninterrupted memory of these succeeding life experiences may or may not be demonstrable, but it is evident that *life,* as a characteristic, is continuing.

The discovery by the mystic that the power to control events attributed to an extraneous force may be developed by degrees within himself, changes the nature of the question still further. With an increase in the ability to direct the events that transpire within his own organism, the investigator determines to learn the extent to which this control may be developed, so that his nervous system will respond even more readily to his desires. In the observation of his growth in the ability to direct the sensory responses, the searcher discovers a still

wider activity. There are occasions in which it appears that the power of control reaches outside the environs of his body. It is as though his thoughts have been projected in some manner from his mind to those of others. Under certain conditions, there seems to be a similar ability of projection from other minds to his. As the result of his experiences, the final endeavor of the mystic becomes one in which he attempts to discover the manner by which sensory control may be brought about, and the degree to which this control may encompass activities which extend beyond his individual organism.

By the demonstration that the achievement of control is accomplished through the redirection of the energy within his nervous system, the searcher inclines more and more to the conclusion that the universal system under which his activities are subsumed is of a self-sustaining nature with *himself* at the apex—the upholder and co-ordinator of the powers within his grasp. But, so far, this is a mere deduction on the part of the mystic. His interpretation is based upon an individual experience alone. To substantiate his conclusions it will be necessary for the investigator to set up a series of scientific experiments in which his responses may be evaluated. If the nature of the perceptual activities is of a different order under the practices of mysticism than that ordinarily comprehended by science, experimentation must demonstrate the manner in which the order differs, and the processes involved in the transition from one type of response to the other. If, through an increase in the control of the heightened sensory activities induced by these practices, the power of direction extends beyond the environs of the organism experiencing such direction, this fact must be demonstrated experimentally, with a description of the means of accomplishment. Furthermore, in cases where the response occurs spontaneously, as apparent in many instances of extra-sensory perception, the reason for such deviation must be determined.

A dead-end has been reached by the psychologists in the attempt to explain the functions of the mind by scientific procedures alone. Experiments guided by the methods developed by the mystics indicate the manner in which the wider ranges of the mind may be comprehended. The readiness of the psychologists to apply the principles of scientific mysticism will disclose their earnestness in the desire to solve the problems with which they are confronted by the necessity to evaluate phenomena of an extra-sensory type. Through such investigation,

it may well be demonstrated that the controversial issue envisioned by the reactionists will prove to be a projection from their own emotionally surcharged minds, and in reality non-existent. By experimentation of a more penetrating nature than hitherto has been possible, the need for a force extraneous to the phenomenal activities of the universe may disappear. The ultimate fate of the controversy between the concepts of mechanism and vitalism lies in the willingness of the experimenters on both sides to put aside their preconceptions and advance boldly upon the investigation of the phenomena lying within the new frontiers of psychological research.

Der arische Männerbund. By Stig Wikander. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1938. Pp. xii + 111.

This monograph presents studies of certain words (beyond the range, solely, of the "science of linguistics") in the Indo-Iranian field, in an effort to clarify the meaning of certain sociological phenomena: —studies of *mērak* and *ziyānak*, of *marya* and *mairyō*, in particular, as they were used in the *Rig Veda* and in the *Avesta*, especially, and as they bear upon the role of the männerbund in Indo-Iranian religion and history. These studies have been prompted, says the author, by the inquiry of Otto Hoefler into religious secret orders among the Germans, and had for a more immediate occasion H. S. Nyberg's investigation of old Iranian religion, as in his *Die Religionen des alten Iran* (Leipzig, 1938). This "school," if it be such, presents what it judges to be a sounder method of understanding the Aryan era than has been offered by "the quaint muddling" of the linguistic and the historical, or even the "numinous." Wikander suggests that these methods, especially Otto's theory of the numinous, fail to explain Indra and Rudra, for example, and cannot properly account for the later disparity of the originally similar *asura* and *deva*.

Wikander assumes (p. 7) Nyberg's "trail-blazing" findings: Zoroaster not a great founder of religion, of interest in himself, but rather more of a tribal shaman, belonging to a primitive era of religious development, the conservative advocate of the cult of his own lineage (and perhaps the Vedic texts also might yield signs of shamanism); if the total Aryan period be examined,—shamanistic elements, the Ahura-cult of the Gatha-community, the role of Mithra, and all—a reconstruction would afford a pre-Zoroastrian status to Mithra, certain Yasts, etc.; and traces there are in the Avesta of other cult-forms seen emerging as hostile and dangerous powers on the periphery of the historical Avestan scene, forms at variance with the syncretism of Zoroaster. *Der arische Männerbund* is the most characteristic of these "other forms" which rest on their own peculiar religious and social base.

This early "man-pack," then, is Wikander's theme or objective, to him a "third" recognizable form of Avestan religion, undoubtedly "Aryan," the Vedic texts furnishing some evidence in accord with re-

liable Avestan data, and references existing to the location and time of this institution among ur-Aryan folk. (There is a suggestion in his work that he would present further Indic and Iranian materials in evidence of the "common elements" in "Indo-*Germanic*" culture). He appeals to lexical, anthropological and historical data, including comparative mythology. Among his "problems" are: *deva* as "god" in India and "devil" in Iran, *asura* as "god" first, then "devil" in India, and always "god"—and finally God—in Zoroastrianism; Rudra and the Maruts; the relation, if any, of Śiva to Rudra; etc.

Chapter I is devoted to the terms *Mērak* and *Ziyānak*, "fairly common words in Zoroastrian scripture of the middle-Iranian epoch," which seldom occur otherwise. They occur together for "man" and "woman" respectively. *Mērak* must be the old Iranian *maryaka*, but the etymology of *ziyānak* is uncertain. It often connotes the married woman, while *mērak* stands for husband; *ziyānak*, often a synonym for *zan*, indicative of adolescent, even erotic feelings. In any event they symbolize a peculiar social order. Chapter II is a discussion of *Marya* and *Mairyō*. He had disputed in Chapter I Bartholomae's etymology—*mērak* from Avestan *mairyō*. *Marya*, says Wikander, was already in decay in old Iranian. Translators have wavered between "man" and "stallion" as its meaning. But this misunderstanding of the Vedic texts disappears when it becomes known that, for example, the Maruts were *maryah* (plur.). The exact meaning of the Avestan *mairyō* is lost. Angra Mainyu, "evil mind," is called *mairyō*. *Mairyō* was, at least, on the way toward denoting beings hostile to the Mithra-cult, e.g., the Turanian Frangrasyan, enemy of Mazdaism. In Chapter III certain culture-conflicts are discussed in terms of Aryan vocabulary, groups of words descriptive of the active, energetic, boisterous movements of Indra, the Maruts and the Aśvins, a group of words which in some remarkable manner "got dislocated in the Iranian," and come to be applied, in fact, to a foreign cult. "In the Avesta, both Indra and the Maryas play the part of demons" (*devas*). Wikander cites many instances of transposed meanings, borrowings of words, etc., due, as he thinks, to circumstances of conflict of peoples and cultures. With a certain reliance upon Nyberg, he makes Zoroaster in the preservation of established cult-forms utilize old Aryan terms in his preaching. He remarks that, from the Gathas on, *daeva* was a term of reproach against heretics and enemies, but that the distinction between *ahura* and *daeva*

in the Avestan vocabulary came of "young Zoroastrian" theology. And he finds in the Gathas evidence of conflict between the "Zarathustrians" and the "Mithra-cult," whose members were known by the old Iranian designation of *kavi, karapan, usig*. He finds also Gathic polemic against the ecstatic *haoma*-cult attended by bloody rites.

On page 64 the author gets at his main point deduced from the previous word-studies, studies of words characteristic in the *Rig Veda* of Indra and the Maruts, but used in the Avesta with other connotations. Some cult lay back of these divergencies,—some cult of warriors with ancestor-worship and orgiastic rites and offerings, a cult of related peoples bound by such primitive ties as those of the *Männerbund!* Wikander insists on treating his facts and figures in their total proper setting, rather than as isolated linguistic phenomena. By such a method he gives consistency to the character of Rudra and reconciles Rudra and the Maruts—do not the Maruts "spring from Rudra," are they not "sons of bounteous Rudra"? The institution of the Aryan männerbund, our author says, belonged only to the period of Aryan social solidarity, before the separation of the Iranian and Indian stocks. In Chapter IV he takes up the problem in further detail, treating Rudra as God of the warrior band, a hunter like the ancient Wodan, and the Maruts, "born together," as constituting the männerbund (a secret society of initiates?). And he says somewhere that "the chief result of our investigation is that the various forms of the root *mario* (Avestan *mairyō*) are only to be understood from their basic Aryan meaning as technical terms for the companions of the männerbund" (p. 81). *Marya, mairyō, mērak*, are all traced back to such technical usage. And post-Zoroastrian materials are employed, including Parthian sources, in confirmation of the thesis of the männerbund, the conflicts it occasioned amongst different racial stocks, and the syncretism of Zoroaster who accepted the—to him—foreign *haoma*-cult and cult of Mithra, although in altered form (Zoroaster married into the new stock).

Chapter V discusses the *kavi* banner and the founding of Parthia, making *kavi*, which he deems "one of the most vital ingredients of Iranian tradition," a loan word applied in early Aryan times to the significance and spread of the männerbund. It becomes the title of the royal Arsacid line, and the symbol of a long effective national tradition whose nucleus was the Aryan männerbund with its ancestral, social and dynastic connotations. Thus the author attempts an explanation of

many previously puzzling items! The Feridun-saga is thus connected with ancient Avestan data, and even quotations from various classical sources which bear upon Iranian and Parthian events are given thereby a new significance. Through the männerbund he "achieves the historical background for the distortions of meaning" assigned by various interpreters heretofore—and by the same token, a reconciliation of inconsistencies in the Indo-Iranian movement. As an example of his summary on page 107, we may cite his claim to have traced the various meanings of *mērak* (*mairyō*) back from "young man," "lover," "proxy," to "member of the männerbund."

Time alone, along with further investigation, will test the thesis. Certainly here before us is patient and skilful research, whose results are challenging. The field, of course, is wide open, greatly in need of further attention, and yet peculiarly subject to surmise, psychological conjecture, ethnological explanation, comparative philologizing, and analogy. The Zoroastrian tradition is peculiarly complex and confused —beyond any uncertainties of the Vedic. And there are so many problems of authentic text and emendations. Of one thing we are sure, namely, that investigation in the history of religion must go far beyond the customary reliance upon merely comparative word-studies. The meanings themselves of words are often so varied and deceptive! Certainly their setting must be reckoned with, as in this interesting study, although the student may well guard against any extreme simplification of a naturally complex situation.

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Histoire de la philosophie, Fascicule Supplementaire: *La Philosophie en Orient*. By PAUL MASSON-OURSEL. Paris: Librarie Félix Alcan, 1938. Pp. xii + 188. Fr. 25.

Philosophy in the Orient—the very title suggests something intensely florid, with a strange fragrance, so different from classical, pragmatic, and other forms of philosophy which are nothing but stereotyped characterizations invented for convenience, rather than adequate scientific description. The use of the adjective Oriental as applied to philosophy does suggest a legitimization of our own, Western, endeavors, as being something quite apart, perhaps qualitatively different from the forms of thought in Eastern regions. Some go

further and question whether philosophy can bear the adjective Oriental at all. Hence, perhaps the rather cautious phrasing of the title at the head of the eloquent work of the well-known scholar M. Paul Masson-Oursel, Director of the École des Hautes Études.

It is gratifying, indeed, that the two-volume *History of Philosophy* by M. Émile Bréhier, Professor at the University of Paris, has been supplemented by this volume dealing with those systems left unconsidered there. The attempt to combine East and West in one comprehensive view of the development of thought is not new. It has been done before, though differently. The present treatment is quite typical of the leading authority in the field of comparative philosophy. Let it be said here that the whole matter of comparative philosophy with which M. Masson-Oursel has dealt in so many brilliant treatises, has really been another wedge into that recalcitrant isolationist attitude which seemed almost to petrify science less than a generation ago. The way had been prepared by comparative religion, and the allegiance, to be sure, is still in evidence. The present work exhibits in new perspectives the labors and travails of this period into which the author brought method and clarity by his *Philosophie comparée* (1923). His friendly warnings, also in this 1938 volume, of a *mauvais comparatisme*, will doubtless help those who might stray when lured by happy intuitions stimulated by the author himself. And thus, even though the fragrance we have spoken of, and which had been conjured up by many a more popular story of Oriental philosophy, has become a bit vapid in the scientific treatment, we find plenty of brilliant characterizations that make our ideas scintillate.

But it is not comparison that M. Masson-Oursel is concerned with in the main, in this new work. The treatise has been fitted much more neatly into the *cadre* of the larger *History*. As he says himself (p. 177): "The desire, on the one hand, to show that Western speculation has ever bathed itself in a circumambience of thought co-extensive with the entire globe, and that tearing it from this atmosphere invites the risk of misinterpretation, as well as the endeavor to bring the student and intelligent layman face to face with non-European systems of speculation which are nevertheless comparable to ours—these are the reasons why these pages have been written." Hence also the peculiar disposition and treatment of the material.

From Asia Minor, with its *olla-podrida* of Eurasian civilizations, M. Masson-Oursel proceeds to Egypt and Mesopotamia, and thence to Persia, India and China. Very characteristically he starts with the socio-political matrix of each culture complex to which belong integrally a mythology, a ritual, and a formalism through which, chiefly, it has made an impression on its environment. A good deal of the material being thus inescapably religious, there is danger of strengthening in his own persuasion a mind already skeptical about Oriental claims to philosophy. Yet, irrespective of whether the light of pure thought shines through or not within each and every culture depicted, it is indubitable that the peculiar quality of thinking-in-general has colored many a philosophy in its own rights. You simply have to admit with the author: "Philosophy has ever been relative to the civilizations, which in turn are relative to each other" (p. 181).

Thus, the thoughts of the countries, from Anatolia to China, and of those regions which are still in the throes of an escape from a "pre-logical" condition, have been built up in the erudite work of M. Masson-Oursel into a sort of *entourage* to European philosophy. One should not omit reading the fine and highly stimulating chapter towards the end: *"Il y a aussi le reste du monde!"* One's only regret will then be that it is so brief, and leaves us with vistas into unexplored regions. If we miss Islam in the *entourage*, we are referred to M. Bréhier's part of the *History*. Select bibliographies conclude every chapter of the book which, it seems to us, would make the philosopher more conscious of the origins of his art, and the student of religion of the inherent tendencies of all forms of worship and adjustment to the mysteries of the experienced universe.

It is one of those works which betray, in virtue of an inimitable condensation, the complete mastery of an exuberant and variform, but largely arrested growth of the human mind. With it, M. Masson-Oursel has once more put all those under obligation who wish to approach Oriental philosophy, as well as those who, with the reviewer, are desirous of procuring for it a deeper and more general appreciation, not as a phenomenon of the human mind, strange and forbidding, but somehow as a manifestation of a human destiny.

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Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese Culture. By DAISETSU TEITARO SUZUKI. Kyoto, Japan: The Eastern Buddhist Society, 1938. xii + 288 pp. 33 plates. ¥8.00.

Dr. Suzuki's new book is a sort of sequel to his earlier works on Zen. His *Essays on Zen Buddhism*, which came out in Series I, II, and III, are lucid expositions of this subtle and intricate mysticism of the East from both historical and philosophical points of view, and are already familiar to western students of Zen. These essays were followed by a number of interesting works on the same subject, among which *The Training of the Zen Buddhist Monk* and *A Manual of Zen Buddhism* deserve special mention. These latter works describe in concrete and practical form the actual course of the Zen monk's life from the day he becomes a novice to the dawn of enlightenment, with proficient use of source materials and biographical anecdotes of Zen masters. They help in the understanding of Zen, not as a mere system of religious doctrine to be inculcated, but rather as a certain peculiar series of disciplines to be gone through. Having thus prepared the way, Dr. Suzuki proceeds in this new book to the broader field of Japanese culture, and discusses Zen influence in its various manifestations.

A better man than Dr. Suzuki would be difficult to find in Japan for the discussion of this hazardous problem of Zen. Historically, Zen had its inception on Indian soil, attained the stature of an independent cult in China during the T'ang and the Sung dynasties, and blossomed out as the arbiter of the nation's culture in Japan during the Kamakura, Muromachi and early Yedo Periods. A purely Indian or Chinese scholar may have reason to be hesitant about discussing Zen in a conclusive manner, but Dr. Suzuki occupies a position from which he may speak with unqualified authority. Thoroughly versed in Sanskrit and Chinese lore, secular as well as ecclesiastic, and a veteran Zenist, of half a century's standing, he can take the entire evolution of Zen "in a stretch" and give interpretation to it both from the inside and the outside. That may explain in part why he is sometimes paternal in tone, apologetic in attitude, and polemical in form. He seems not to be satisfied with a simple, straight-forward statement of objective truths about Zen. It may also be remembered that this publication consists of a collection of lectures given in English to non-Japanese audi-

ences in America and in England. Yet, whether he be paternal, apologetic or polemical, he speaks or writes uniformly with a master's conviction and assurance. The book falls into three parts: (1) the proper understanding of Zen; (2) its ethical aspects, which he calls Zen asceticism; and (3) its influence over arts and literature, the Zen aestheticism.

In the first part concerning the proper understanding of Zen, this veteran spokesman takes to task such eminent scholars of Japanese culture as Dr. Masaharu Anesaki and Sir George Sansom. "Both Dr. Anesaki and Sir George Sansom," he says, "fail to grasp the true Zen attitude toward nature" (pp. 216, 228). Sir George Sansom wrote in *Japan, A Short Cultural History* (p. 385), commenting on Zen's love of nature, that the Zen artists and the Zen poets—and it is often hard to say where their poetry ends and their painting begins—feel no antithesis between man and nature, and are conscious even of an identity rather than a kinship. What interests them is not the restless movement on the surface of life, but (as Professor Anesaki puts it) "the eternal tranquility seen through and behind change." According to this Zen veteran, however, "This is not at all Zen. It is not an experience of identification, nor is it the feeling of the 'eternal tranquility' which the Zen poets and the Zen artists have when they stand before objects of nature. As long as they are on this stage of realization they are still outside the gate of Zen. They are dreaming."

Zen is not a form of pantheism, nor of quietism. "Zen in fact has given an articulation to it in the following phrase: One in All and All in One." Suzuki states in another place, "people imagine that it means pantheism, and some students of Zen seem to agree with these critics. This is to be regretted, for pantheism is something entirely foreign to Zen and also to the Zen artist in the actual understanding of his work." Dr. Suzuki goes on to explain (pp. 27-28, 32), "when the Zen masters declare the One to be in the All and the All in the One they do not mean that there is a thing to be known as the One or as the All and that the one is in the other and vice-versa. As the One is in the All, they imagine Zen is a pantheistic teaching. Far from it; Zen recognizes neither the One nor the All as something distinct from each other. The phrase 'One in All and All in One' is to be understood as a complete statement of absolute fact and not to be analyzed into its component concepts. . . . Those who proceed to

analyze the experience and try to establish a theory of knowledge are not students of Zen. . . . To Zen students, the One is the All and the All is the One. The one is always the same as the other, the two are never to be separated. Things are in and of Stenyata (Emptiness) with all their Suchness (tathatā); this Suchness is Emptiness itself." Beyond this even Dr. Suzuki cannot do anything more than illustrate the point by "question and the answer" made by two ancient Zen masters.

A monk asked a Zen master, "I understand that all sounds are the voice of the Buddha. Is this right?" "That is right," the Master said. "Would not the master stop," the monk proceeded, "making a noise which echoes the sound of a fermenting mass of filth?" The Master thereupon struck the monk. The monk further asked the Master: "Am I in the right when I understand the Buddha as asserting that all talk, however trivial or derogatory, belongs to ultimate truth?" "Yes," the Master said, "you are in the right." The monk went on, "May I then call you a donkey?" The Master thereupon struck him again. Obviously not only the pantheistic or the quietistic understanding of Zen, but all "ismic" understanding may well expect manhandling at the hands of a Zen master.

Incorrigibly iconoclastic and perennially protestant as Zen was, and vehemently so in its early days in China, it appears to have felt quite free as time went on to take over any system of thought for its own purpose. Dr. Suzuki explains this act of trespassing as follows: "Strictly speaking," he says, "Zen has no philosophy of its own. Its teaching is concentrated on an intuitive experience, and the intellectual content of this experience can be supplied by a system not necessarily Buddhistic. If the masters find it more expedient for some reason, they may build up their philosophical structure not always in accordance with the traditional interpretation. The Buddhists are sometimes Confucian, sometimes Taoists, sometimes Shintoists; Zen can also be explained by western philosophy." In this respect it may be noted that Zen is not unlike Shinto, the indigenous cult of Japan, which had no scripture and therefore no tenet, of its own, and acted freely in accommodating alien doctrines at its convenience, the difference between the two being that while Zen was aggressive and masculine, Shinto remained receptive and feminine.

"Empty it came and fulfilled it went" was the case of Zen in China.

It is significant that Bodhidharma, founder of Zen Buddhism in China, is said to have crossed the Yangtze on a leaf barehanded. During the early wandering days, however, Chinese Zen monks were accorded the privilege of living with the Vinaya schoolmen of Buddhism under the roof of the latters' temple. With Taoists, who were very popular in the Yangtze and seacoast provinces of China, Zenists became intimate in no time, so intimate in fact as to say, "All that is mine is thine, and all that is thine is mine." Later in the Sung dynasty, and more especially during the Southern Sung, Zen came to play the part of a court cult side by side with Confucianism, and was of such momentous importance in the history of Chinese thought that it cannot be adequate treated in the limited space of this comment. Zen's congeniality with Chinese art and literature of the time also forms an interesting and fascinating chapter in itself. Suffice it to say here that, when Zen arrived in Japan by the thirteenth century, it carried every appearance of being representative, not merely of its own, but of entire Chinese Buddhism,—not merely of Chinese Buddhism for that matter, but of the entire Chinese culture.

No wonder, therefore, that upon its arrival in Japan, Zen Buddhism found itself eagerly embraced by the fighting and ruling class. Somewhat apologetically Dr. Suzuki explains this situation as follows: "It may be considered strange that Zen has in any way been affiliated with the spirit of the military classes of Japan. Whatever form Buddhism takes in different countries where it flourishes, it is a religion of compassion and in its varied history it has never been found in warlike activities" (p. 34). But according to Dr. Suzuki, Zen has three strong appeals to the militarists. "Morally Zen is a religion which teaches not to look backward once the course was decided upon; and philosophically it treats life and death indifferently." In the second place, "Zen discipline is simple, direct, self-reliant, self-denying" (p. 34), and this asceticism is the thing that goes well with the fighting spirit. The third is the historical appeal. At that time Kamakura was the seat of government where the Hojo were ruling. "The Hojo regime is noted for its severe frugality and moral discipline and also for its powerful administration and militaristic equipments, so the directing heads of such a strong governing machine embraced Zen as its spiritual guide" (p. 34). Dr. Suzuki's explanation seems quite plausible, though this writer believes that there were far more

complex influences operating at this time to bring Zen and the ruling class of Japan together.

Once in the same saddle with the ruling class of the day the door was wide open for Zen to be received into almost all important practices of the fighting class. Even the art of swordsmanship was made to listen to Zen's doctrines. The reader's attention is specially called to two interesting documents, an English translation of which is given by Dr. Suzuki for the first time. One, entitled *Hagaku-re Rongo*, is a secret Bushido scripture, used by a certain feudal lord in the training of the warlike spirit; complete disregard of death is the keynote of the work (pp. 45, 49, 50). The other, *On Immovable Intelligence*, is a lecture on Zen and its connection with the art of swordsmanship. The writer was the foremost Zen master in the early Tokugawa period, and the man to whom it was addressed was the foremost swordsman in the service of the Shogunate (pp. 93-95). This document calls for careful perusal.

So much for the discussion of Zen asceticism. The third part of Dr. Suzuki's work, on Zen aestheticism, is no less refreshing. It is interesting to note that Zen was quite as much at home with the arts of peace, such as appreciation of tea, arrangement of flowers, building landscape gardens, painting in monochrome, and writing poetry and prose, as it was with the martial arts. The Zen monk was free to be an ascetic and an epicurean in turn, and often at the same time. During the Ashikaga Period, however, they were more epicurean than ascetic, because of the unique position they came to occupy in the councils of the Shogunate as diplomatic advisers and foreign trade commissioners. The Zen monastery was not merely a religious habitation, but a state department that dealt with foreign affairs, as well as international trade with China and Korea. Those who were high in the counsels of the nation lavishly patronized Zen monasteries, and frequented lodges of Zen masters that stood with an air of privacy in the midst of landscape gardens. It was in this contact zone of monasticism and secularism that a pecular aestheticism was brought into prominence. Sir George Sansom calls it "restrained aestheticism," and Dr. Suzuki explains it as "an aesthetic appreciation of poverty." *Wabi*, or *Sabi*, is the Japanese expression for it—terms which remained so dear to the heart of Japanese esthetes of feudal times. The author's analysis of this interesting aesthetic evolution, though not critical, is elaborate,

and evinces his profound solicitude for its survival (pp. 137-142).

It survived in the Tokugawa Period in the face of the rising tide of epicureanism. Two remarkable examples will be found in the poetry of Basho (1643-1694) (pp. 144-147), and Ryokwan (1758-1831) (p. 238). The former was "the nature troubadour" who elevated the shortest form of poetry into the greatest, and the latter, known variously in his life-time as "a great fool," "a lunatic," and "a great nature mystic," was a poet who sang of poverty:

> In tatters and in tatters,
> Again in tatters—this my life.
> For food I pick herbs on the roadside,
> For a hut, straws and bamboos are gathered,
> In the moonlight I sit meditating all night long,
> Looking at the flowers I forget to return home.

Both were inimitable combinations of asceticism and epicureanism, and the monastic aestheticism found its highest expression in their poetry. Dr. Suzuki's generous translation of their poems and memoirs of travel will give insight into the paradoxical enigma of their genius.

In conclusion, this new book of Dr. Suzuki is replete with information and revelation on Zen Buddhism and its influence on Japanese culture. It is made especially valuable for the student of Japanese arts as it contains in thirty-eight plates almost all the important works of Zen artists in Japan. Whether or not Zen's influence is already a story of the past in Japan, as it has been in China for a long time, is a question Dr. Suzuki leaves unanswered.

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The National Faith of Japan. A Study in Modern Shinto. By D. C. HOLTOM. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1938. xiii + 329 pp. $3.75.

Here is a book that has been long overdue. Since W. G. Aston's *Shinto, the Way of the Gods,* which appeared in 1905, there has been no general study of Shinto in the English language. A great deal has happened within that time, aside from the fact that Aston's book is out of print, to call for scholarly attention from a competent historian of religion.

Dr. Holtom is the logical person to have produced this timely

treatise. He has for many years been writing upon aspects of Shinto, and his *Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto* had long served as a major supplement to older studies of that faith. To its writing he brings a thorough knowledge of Japanese, a first-hand working acquaintance with major original sources which needed to be studied, and a profound understanding of the Japanese mind, which has grown out of his long-time residence in Japan. Probably no other living writer could have done greater justice to Japan's national faith than Dr. Holtom. He is, of course, a missionary but that has not interfered with his objectivity in dealing with Shinto. At only one point does it seem to the reviewer that he might be accused of personal bias, and that is in his discussion of the shrine problem, on which Dr. Holtom has written again and again. However, one who did not know his personal conviction in the matter would, I think, be moved by the cogency of his logic in discussing it, to feel that his conclusions were not dictated by bias, but by the facts in the case.

The book is divided into three parts, the first and third dealing mainly with State Shinto, the second with Sectarian Shinto. Not the least valuable section is the second part, which sets forth in considerable detail the main features of the Shinto sects. This section fulfills a long-felt need, for aside from occasional monographs, mainly of a propaganda nature, published by the sects themselves, there has been no great source of information concerning them in English. He has classified them into pure Shinto, the Confucian, the Mountain, the Purification, and the Faith Healing sects. His general remarks at the conclusion of his discussion reveal characteristics of the sects as a whole, little realized by western readers. He says of them that a review of the modern sects "leaves one with the impression that they are destined to widen their influence and to multiply in number of adherents in the years that lie immediately ahead. Such a point of view is justified not merely by their phenomenal growth . . . but mostly by their promise of progress in line with the best ethical and intellectual demands of the contemporary world. . . . Their avowed syncretism with whatever they feel to be best in other systems raises them beyond the danger of the stagnant dogmatism that has so limited the usefulness of whole areas of institutional Christianity in the west, and holds out to them the possibility of survival in an on-going world. They have revealed a surprising facility in adapting inherited thought forms to the de-

mands of a progressive philosophy. Their ethical content at its best is as fine as the nobility of universal human nature itself . . . their tendencies toward universalism will grow strong in proportion as the veil of economic frustration is lifted from before the eyes of the Japanese people" (p. 284-285). If the book contained only this second part, it would be a distinct addition to our understanding of Japan's religion.

But the main part of the book deals with State Shinto. After describing briefly the early and medieval forms of Shinto, which it will be recalled was the main concern of Aston, he goes on to discuss modern Shinto, its adjustments with Buddhism, and the legal separation of the state system from the sect system. He dwells at great length upon the official history of Japan itself, which runs back into the mythological beginnings as given in old Shinto. All the way through, it is the primary concern of the author to see this national faith in relation to the people and the institutions of Japan. It becomes the clue to the understanding of current Japanese ideals and ideas. Any reading of the book by those who have to deal with the Japanese people in a diplomatic and political way would prove greatly enlightening. The book ought to become required reading for ambassadors and members of the staff of the Secretary of State, and all those in our government who have to deal intimately with the Japanese people. Dr. Holtom has documented his study throughout with pronouncements, official and unofficial, by the leaders of Japanese life and thought during the last seventy-five years. One becomes aware that the study of Shinto is of profound contemporary significance.

The author has been at considerable pains to attempt to discover the beginnings of the sky father and earth mother worship, as well as that of the sun goddess who is the head of the Japanese pantheon. Whether his conclusions will stand the test of time and further investigation may be open to question, but he has made some exceedingly interesting conjectures with reference to the origins of these deities.

The book is beautifully printed. Incidentally, it was done in Japan. Also it is well illustrated. The description of Japanese ceremonials is not only entertaining but very enlightening. Altogether it is a highly satisfactory book, and one which has put the entire world of scholarship in the field of religion in debt to Dr. Holtom. Doubtless, some important materials have been omitted. For instance, I recall no refer-

ence to Omotokyo, which, while probably still suppressed by the government, does exercise not a little influence in Japanese life. The book is quite definitely a "must" book for college libraries, all teachers of the history of religion, and those who desire a basic understanding of the people and institutions of Japan.

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The Mishneh Torah. By MAIMONIDES. Book I. Edited according to the Bodleian Codex with Introduction, Biblical and Talmudical References, Notes and English Translation by MOSES HYAMSON. New York: Bloch Publishing Company, Inc., 1937. XIII pp. + 93 + 93 folios. $5.00.

Professor Hyamson has made a very important contribution to our knowledge of Maimonides, by making accessible to the public for the first time the most authentic version which has come down to us of the *Sepher ha-madda*, i.e., the first "book" of the *Mishneh Torah*. "The text in this edition closely follows, line by line, a unique manuscript in the Bodleian Library of the Oxford University"; that "manuscript has the unique distinction that it contains Maimonides' autograph at the end of Book II," i.e., practically at the end of the MS.; and the subscription in Maimonides' hand is "a certification by Maimonides that the manuscript had been revised and corrected by comparison with the author's original copy." How necessary is the work, the first half of which has now been achieved by Professor Hyamson, was eloquently pointed out by Professor A. Marx some years ago (see *JQR*, N.S., XXV, pp. 371 f.). The best way of appreciating the editor's achievement is to make a survey (which cannot but be somewhat arbitrary) of some of the most striking differences between the text of the new edition and that of the current editions.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the text of the new edition is much superior in grammatical correctness to the text of the current editions. It is no more surprising, if somewhat more interesting, to observe, by comparing the two texts, how much the original has been adulterated under the direct or indirect influence of Christian censorship. I shall briefly indicate, by putting the readings of the current editions into angular brackets, the typical adulterations caused by that factor.

גוים[עכ"ום]. הכופרים[כופרים]. כופרי מדוס[כופרי עכ"ום]. פ"ק[מניקורס]. נצרי[עכ"ום = גוי]. עבודה זרה[עכ"ום]. פלגות הרשעה[פלגות עכ"ום = פלגיות]. שמר[גזרה]. משומד[פושע]. תלמיר[גמרא].

To the same connection belongs the omission in the current editions of the name of Jesus, which occurs in 'Aboda zara x, 1, in Teshubah III, 10 (end), and IV, 2 (4). The most important group of the variants, for which we are indebted to Professor Hyamson's edition, consists of such readings as have, or may have, some bearing on the understanding of Maimonides' thought. For the convenience of the reader, I shall indicate some examples of those variants by arranging them according to subject matter.

I. *The character of the Mishneh Torah and its plan.* The *M.T.* begins with the motto (omitted in the current editions) "In the name of the Lord, the everlasting God" (Gen 21:33), i.e., with the same motto with which each part of the *Guide of the Perplexed* opens. That motto is explained in the *M.T.* ('Aboda zara I, 3) in the same way as it is in the *Guide* (II, Ch. 13 and Ch. 30; III, Ch. 29), namely as indicating, first, God's existence, and then, His governing the sphere as well as His creating the world. In Teshubah IV, 5, we now read "we have compiled in the H. Deot . . . ," instead of the usual reading "we have explained in the H. Deot. . . ." It is important to note that, when quoting in the *Sepher ha-madda* (and, indeed, the entire *M.T.*) an earlier chapter, Maimonides usually says "we have explained (in that or that chapter)" (see Teshubah V, 5, VIII, 3, and X, 6); on the other hand, the *M.T.* as such is called by him a "compilation" (of traditional materials). By occasionally using the expression "we have compiled" (instead of "we have explained") when expressly quoting the H. Deot (the laws concerning morals and hygiene), Maimonides possibly alludes to the peculiar character of that section of the *Sepher ha-madda*, as indicated in the *Guide*, III, Ch. 35 (394, 5-6 Joel) and Ch. 38, if not to the peculiar character of all parts of the *M.T.* other than its first four chapters. At the beginning of Yesode ha-torah III, we now read "And the spheres" ["The spheres"]. The new reading makes clear the inseparability of physics (= Yes. III-IV) from metaphysics (= Yes. I-II), and *vice versa;* it is explained in the *Guide*, I, Introd. (5, 6), where Maimonides says: "Physics are contiguous to metaphysics." Our insisting on apparently slight variations of expression

is justified by another variant, which, indeed, was already known from other sources. In Yes. IV, 8, Maimonides says: "Therefore, one must be careful as regards names (terms) [as regards their names (*sc.*, the terms mentioned immediately before which designate soul or spirit)], in order that you (singular number!) will not err [in order that nobody will err with regard to them] and each individual term has to be understood (*sc.*, in each individual case) from its context." (The statement quoted refers not only to Biblical terms, but likewise to terms as used by Maimonides himself; this is shown by the parallel to Yes. iv, 8 in Tesh. VIII, 3; cf. also *Guide*, I, Introd. [9, 26 ff.]). The new reading conveys a much more general warning (a warning with regard to an unlimited number of words, and not only with regard to the two words mentioned immediately before), and it conveys at the same time a much more specified warning: it is addressed, not to all men, but to one man only. For the secret teaching which is transmitted, especially by words of manifold meanings, is addressed to "one man" only.

II. *Theology*. "One says [He says (*sc.*, the Scripture says)] 'By the life of Pharaoh' and 'By the life of thy soul,' and one does not say [and he does not say] 'By the life of the Eternal,' but 'The Eternal lives.' " (Yes. II, 10). The authentic reading is confirmed by the parallel passage in the *Guide* (I, Ch. 68 [112, 18]). In the enumeration of the names of God in Yes. VI, 2, we now read *Ehyé* instead of *Elohai*. Cf. *Keseph Mishneh* on the passage and *Guide*, I, Ch. 62 (105, 4) and Ch. 63 (106, 14 ff.). Speaking of man's imitation of God's moral attributes, Maimonides in one case says "to assimilate himself [to assimilate himself to Him]" (Deot I, 6). The omission of the object is perfectly understandable on the basis of the *Guide*, I, Ch. 54. "If the divinities were many [If there were many divinities]" (Yes. I, 7) "The worship of him whose name is Molech [The worship (*sc.*, the idol) the name of which is Molech]" 'Ab. zara VI, 3. The scriptural proof of God's incorporeality is introduced by the words "It is clearly set forth in the Pentateuch and in the prophet [prophets]" (Yes, I, 8). As a matter of fact, Maimonides mentions in that context one prophet only. "If He were living by life and knowing by knowledge, there would be many divinities: He, His life, and His knowledge." (Yes. II, 10). The current editions read "and knowing by knowledge external to Himself." One line before, Dr. Hyamson's text, as well as

the text of the current editions, reads "He does not know by a knowledge which is external to Himself." But, there, *de'ah* (knowledge) means intelligence, strictly speaking, whereas, one line further on, that term is used in a sense similar to that in which it occurs in the heading H. Deot (laws concerning moral qualities). The passage "We do not find that God ever revoked anything good (which he had promised) except at the destruction of the First Temple, when He had promised to the just that they would not die together with the wicked, and He revoked His words; this is clearly set forth in the talmudic treatise Shabbat" (Yes. x, 4), does not occur in the text of the new edition.

III. *Angelology*. Maimonides indicates the problem of the relation between the Biblical angelology and the philosophic doctrine of separate intelligences by the following irregular expression "the rank of those forms [that form] which *is* called *Hayot*" (Yes. II, 7). Compare one line further on the statement "the rank of the form which is called *Ishim*, and they are the angels who speak with the prophets."

IV. *Ethics*. "Man ought to direct all his actions [his heart and all his actions] to the knowledge of God alone" (Deot III, 2). "Their hearts (*sc.*, the hearts of men) are left to them (*sc.*, to their discretion)." The current editions read: "All is left to them" (Tesh. v. 3). "So also what he (David) said, 'Let a noble spirit uphold me,' that is to say, 'Suffer my spirit to accomplish its desire [Thy desires]' " (Tesh. VI, 4). The question of the limits of human liberty is the secret topic of Tesh. v, as is indicated by the beginning of that chapter: "The freedom of every man is given to him [Freedom is given to every man]." (Cf. *Migdal Oz* on the passage, and Tesh. v, 2 and VII, 1). For the interpretation of the passage, compare *Guide*, III, Ch. 17 (cf. 337, 24-28 and 338, 21-30 with 340, 10 ff.) and Ch. 19 (345, 10). In the enumeration of (faulty) extremes in Deot I, we observe the following two interesting variants: "extremely [particularly] humble," and "particularly pure as regards his body (*sc.*, his bodily appetites)," instead of "of a very pure heart" (I, 1). The second variant is illustrated by another variant which occurs somewhat later on (I, 4): "that he will be perfect [as regards his body *add.*]." (Cf. *Shinnuyé nushaot ad loc.*). "Every man whose moral dispositions are all of them in the middle (*sc.*, between the two faulty extremes), is called wise" (Deot I, 4). "All of them" has been omitted by the current editions, perhaps in order to avoid the apparent contradiction to Deot II, 3, where Mai-

monides shows that the extremes of humility and meekness were recommended by Jewish tradition. "It is impossible to understand or to know [something belonging to the knowledge of the Creator *add.*], while one is sick" (Deot IV, 1).

V. *The Law.* Rabbi Juda the Saint "compiled from all (those materials) the Mishnah which was taught in public [to the wise *add.*]." (Introd., 2b10 Hyamson). "These were the great ones [the greatest of the wise] . . . and together with them were thousands and tens of thousands [and tens of thousands *om.*] of other wise (men)." (*Ibid.*, 2b19 f.). "The great Bet-Din of seventy [seventy-one]" (*Ibid.*, 3b25). "Forty men [Forty generations]" (*Ibid.*, 3a8. Cf. also 4a12 f.). " . . . Elijah at Mount Carmel, who offered up burnt offerings outside (the Temple), and Jerusalem was chosen [had been chosen for that purpose], and anyone who offered them up outside, incurred the penalty of excision" (Yes. IX, 3).

VI. *Eschatology.* To the statement "he who commits idolatry under compulsion, does not incur the penalty of excision and, needless to say, the judicial penalty of death," the current editions add the following remark, which does not occur in Dr. Hyamson's edition: "But if he is able to save himself and to escape from the power of the wicked king and does not do so, he is like a dog that returns to its vomit, and he is called a wilful idolater, and he is excluded from the world to come, and he descends to the lowest rank of *Gehinnom*" (Yes. V, 4). Cf. *Shinnuyé nushaot ad loc.* To the expression "the intelligences that are devoid of matter" (Yes. IV, 8) the current editions add the explanation "such as the angels that are form without matter." The addition creates the impression, contradictory to what had been indicated in Yes. II, 3, that there are immaterial creatures apart from the angels. In Yes. IV, 4, the current editions substitute the unambiguous term *niphsad* (perishable) for the ambiguous term *niphrad*, which may mean "separate, *sc.*, from matter," as well as "susceptible of disintegration." (For the first meaning, see Tesh. VIII, 3, and for the second meaning see Yes. IV, 3. The term occurs in yet another meaning in Yes. I, 10 and II, 3). Compare for this and the preceding variant *Shinnuyé nushaot ad loc.*

VII. *Words of particular significance.* In Deot II, 3, the current editions substitute in one case *middah* for *de'ah*. Maimonides prefers the latter because of its specific ambiguity. "In discussing Torah and discussing wisdom, the words of the wise [the words of a man] should

be few, and their meanings (or contents) should be many" (Deot. II, 4). In Deot IV, 21, the current editions substitute in one case *hanhagot* for *minhagot*. Maimonides seems to wish to avoid, in this context, the word *hanhagah*, which, according to him, is the "translation" of *merkabah*, i.e., of the term designating the most secret topic. He prefers *minhag* (custom), which he sometimes uses as a synonym of *nature*. In 'Ab. zara I, 3 and II, 1, we now read in a number of cases "people" or "peoples" instead of "world."

There is one point of no small importance with regard to which Dr. Hyamson's edition seems not to be quite satisfactory. One cannot see from his edition to what extent the division of chapters into numbered paragraphs is based on the MS., and to what extent that division is due to the editor's discretion. The indication which he gives in his Introduction (p. iv) is difficult to reconcile with his note at the bottom of page 34 a.

As regards the English translation, it is in most cases correct, and in many cases even excellent. It certainly will be most helpful to the general reader. Its most obvious shortcoming is that very often it is based, not on the MS. text, together with which it is printed, but on the text of the current editions. But, apart from this, the question may be raised whether a translation meeting all the conditions which excellent translations of most philosophic or halakic books have to fulfill, would be an adequate translation of a work of Maimonides. The answer to that question naturally depends on which view we hold of the character of Maimonides' writings. As far as the *Sepher ha-madda* is concerned, we could learn from the author's own statements what kind of a book it is. Being a part of the *M.T.*, it is addressed to "all men" (*Guide*, II, Ch. 35 *in princ.*; cf. I, Introd. [3, 7]with Yes. IV, 13), i.e., it is not addressed to philosophers in particular; it is, therefore, less scientific and more exoteric than the *Guide*. The most striking proof of this is the fact that Maimonides, as it were, hesitates to use within the *M.T.* the word *nature:* he speaks, to begin with, not of the *nature* of the elements, but of their *custom* or their *way*. (Yes. III, 11 and IV, 2. Professor Hyamson wrongly renders the two words in question by "governing principle" and "nature.") Now, an exoteric book, if it is the work of an unexoteric or initiated mind, is, by its very nature, more difficult to decipher than is an esoteric book. For in an exoteric book, the author can explain his views only in a rather hap-

hazard and vague way. (Compare *Guide,* I, Introd. [6, 8-9], and Ch. 71 [125, 24]). One may venture to say that an exoteric work such as the *Sepher ha-madda* (or the *M.T.* as a whole) is much more esoteric than are most esoteric works. Or, to avoid that paradox, we shall simply say that the *Sepher ha-madda* is a book full of mystery. To see this, one only has to consider what secret teaching, according to Maimonides' principles, means. It means teaching the truth to those who are able to understand by themselves, while at the same time hiding it from the vulgar. The most important method, used by him, of thus teaching the truth, is to make contradictory statements about those exalted subjects with regard to which the truth shall flash up for one moment and then disappear again. Now, it is obvious to anyone who reads the *Sepher ha-madda* with a reasonable degree of care, that Maimonides uses the method of "contradictions" in that work not less than he does in the *Guide*. The most famous examples are the contradictory statements about piety which occur in the first two chapters of the H. Deot. From the translator's point of view, however, contradictions are of minor importance, as they do not, by themselves, present a serious difficulty of translation. But it is of decisive importance for the translator of the *Sepher ha-madda* to be aware of the fact that Maimonides, in a number of instances, reveals what he considers to be the truth by the use of ambiguous, as well as unambiguous words of secret meanings, and that he does this in the *Sepher ha-madda* not less than in the *Guide*. This being the case, a translation of the *Sepher ha-madda* ought to be as literal as possible: the same Hebrew word has, if possible, always to be rendered by the same English word, if the allusions intended by Maimonides are to be noticed by the reader who cannot understand the original. In a translation of a work of Maimonides, the principle of literalness has to overrule all other considerations, to the same, or even to a greater extent, than in the medieval translations of the works of Aristotle and Averroes.

In Yes. I, 6, Professor Hyamson translates *b'né adam* by "majority of mankind," one line further on by "men." At the beginning of 'Aboda zara, he translates the same expression by "the people." Towards the end of Yes. III, he translates it more literally by "children of men." It might be worth considering whether one ought not to translate it in all cases by "sons of man," since the translation "men"

would not remind us of the fact that the expression in question sometimes does not designate mankind as such, but only the great majority of mankind. Besides, the translation suggested would bring out the connection of that expression with the expressions, "sons of the prophets," and "sons of the wise." (As regards the ambiguity of "son," see *Guide*, I, Ch. 7). One might even raise the question whether in some cases Hebrew proper names ought not to be accompanied by a translation, e.g., in the case of Enosh ('Ab. zara *in princ.*), where an adequate translation might solve the difficulty presented by Maimonides' statement about that person. In Yes. II, 3, Professor Hyamson translates two Hebrew words of very different meanings by the same English words "such are," and thus renders unrecognizable an important hint given by Maimonides. In Yes. IV, 2, he translates both *'aphar* (dust) and *'ereṣ* (earth) by "earth." He translates *ḥaḥamim* by "sages," "our sages," "wise," "wise men," and "Chachamim." The translator is not to blame for his failure to find a single English rendering for that most important word *de'ah*. He translates it by "intelligence," "knowledge," "moral disposition," "moral principle," "mind," "passion," "sentiment," and "idealistic being." It may very well be that there is not a single English word which could be used for designating separate intelligences as well as knowledge, moral qualities, and mind. But it can safely be said that, until such an English word has been found, or coined, the reader of even the best English translation of the *Sepher ha-madda* will miss important points of Maimonides' teaching. For Maimonides did not use the ambiguous word in question without good reason.

The biblical and talmudical references given by Professor Hyamson are doubtless very useful, although they are less complete than they could easily have been made. But, by omitting to add references to the non-Jewish sources of the *Sepher ha-madda*, the editor unintentionally creates a somewhat misleading impression of that work. It would have been interesting, and even important for some readers, to know that the titles, both of the whole work, and of its first section, are practically identical with the titles of the first two books of Ghazzâlî's *Ihyâ*, not to mention other parallels which are perhaps less obvious. (Cf. Boaz Cohen, *JQR*, N.S., XXV, pp. 529 ff.). The editor has also omitted to give cross references to other passages of the *M.T.* or to the other

works of Maimonides. Such cross references are indispensable in order to enable the great majority of readers to notice the contradictions which both hide and reveal Maimonides' secret teaching.

LEO STRAUSS

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Don Isaac Abravanel. By JOSEPH SARACHEK. New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1938. x + 222 pp. $2.00.

Isaac Abravanel: Six Lectures. By PAUL GOODMAN, I. G. LLUBERA, M. GASTER, L. RABINOWITZ, L. STRAUSS, A. R. MILBURN. Edited by J. B. TREND and H. LOEWE. Cambridge: at The University Press. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. xxvii, 157 pp. $2.50.

A stimulating essay could be written on the contribution of anniversaries to biography and history. Many an important movement has come to life as a result of such an inspired study. Likewise, great personalities of the past have risen as in resurrection at the trumpet call of a centennial celebration. The quingentenary of the birth of Isaac Abravanel, reputed scion of the house of David, awakened a renewed world-wide interest in the life and works of this distinguished statesman, philosopher, Bible exegete and messianic harbinger.

The Abravanel Exhibition at the Jewish Museum in Berlin inaugurated a series of studies and literary celebrations that extended to many countries, and included among the participants noted scholars in the various fields enriched by the creative efforts of Don Isaac Abravanel. A note of pious devotion to the memory of this noble religious figure naturally makes itself felt in these literary tributes, notwithstanding the objective scientific analysis which characterizes the more important of these writings.

The volume entitled *Isaac Abravanel, Six Lectures,* edited by J. B. Trend and H. Loewe, represents the gift offering of a group of English scholars. *Don Isaac Abravanel,* by Joseph Sarachek, is the work of an American rabbi and scholar. Both volumes are fresh, original studies of the prolific works of our author. The result is a vivid portrayal of a rich, multiple personality, who was a worldly financier and mystic visionary, a philosopher and anti-rationalist, a rabbinic exegete who was profoundly influenced by the trends of Christian speculation, a medievalist on the threshold of the Renaissance and the Reformation.

Sarachek's work is schematically arranged in four parts: the man, the scholar, the thinker, the dreamer. The first part deals with the purely biographical data. Part two describes with considerable detail Abravanel's Bible exegesis. The third chapter, the thinker, interprets his philosophic views and political theories, while the concluding chapter deals with the author's messianic trilogy, *The Wells of Salvation, The Proclamation of Salvation,* and *The Salvation of His Anointed.* This 'logical' division, which has undeniable advantages in the treatment of abstract ideas, does not serve advantageously the purposes of biography. It ignores the affinity between the man and his ideas; it overlooks the rhythmic relationship between Abravanel's personal fortunes and the temper of his writings—a feature which is so marked a characteristic in the spacing of Abravanel's literary output.

Doctor Sarachek's book is a thoroughly informed and conscientious study of Abravanel's life and works. It was obviously planned as a 'popular' work, without notes and bibliography, and, consequently, without the controls that are often so necessary to restrain wide-sweeping assertions of fact and fancy. This is especially evident in the opening chapter, where the author is not limited by the interpretation of texts, but has free rein in the portrayal of the man and his historic setting. The deprecatory remarks about Portuguese Jewry in the fifteenth century, the interpretation of the political policies of King John II of Portugal, or the basis for the general attitude to Jews and Marranos in Spain, the unqualified acceptance of the statement that three hundred thousand Jews left Spain, and that scarcely ten thousand survived, will cause the critical reader to wonder and protest. Doctor Sarachek is on much firmer ground in the subsequent chapters, where he skillfully leads the reader through the labyrinth of Abravanel's biblical philosophical and messianic teachings. This was by no means an easy task, and Doctor Sarachek acquitted himself as a faithful and patient guide.

The modern student is likely to be more attracted by Abravanel's fantastic messianic expectations than by his scholastic, philosophical treatises. There was a glow of fire in his utopian visions, despite the illusory pedantry of his method. His messianism was intuitively the defiant response of the exile's unconquerable spirit, and ought to be treated with psychologic penetration rather than logical detachment. Abravanel's mystic faith was as bold as it was intense. For unlike most

prognosticators, he had the temerity to predict the great Advent in the immediate future, during his own lifetime, in the year 1503. He lived to be disillusioned, of course, but his courage remained unbroken, for he proceeded to construct another, more distant date on which to pin his messianic hope; but, strangely enough, Doctor Sarachek leaves his readers in the dark on this important point.

Abravanel's nearest approach to modern thought lies in his attack upon monarchy and his strong preference for the republican form of government. It is a great temptation to read into these views a note of rebellion, as they were expounded by Abravanel while he was still living in monarchical countries and was in the service of the Crown, but Doctor Sarachek shares a common error when he attributes to Abravanel the denial of the divine right of kings. To him, undoubtedly, the ideal government was the republic; but he was equally emphatic that wherever the people adopted the monarchical form of government, the king represented God (cf. comment on Deuteronomy XVII, 16-20). Doctor L. Strauss proves this contention convincingly in the brilliant essay which he contributed to the Abravanel volume edited by Trend and Loewe.

This excellent volume, entitled *Isaac Abravanel, Six Lectures,* (but containing seven essays) is a composite work of distinguished scholars who illumined the various aspects of Abravanel's life and works from the angle of their own specialized interest. The result is what one might naturally expect, a certain amount of overlapping of theme, some discrepancies and disagreements among the contributing authors, but, above all, keen, critical studies.

The introductory essay by one of the editors, H. Loewe, and Lecture I, Introduction, by Paul Goodman, cover the same ground, the purely biographical material; but the treatment is sufficiently subjective in each case to render the two essays complementary rather than repetitive. Professor Llubera's contribution on Spain in the age of Abravanel is a sound, historical survey of the position of the Jews on the Iberian Peninsula, with little attempt to connect his theme with the personal fortunes of Abravanel.

To the late Doctor Gaster was assigned the discussion of the great teacher's philosophic works and his messianic speculations. While giving a bird's-eye-view of the entire range of the author's literary productivity, Doctor Gaster focussed his attention on Abravanel's mes-

sianism. With fine delineation, he traced the influence of the tragic course of events in Spain on Abravanel's spiritual development, and showed how the misfortunes that befell his brethren kindled in him a fanatical passion and ardent yearning for speedy redemption through the Messiah, and finally, how the mingling of hope and despair came to dominate the twilight hours of his life.

This viewpoint is interestingly corroborated by Doctor Rabinowitz in his essay on Abravanel as Exegete, where he points out that in none of the works written in Spain was there any trace of messianism. Viewed wholly from the standpoint of Bible exegesis, one detects a new note in his commentaries after the Expulsion, a tendency toward subjectivity, a feverish anxiety for consolation and hope. Altogether this essay presents an interesting exposition of Abravanel's special contributions to Bible exegesis, his relation to Christian scholarship, and the nature and variety of the highly valuable excurses to be found in his Bible commentaries.

A keen analysis of Abravanel's philosophical tendency and political teaching is presented by Doctor L. Strauss in what is actually the concluding lecture on Isaac Abravanel. Maimonides' divided loyalty between Aristotle's philosophy and Plato's politics, in contradistinction to the thoroughgoing Aristotelianism of the Christian scholastics, and the influence of the latter on Abravanel's thinking—these factors are utilized brilliantly to explain Abravanel's departure from Maimonides on fundamental aspects of law and government. Abravanel's use of Josephus, the Christian Fathers, and Hellenistic teachings is brought to bear on his concepts of society and government, and this, in turn, leads Doctor Strauss to the discussion of Abravanel's ideal of government.

The concluding essay by A. R. Milburn treats, not of Don Isaac Abravanel, but of his son Judah, under the title "Leone Ebreo and the Renaissance." The son thus forms a natural link between the medieval past and the new world.

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The First Five Centuries of the Church. By JAMES MOFFATT. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1938. 262 pages. $2.00.

To write church history by centuries is an old habit stemming

from the *Magdeburg Centuries* begun nearly four hundred years ago. Its last conspicuous exponent was Mosheim, whose *Institutiones* appeared in 1764, but continued to exert a wide influence in America, particularly in Murdock's translation, down to about the middle of the nineteenth century. Since that time there has been an increasing disposition to employ more natural divisions based upon the development of the subject matter without reference to the specific turning points of the centuries. Hence one's curiosity is aroused, to say the least, by a modern book whose successive chapters each cover a hundred-year period. Professor Moffatt so far revises the scheme as to make the year thirty, rather than the year one, his point of transition from century to century, and he admits that history cannot be really broken up into separate segments of time, yet he thinks that the thirties do stand out with sufficient uniqueness to justify his procedure. Some readers may very likely feel that this arbitrarily superimposed chronological framework has impeded the natural flow of the historical stream. Time, rather than persons and events and movements, tends to become the imperious arbiter of history.

Still another form of antiquarian interest is revived in this volume. Each chapter opens with a long chronological table listing in parallel columns "secular" and "church" names and dates. The spirit of Julius Africanus, Eusebius, Jerome, and their many imitators once more stalks across the stage. While this material may be useful for purposes of reference, as an introduction to the study of church history it seems menacing. It is as if the beginning student of English should be expected to find Webster's *Dictionary* interesting consecutive reading. Then, too, it may give one the erroneous impression that "secular" history and "church" history flow in sharply separated channels, each of which may be navigated by the student without the necessity of frequently charting his course through the whirlpools of the contiguous stream.

Each chapter concludes with a charmingly written, but highly selective, presentation of the story as reconstructed by the author. These sections are so brief that two or three hours will suffice for their perusal over all five centuries. In all they embrace only about one hundred openly printed pages. They are especially conspicuous for absence of reference to materials that one might expect to find reported as matters that are really essential to an understanding of the Church's development. The story of the first century involves no

account of the planting of churches by Paul on gentile soil, or of the non-Pauline groups in Rome and elsewhere that laid foundations on which the ecclesiastical structure of later centuries rested. Practically the only phase of Christianity to be noted in this period is the doctrinal conception of Jesus as Lord. Similarly, in the second century it is the expansion of the "faith" and its heretical aberrations, rather than the main line of the church's growth, that engage attention. The same selective and partial treatment of the subject characterizes the succeeding chapters.

Especially does one get no insight into the significant environmental contacts under whose impact some of the most significant phases of the life of the Church were shaped. There is no mention of gentile influence upon the growth of sacramentalism in the Church during the first and second centuries. The effects of the popular philosophies upon the development of Christian interest in speculative theological problems during the second and third centuries is scarcely noticed. And the significance of the Roman doctrine of totalitarian imperialism as a force in shaping the ecclesiastical conception of institutional solidarity and catholicity seems not to be perceived. One gets the impression that the Church was an exotic plant flourishing on foreign soil without drawing any vital sustenance from its new environment, once it had sloughed off the heretical excrescences and monastic extravagances by which it had become tainted through it environmental contacts.

A reader disposed to carry on research on his own account and having ample time for the pursuit will find the more than fifty pages of bibliography at the end the most useful section of this volume. Its usefulness for this purpose could have been enhanced by a similarly detailed listing of the pertinent original sources of information. But these can be recovered without excessive labor from a study of the books listed in the first paragraph of the bibliography.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

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Civitas Dei. By LIONEL CURTIS. 3 vols. London and New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934, 1937, 1937. xxiii + 297 pp.; ix + 157 pp.; xi + 131 pp. $4.25; $3.00; $1.75.

Civitas Dei, "The City of God," is the challenge of faith to what we call the world of fact. It was so in Augustine's day, and it is so

even more consciously in this treatise of an English thinker of our own time.

It was in the opening years of the fifth century, that century which saw the downfall of the Roman Empire in the West, when Alaric and his Visigoths overran Italy and sacked Rome itself, that the greatest of the Christian Fathers of the Latin West wrote his philosophy of history, defending the Providence of the God of the Christians against the pagan charge that the calamities which had befallen civilization were due to the neglect of the old gods and the old pagan virtues. In a vast and rambling survey of the history of the ancient world, Augustine set out to prove that these calamities had befallen mankind, not because of the growth of Christianity, but because of the triumph of the powers of evil and mankind's ready acceptance of them throughout the past. Pagan superstition, and not the Christian religion, was to blame. But now "The City of God" was definitely established on earth through the coming of Christ, and the divine scheme of world governance would ultimately work out in the perfect harmonies of human and divine justice.

For over a thousand years this scheme of Augustinian philosophy dominated historical thinking. Then came the skepticism of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, seeking the explanation of events in natural causes in the physical world. As miracle dropped out of the narrative of history, the Augustinian method of argument, which attacked supernaturalism in its own terms, lost its effectiveness. Human evolution was no longer viewed in terms of the direct intervention of either God or the Devil, but as the consequence of diverse influences making for good or evil in human conduct. Rationalism ultimately achieved its vision of progress and of the perfectability of mankind; but this required a more vigorous faith than that of the more orthodox view, and the nineteenth century swung back to the less robust attitudes of romanticism, which fitted in with the historical interest of the era that was realizing the development of the national state.

It was in this setting that Hegel restated the Augustinian philosophy in modern terms of political mysticism. The national state, and more especially the Prussian form of it, revealed God's plan as the inevitable culmination of the process by which liberty was saved from anarchy by being reinterpreted in terms of duty to the state. This

vision of the political development of the Western world gave comfort and satisfaction to nineteenth century thinkers, not only in Germany itself, but in other countries as well. Naturally the conclusion was somewhat different when one traced God's hand in the formation of British or American institutions; but there was quite as full a confidence in the process itself.

The twentieth century disturbed this placid current of nineteenth century history, first, by the advent of modern science, and second, by the disturbances created by the World War, so that the present state of mind is one of bewilderment and confusion. Finally, in these last years it would even seem as if the Goths were once more breaching the walls of the civilized world with the threat of a new dark age of oppression and brutality.

It is these circumstances which give special significance to the work of Lionel Curtis. There is nothing unique or extraordinary in a reassertion of faith in the Christian way of life, or in the fundamentals of Christian doctrine. But no one before has ever so boldly applied it, not only to the conduct of individuals, but to that of the nations faced with the problems of today. Mysticism suffers from the tendency to seek escape from reality; Curtis uses it to translate reality into new meanings. This is prophetic work in the truest sense of the word. Whether the specific prophecy to which it points, the spiritual leadership of the English-speaking world, comes true or not, is a question which only the future can answer. But there is a growing recognition in the world today of the need for such spiritual forces in the determination of human events, if civilization is to be saved from ultimate anarchy.

Civitas Dei is a work of long and serious study, covering the history of the world in what seems, at first, like a separate series of studies. But it is held together by the underlying thought of God's mysterious design. In this it bears a strange resemblance to the text of Augustine, a text which has baffled all but the more serious students by its scope and intricacy. The reader will perhaps do well to turn to the chapters of recapitulation at the close of the first two volumes to catch the full import of Curtis' philosophy of history. It is in the light of this that the story becomes consistent, and one sees how his political theory, which took shape in the intimate study of the British Dominions, is fitted into the scheme of world governments.

The final volume opens with a confession of faith which is both beautiful and appealing. When, however, the reader comes to sum up the whole argument, preserving as Curtis would wish him to do, his full intellectual freedom for objective judgment, he finds that the Civitas Dei, as here conceived, is that of a special Providence, limited at present to a privileged section of the world. While "The City of God" is ultimately viewed in universal terms, we are to work for it by building upon English and American experience. To do this effectively the remnant of the League of Nations must be swept away and replaced by a looser organization, offering no guarantee against world anarchy. Ultimately other nations would grow to the stature of membership in the world community, which would be a projection of the British commonwealth of nations. Here is where the mystic would leave the world of practical affairs, faced as it is today with the dangers of attack by an increasing militarism. The contrast between this essentially British way of regarding politics as something which is denatured by too close definition, and the American outlook which tends to define relationships in terms of contract, was already evident at the Peace Conference, and the League of Nations Covenant is a compromise between the two ways of thinking. Wilson was more British than American, however, in his insistence upon a political rather than a juristic basis for the League. But he spoke and thought American when he insisted that the League should be universal.

The argument for bringing together the English-speaking world and the democratic nations which understand their way of life, has been urged recently with much insistent emphasis by Clarence Streit in his volume, *Union Now*. Curtis is more cautious. He thinks that the Dominions have first to realize their responsibility as nations before the United States will become an integral part of a new international commonwealth. Whether this is the path toward ultimate peace or not, will depend, in the opinion of the reviewer, upon what would be the attitude of the democratic nations toward those outside the pale. Could America mediate between the states which cherish the heritage of England and those which look out of other windows on a different past and present? The institutions of freedom will only prosper in so far as we can be secure from attack by those peoples who cherish institutions of a different kind. This security cannot be gained by erecting a Roman or a Chinese wall around the countries

of the elect, outside of which the barbarians may roam at will. "The City of God" must have the protection of the spirit, the spirit of magnanimous policy and impartial justice that views the world as one.

JAMES T. SHOTWELL

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Platonism, Ancient and Modern. By PAUL SHOREY. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1938. 259 pp. $2.50.

This notable volume consisting of the Sather Lectures delivered at the University of California in 1928-1929, and following as it does *The Idea of the Good in Plato's Republic* (1895), *The Unity of Plato's Thought* (1903), *What Plato Said* (1935), his translation of the *Republic* in the Loeb Classical Library (1930) and various monographs, crowns Professor Shorey's work in Platonism and establishes his place, not only as the leading American Platonist of his time, but as one of the outstanding Plato scholars and interpreters in the long roster of eminent Platonists.

Beside being a valuable contribution to Platonism, the volume reveals anew the author's ability and achievement as a literary critic. His characteristics as a critic are here conspicuously present—clarity of insight, breadth of outlook, penetration of discernment and discrimination, epigrammatic brilliance and felicitous ease in composition, and the ripe culture of true appreciation and mature judgment. He can be caustic, but indulges in this pastime, usually, only when it is called for. Doubtless he is a bit prejudiced in some directions—as in his not unjustified jibes at experimental psychology and psychoanalysis, and at certain recent crudities in poetry—but he knows well where the times are out of joint, if not how to set them right. His occasional disparaging allusions to "rhetoric" are somewhat ambiguous as to whether he means rhetoric in general, or the pseudo-rhetoric which has deservedly provoked the scorn of our realistic age. If the former, it would be difficult to find a more truly eloquent passage of true rhetoric than the tribute he offers to French literature at the close of Chapter VI.

To trace the history of Platonism from antiquity to the present time in a single volume requires, not only a breadth of horizon, but a skill of selective discrimination such as few scholars have possessed. It is achieved here with notable success. The scope of the survey is

indicated in the titles of the chapter headings, which are as follows:

I. Plato and Antiquity
II. Platonism in Antiquity—Neo-Platonism
III. Plato and Christianity
IV. Platonism in the Middle Ages
V. Platonism and the Renaissance
VI. Platonism and French Literature
VII. Platonism and English Literature

Manifestly the chief omission is that of the colossal German accumulation of Platonism. To have included this, however, would have made the task quite too gigantic for even the Davidic daring of Professor Shorey, but there should have been, at least, some brief account of the service rendered to Platonism by Schleiermacher.

The Platonic provinces in which the author has shown greatest command and most sympathetic understanding are those of Italian Platonism, the Renaissance, and the influence of Plato on French literature. He is least satisfactory in his treatment of Stoicism, of Neoplatonism, of the Alexandrian and Nicene theologians, and of the Cambridge Platonists. The recapitulation of Plato's influence upon English literature is encyclopedic, but poorly proportioned, and contains much material that is negligible, attention to which had much better have been given to more influential authors—Tennyson, for example, and the metaphysical school of poetry, whose conceits are remindful of Plato's playfulness. The estimate of Coleridge's Platonism is hardly adequate, especially in its failure to note the influence Coleridge exerted upon American philosophy, theology, and literature. Indeed, the influence of Plato upon Amrican thought demands a more thorough and complete presentation than it has as yet received.

Coming now to Shorey's understanding and interpretation of Plato himself, the first and most sustained impression one receives from the present volume is that of the breadth and thoroughness of the knowledge of Plato's thought, in *esse* and in *extenso*, herein summarized. Here is one who understands and loves Plato in all his many-sided aspects and moods—his marvelous insight, his logical acumen, his ethical soundness and severity, his universalism, his aesthetic genius, his humaneness, his religious ardor, his large and victorious idealism. Professor Shorey is ardent to the point of adoration in his admiration of Plato, yet with no blindness of zealotry, but a true

lover's intense and authentic appreciation. The scope of his understanding of Plato's mind is well indicated in his surprising commendation of Mill as "perhaps the greatest nineteenth century Platonist," a judgment which he essays to substantiate by adding: "So far from being anti-Platonic in temper, Mill is a typical Platonist in his combination of severe logic with a passion for reforming the world. That he did not add to these qualities the unction of the mystic Plato and the genius of Plato the poet and artist, is no abatement of his claim to the title of Platonist. That was a synthesis unique in the history of the human mind."

If there is any lack in the depth of this modern disciple's sounding of the genius of Plato, it relates to his *metaphysics* and his *mysticism*. Rightly, and forthrightly, Professor Shorey insists upon the avoidance of a metaphysical system as a resolute principle of Plato and Platonism. Yet this does not mean that there is not in Plato a positive and profound metaphysic, however loosely formulated. With equal pertinence and persistence Shorey emphasizes the difference between true *Platonism* and *Plotinism*—indeed between Platonism and Neoplatonism in all its forms and phases. At the same time, although he is on the right side of this issue and is an implicit personalist, he fails to comprehend the real depth and significance of Absolutism, from Plotinus and Augustine to Spinoza and Hegel. It should be kept in mind throughout that Professor Shorey is primarily *literateur* rather than philosopher, although his knowledge of philosophy is wide and discerning.

As for Plato's mysticism, Shorey definitely and whole-heartedly make a place for it, especially in the form of Platonic love; but he is not sufficiently grounded in the philosophy of mysticism (as his selection of definitions of mysticism indicates) to be cognizant of its full meaning, especially as related to Christianity. Moreover, although he gives full credit to Plato's "natural theology," it cannot be said that he has (or indeed could have, from the limitation of the purely classical approach) a complete apprehension of the mission of Platonism as a propaedeutic of Christianity—its deeper meaning and import completely fulfilled only therein.

If we could call up Professor Shorey from the world of spirits, as Socrates essayed to do with Protagoras in *Theaetetus*, I think we might (though not too readily) convince him of the guilt of what may be

termed *solo-visionism*, so common to biographers, as well as specialists in every sphere, i.e., the extravagance of finding adumbrations of one's hero in every expression of the truths of which he was a protagonist, wherever found. But that is a pardonable, if not a commendable, fault, and nowhere more justifiable than in so persuasive and convincing a lover and interpreter of Plato as the late beloved scholar and teacher, Paul Shorey.

JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM

Pacific School of Religion

L'Art religieux moderne. By CHANOINE G. ARNAUD D'AGNEL. Grenoble: Arthaud, 1936. 2 vols. 243 pp., 101 pp., 320 illustrations. Fr. 50.

At almost all times the Church has used the arts of the period and place for its imagery and buildings. This fact has led some historians to say that there is no specifically Christian art, only varying local arts applied to a Christian content. But in the Middle Ages, when the Church was the chief patron of art, such local and period styles were themselves formed in enterprises of the Church and apparently correspond to the religious attitudes of the time. Since then, except for a brief moment in the nineteenth century when Protestants and Catholics alike attempted to revive Gothic art as the Christian style par excellence, the Church has had to accept the styles which arose in secular fields. In adopting the forms of contemporary art the Church must decide today whether styles originating outside the religious community are suitable for its cult. The problem is not the same in all the arts. In modern painting, for example, there are expressionistic tendencies which show an affinity with primitive and medieval religious arts; independently of doctrine and cult, the painters have represented biblical themes with an intense conviction. In architecture the case appears to be different. Here the recent innovations, the new international or functionalist styles, spring from wholly secular, sometimes reformist, ideas of human and technical efficiency; the architects conceive of man as essentially a biological and economic creature capable of attaining happiness through adjustments in his physical environment. These new styles have been regarded in a neutral sense as the conventions of a time and place, like a language which can be applied to any content, practical or religious. But the interest in art today plays a part

in the formation of general attitudes and constitutes an important ideological field, especially in educated circles. The adoption of a still problematic and disputed style by the Church may help to strengthen the forces from which the style arose.[1]

This has been recognized by Catholic writers who have criticized certain types of modern art precisely because they seem to imply secular values incompatible with Catholic faith. In the same sense, what Catholics sometimes find offensive in Renaissance art, regardless of the technical perfection of individual works, and in spite of the fact that its style was the style of the period and therefore the only possible style of Christian art then, is the general pagan implication of its forms. A rococo or neo-classical church building seems to sanction the sensuality or worldliness expressed in these styles. However, the Church tends to adopt a new style if it is accepted by the community or its leading groups; the Church cannot undertake to fight against the course of secular life, but must adapt itself to it.

The Canon Arnaud d'Agnel, the author of several works on the older religious art of southern France, has offered his book as a guide to the Catholic religious artist. It is a defense of modernism and provides a detailed theory of modern Catholic art in the light of Thomism and canon law. The counsels to artists are accompanied by a richly illustrated survey of the new religious buildings, paintings and sculptures in western Europe. The taste of the author and the ideas expressed in this book are therefore not personal; they are the product of an intensive movement of more than two generations in Europe (and now in America) toward a modern Catholic art. The lengthy bibliography, very poor, however, in German and English titles, indicates the scope of this movement. The Canon concludes that the artistic ideals of modern architecture and painting not only come very close to Christian teachings, but are in principle identical with the statements of Thomas Aquinas about art and the beautiful. Hence he has "the

1. It is for this reason that the Nazis forbid functionalist architecture and label it *Kulturbolschewismus*, although they have preserved many of its inventions; it was associated with the liberalism of the Weimar republic. On the other hand, the same style has been adopted officially by Mussolini, since it is identified in Italy only with technical progress and the rationalization of economy, in which Italy had been backward. In the Soviet Union, this style represented up to about 1932 the most advanced culture of western Europe which Russia was to overtake; with the assertion of its independence of bourgeois Europe and of its attainment of socialism, the Russian state rejected functionalism as bourgeois decadence and promoted officially an academic, classicistic style expressing the new grandeur of the state.

certitude of the complete compatibility of the new art with the beliefs and spirit of Catholicism."

The acceptance of the new style of architecture is not simply an æsthetic choice; it involves also to some extent a reformulation of religious values. This is strikingly evident in the author's criticism of Gothic architecture. He finds that the medieval buildings, which he has praised earlier for their rational construction, their logic and adaptation to the ends of church building, are inadequate for modern needs. They facilitate religious individualism, contrary to the gospels, in that they permit the Christian to isolate himself from his fellows even during the services. This must be combatted as anti-social. The multiplicity of pillars conceals the altar and the preacher from a large part of the congregation; it is also prejudicial to the material unity of the people who can not experience in the Gothic buildings that strong sense of solidarity given them by the modern churches of concrete with few or no inner obstructing supports. In this new form the Catholic building approaches the first Protestant temples, large elliptical or circular chambers, simple meeting-halls with a maximum visibility. But even the qualities of the Gothic churches which are the material bases of their most profound spiritual effects are now regarded as defects. The height of the vaults may elevate some souls to heaven and eternity, but it also throws many into a dream and they lose sight of their actual duties. "This symbolism of the vaults," he says, "inspires poetry rather than action." It softens the character rather than hardens it. Hence the taste for these vaults during the romantic period, the most unrealistic epoch of the nineteenth century. But what of the Middle Ages? Were such vaults built then in order to detach Christians from their duties here and now? No, says the author, the Gothic style was also the style of civil and military buildings, and the cathedrals therefore reminded the people of their own homes on another scale. He forgets here that it was this scale or proportion that was in great part responsible for the religious impressiveness and mystery of the church interiors.

This new "realism" is expressed in the preference for concrete rather than the traditional stone in church buildings. The stone church of Gothic style not only points to the antiquity of the Church as an institution, but refers to a high moment in Catholic authority. It embodies in its shapes suggestions of piety, devotional attitudes, and hierarchical

orders that fill the consciousness of Christians. The very use of stone, in its guarantee of permanence, its reference to the earth, to the rock of ages, and to Peter, provided the Church with a deep reservoir of spiritual and historical allusion, lacking in the artificial parvenu material, concrete. And the derivation of concrete from industrial contexts and secular purposes which also underlie the decline of religious faith would seem to exclude concrete entirely from sacred uses.

Nevertheless, these facts are outweighed by the economic and social advantages of the new materials and forms. An important motive in adopting the modern style is its relative cheapness. It is possible to erect high towers with simple means instead of resorting to expensive masonry and elaborate scaffoldings. The author adds that concrete pleases the young, whose initiative is encouraged by the modernism of the church; it increases their confidence in God. The workers and lower middle class really prefer the new architecture and the churches of concrete. Modern art, he says, is the art of all social classes and all humanity. The modern urbanist planning of the church and the group of parish buildings, formerly scattered but now clustered and organized, gives the Church an institutional solidity and prominence that it has lacked in the past.

There are also æsthetic and symbolical justifications of the new style. The simplicity and sobriety of the modern churches is fitting for "the terrestrial dwelling of Him who recommended simplicity in all things." Even the linear forms of concrete, the relations of its planes and volumes, can acquire a religious value, since they can symbolize the "geometry of Christian doctrine which is not without analogy with that of the beautiful churches of modern art."

It is curious to read in a book dedicated to ferro-concrete church architecture and to Catholic Action the recommendation of a return to the artistic spirit of primitive Christianity (pp. 56 ff.). The author not only asserts that the religious mentality of that time is like our own, but that the qualities of Christian catacomb art were unknown to non-Christians and therefore constitute a specifically Christian style. This judgment of catacomb painting has already been presented with some ingenuity by the great Viennese scholar, Max Dvořák, but few students will accept it today because of the notorious similarity of the Christian catacomb paintings to contemporary non-Christian works. In the present case, the theory is rendered all the more suspicious by

the writer's apparent ignorance of catacomb art and the history of Christian iconography: in recommending catacomb painting as an artistic and theological model, he mistakenly cites as subjects of catacomb painting before the council of Ephesus the virginity of Mary, her purity *sans tâche,* her assumption, the omnipotence of her intercession, the divine maternity and the visitation. In general, he is an unreliable guide to older Christian art. Among his more serious errors is the statement that Viollet-le-Duc discovered the logical and scientific nature of Gothic architecture. This widespread view has been discredited by the investigations of modern scientific constructors (Sabouret, 1928, Pol Abraham, 1934) who have shown the technical incorrectness of Viollet-le-Duc's rationalization of the Gothic style.

Even as an account of modern religious art, the book is not really adequate, although it is interesting in itself as a document of changing religious ideas. In the first place, the author does not analyze the style of modern architecture or its causes, but only isolates certain terms from its programs and apologetic literature. The correlations with Catholic doctrines and values are therefore of theories, not of the actual practice or motives of the modern architects.

In the second place, the churches he reproduces or cites as examples of modern architecture are not of the style which advanced architects today consider modern, but either works belonging to the style of the innovators of about 1900 or of an eclectic, artistically secondary compromise style which is usually called "modernistic" and has little to do with the ideals in question. (It is remarkable that he completely ignores the churches built by acknowledged original masters like Oud and F. L. Wright.) A careful study of these "modernistic" works would be instructive for the student of religion, since they would no doubt throw light upon the problems of religious groups at the present day which wish to assimilate modern tendencies in culture or social life, but at the same time preserve institutional traditions.

I must mention finally the fact that, in his account of modern religious art, the author excludes that vast and impressive body of independent religious painting created outside the Church. It is astonishing that, although he has space for over three hundred reproductions of mediocre art, there is not a single illustration of the work of Georges Rouault, a Catholic artist, one of the greatest of living painters. Rouault's religious painting has a brutality and pathos which

disturbed even his close friend Léon Bloy, whose piety was wilfully vehement. It is one of the most interesting and symptomatic facts in the history of modern art that painters—many of them without religious affiliation—have created religious images for themselves, and have affirmed their sympathy with primitive religious feelings. This highly individualistic and cultless religiosity, springing from the struggles of individuals disenchanted and abandoned by "good society," and often striving to restore communal ties, is completely neglected by the author, although in some instances it has produced converts to the Church.

MEYER SCHAPIRO

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The Degrees of Knowledge. By JACQUES MARITAIN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938. xviii + 475 pp. $6.00.

There is a tendency among modern philosophers, trained in the empirical method, to regard any philosophical movement prior to the instauration of Francis Bacon as unworthy of consideration. This reviewer knows one teacher of philosophy who has expressed himself as unwilling to waste time on such "stupid systems." Obviously such a view is provincial and unworthy of a philosopher, who above all others, should survey the entire field of human thought. Now there comes one who asks us to ignore the developments of modern philosophy. This is no easy dismissal, but a very significant one, for Jacques Maritain knows the recent trends in both science and philosophy, and discusses neo-realism and the theory of relativity with equal ease.

Maritain and Etienne Gilson are undoubtedly the most vigorous apologists for the Neo-Thomist movement, and are making a profound impression on Catholic theology. They are also aggressive polemicists against "modernism," which is their word for anything that does not stem from St. Thomas. That these two men do not entirely agree is evidenced by Maritain's sharp criticism of his colleague. Such disagreement in matters of detail is to be expected, as both men are brilliant and original thinkers.

The book is logical in organization and outline. After a general introduction the author examines sense perception and the experimental sciences, with a statement regarding the knowledge available from these sources. He next considers the philosophy of nature in

relation to its noetic structure. Part One closes with an examination of the knowledge given by reason in the study of metaphysics, and the limitations of the human mind. Part Two goes on to the degrees of supra-rational knowledge whose highest form is the mystical experience. Two chapters are devoted to a study of Augustine and St. John of the Cross, and their use of the "science of contemplation." The last chapter is intended to sum up the entire book, and is an exposition of the doctrine of "All and Nothing" as set forth by St. Thomas.

The author's introduction, which he calls "The Grandeur and Misery of Metaphysics," is a thoughtful study of the limitations of philosophy. There is a grandeur in metaphysics, which attempts to deal with the deeper levels of reality, and awakens the desire for union in actuality as well as in idea. In this same desire lies the misery of metaphysics, for such a consummation can never be achieved by reason alone. All purely intellectual knowledge of God, however acquired, remains irremediably deficient, for it can only signify or point to reality. Ideas and concepts may be true and may constitute an authentic and desirable form of knowledge, but they remain inadequate to the thing known. If we are to know God, the manner of knowing must be appropriate to the object known, thus such knowledge can never come through reason. Love alone (supernatural love), can bridge the gulf, and through the beatific vision bring man to know God. This is not to be taken as an attack upon reason, for the author has a profound faith in reason and logic. He does feel, however, that they have very definite boundaries.

Maritain has no use for nominalism, which to him is the theory that all knowledge has its origin in the senses. Under this heading he groups practically all of the modern schools such as the neo-Kantians, neo-positivists, Bergsonians, logistics, pragmatists, neo-Spinozists, and neo-mystics. All of these schools denounce the theosophical visions of a Boehme or a Swedenborg because they are extra-sensory. The error started with Descartes, and all in his line have built upon a false premise. For this author, the great German movement is merely an eddy, and not at all in the main stream of philosophical thought. It does seem a little strange that one who finds the roots of his philosophy in Aristotle should be so clear in his castigation of nominalism. Historically this movement has come from the Aristotelian influence. A better appeal could have been made to Plato, but then we remember

that Plato was not very popular with Thomas Aquinas. In common with other Thomists, Maritain is attempting to build his system on the principles of Aristotle and St. Thomas.

The epistemologies of current schools of thought are subjected to a searching criticism. Idealists are lost in subjectivism when they affirm that the object of thought is thought, and knowledge becomes merely a development of that which is already within mind, without having any objective reference. In trying to avoid this, Kant postulated *das Ding-an-sich*, but this creates an impossible dualism which can never be bridged. The neo-realists insist on the immanence of the object in knowledge, but they misconceive the distinction between *thing* and *object*. To inclose the extra-mental thing in thought is itself a contradiction. The "critical realists" hold that the object is neither thought nor thing, but rather an *essence*, which is independent of mind. This process makes the object neither a thing nor a product of mind, so that it becomes entirely irrational, and knowledge cannot be an intelligible process.

Maritain calls his own position "Critical Realism," but does not want to have it confused with the British and American epistemology which goes by the same name. He distinguishes the *thing* and the *object*, but does not separate them. They co-exist as a unity in the manner described by Aristotle and St. Thomas. He also separates the universe of existence and the universe of intelligibility. The universe of intelligibility is drawn by abstraction from the world of existence, and, although there is only one universe of existence, there may be as many universes of intelligibility as there are degrees of materialization of the existent object. The mind abstracts from reality and constructs images of that which exists outside of mind. It also constructs images which are incapable of existing outside of mind, such as gender, species, the subject, the predicate and similar concepts. These objects of thought are not to be mistaken for essences, for "essence is the capacity to exist," but neither are they wholly created by mind. They are analogous to things which do exist in reality.

The universe of intelligibility has three levels or degrees of knowledge. There is first of all the universe of sensible nature, or the world of *physica*. Next there comes the universe of quantity as such, or the world of *mathematica*. Finally, there is the universe of being as being, and of intelligible objects which do not require matter as

a condition of their realization, the world of *metaphysica*. The author considers, first of all, the knowledge which is given by the world of sensible nature, but warns us against expecting too much from this, the lowest form of knowledge. Mathematics gives us a higher degree of knowledge, but the limitation is still present. Metaphysics gives us the highest degree of knowledge which is possible in the universe of intelligibility. However, reason as such is not capable of knowing the universe of existence. Nevertheless, it may know God in the "divided mirror of those transcendental perfections which are analogically common to the uncreated and the creation."

Above and beyond the universe of intelligibility stands the universe of existence, which is an extra-sensory, extra-mental order, and above metaphysics or natural theology stands the science of the revealed mysteries. In this realm God has His being and this is the proper sphere of theology. The true theology proceeds according to the method and sequences of reason, but it is rooted in faith. Hence it is not reason alone, but reason illuminated by faith. It is by faith that we attain unto the mystical experience, and in this experience we reach the highest degree of knowledge. We thirst after knowledge, but metaphysics, like all human knowledge, leaves us unsatisfied, so we must turn to mystical wisdom. Here is the highest point in the life of the soul and here both knowledge and love bear their finest fruits.

This is a significant and able portrayal of the position of Thomism, and is destined to gain the respectful attention of the philosophical world. There is an internal consistency which would compel one to accept the conclusions, if questions were not raised regarding the basic premises. It may be that this reviewer's empirical background has made him incapable of proper appreciation. Such a complete dismissal of the entire empirical tradition is a little difficult. Then too, one is amazed at the author's naïve acceptance of the serpent legend regarding the death of Plotinus. Without raising a question regarding the value of the mystical experience, its epistemological implications are certainly open to criticism. The work of the translator should be commended, for he has preserved for the English readers Maritain's beautiful and vivid prose style.

Wilfred I. Orr

Santa Barbara, California

True Humanism. By JACQUES MARITAIN. Translated from the French by MARGOT ADAMSON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938. xvii + 304 pp. $3.50.

M. Maritain has written a very persuasive book. His insight into the deeper levels of human experience is undeniable, and his charity, not only for the sins of men in general, but for the special mistakes of those who disagree with his own position, is notable in this day of theological controversy. The strident note of abuse so frequently found among those who have of late reacted against liberalism and its works is happily absent. In its place one feels not only a desire to make clear how the spirit of love may be made to triumph, but an eagerness to show how an argument can be tolerant without being ineffective. This book on humanism is itself, in a word, humane.

The humanism in which the author believes is theocentric. With Aristotle he holds that to offer man only what is human is to betray him, for by the principal part of him, which is the mind, man is called to something better than a purely human life. In place of the medieval idea of building an empire comparable to that of Rome, and in place of contemporary myths of class, race, or nation, he would return to the Gospel idea of the dignity of the individual in its spiritual vocation of developing the fraternal love which is its gift from God. The common man's desire for justice and nostalgia for communion must be understood in the light of the Incarnation and made to reveal their true religious significance.

Put thus baldly the argument may sound like a return to a naïve individualism, but actually it is worked out with a thorough understanding of the political and economic problems which confront any effort to apply religion in contemporary life. As would be expected, the author disposes quickly of fascism. It has energy, he grants, but no real conception of humanity, justice, or freedom. For communism he has much more sympathy. The communists show a hunger and thirst after justice which puts many professing Christians to shame. It is true that the poor have never won justice except through force. One may say, also, that the proletariat, by the very fact that its part in the capitalistic regime has been one of suffering and endurance rather than of profit through exploitation, is the bearer of unused reserves which give it a special messianic mission in the new society. But the Christian cannot agree with the half materialistic and half

mystical conception by which work is made both the means of transforming matter into economic values and also the essence of man by which he takes on attributes once assigned to deity. The dignity of work must be made clear by removing all taint of materialism. Instead of the idea that one class must absorb man in order to destroy another class, we should think of the individual as communicating to his class his proper dignity as man. Instead of class war on a physical level, we should concentrate on the spiritual warfare which engages all who share the same human ideal. The strife is hard and long, but its pain is transfigured in the heroism which has its source in the heart of God, scourged and crucified outside the city gate. When the struggle seems longest we must remember that God and time are on our side.

Again one feels that a brief summary may give the impression that M. Maritain meets economic arguments with religious rhetoric, and one must say again that this is not the case but that deep religious feeling is combined with specific political suggestions. The author looks forward to the liquidation of capitalism followed by a society characterized by "associated ownership." Co-partnership will be substituted for the salary list, and the dominance of the machine will be offset by allowing the worker a share in management. As in the days of the guilds, the worker's intelligence, skill, and personal powers must be removed by law from the possibility of exploitation. A man's goods must be protected from the state, as they are today by trade unions, his rights as an individual must be protected from all corporate associations, including the unions themselves. In politics there must be a third party which will represent a "great gathering together of men of good will." In all secular life there will be new fellowships which will work to transform the economic mechanisms of society so that religiously humane ends shall be achieved.

The one question which the reader feels impelled to raise is: How does this program in its effort to implement reason and good will differ from the liberalism which the author rejects? Must one be a Roman Catholic to accept it?

J. S. Bixler

Harvard Divinity School

The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought. By Peter Anthony Bertocci. With a Foreword by Frederick Robert

TENNANT. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1938. xv + 311 pp. $3.50.

From the perspective of his own personalism, derived from Bowne and Brightman, Dr. Bertocci has presented an able and closely reasoned critique of the professedly empirical theistic philosophies of James Martineau, A. S. Pringle-Pattison, James Ward, W. R. Sorley, and F. R. Tennant. He approaches them as a friendly critic, for he agrees with their basic contention that the existence and goodness of a personal God can be established with a high degree of probability by induction from the facts of common experience. The writer gives a chapter to each of these figures, outlining his position carefully, and pointing out where in his opinion each has failed to establish his conclusions or to follow a sufficiently empirical method. None of the philosophers examined emerges unscathed from his searching criticisms. No one who is sympathetic in general with his point of view has exposed the confusions in Pringle-Pattison's thought more effectively than Dr. Bertocci, who points out that he was really a rationalist seeking empirical analogies and supports for traditional conceptions. Martineau is given credit for pioneering the revolt against "sense-bound empiricism," and showing how the moral life provides the basis for a more inclusive method. James Ward is commended for his psychological analysis of experience, and for his refutation of mechanistic naturalism, but Bertocci accepts his panpsychism only within the sphere of organic life, and argues that the personalistic view of physical nature as a direct expression of God's energizing Will is more satisfactory. Sorley's moral argument for God is submitted to searching and well-substantiated criticism, on the ground that the underlying theory of value is too rationalistic, and that the inference from the postulated realm of eternal values to God is really a disguised form of the ontological argument.

Dr. Bertocci points to F. R. Tennant as the author of the best and most solidly worked-out statement of empirical theism among recent philosophers. One of the merits of Tennant's *Philosophical Theology* is, as Bertocci says, that in it "the student may find the structure of theism supported by a thorough, yet concise, investigation into the main problems of philosophy." Another, is Tennant's demonstration of the psychological origins and pragmatic character of all categories and principles of explanation. Finally, as Bertocci points out, Tennant

carries his empiricism into the field of value theory and admits that values valid for man are empirical in origin, and relative to the nature of man and his natural environment. Our author agrees with Tennant, furthermore, that religious experience is not a primary and independent source of evidence for theism, but is itself based on interpretations drawn from experience in general. Only in his view of the noumenal self, and in his discussion of creation and the attributes of God, does Bertocci detect Tennant wavering from a consistent empiricism in the direction of admitting traditional ideas without empirical warrant. In each of these cases Bertocci presents the point of view of personalism as a sounder alternative; and in the final chapter, which bears the title, "An Empirical View of God's Goodness," he defends Brightman's theory that God is limited by internal factors of "the Given."

It must not be thought, however, that Bertocci is slavish in his allegiance to Brightman's ideas, for he adopts panpsychism within the limits of the organic realm, and he objects to Brightman's inclusion of necessary principles of logic and morals in the "Given" elements of God's character. This reviewer believes, nevertheless, that Bertocci's thought would be improved if he had achieved a more independent standpoint toward personalism, particularly its pantheistic doctrine of the physical world as "God's energizing." Is this theory really reached on empirical grounds; what particular facts in nature suggest and confirm it? For a professed empiricist it is not enough to say that activity which is not will is "unintelligible" or "meaningless."

It is unfortunate that Dr. Bertocci has not given a more careful discussion of the characteristics and requirements of the empirical method which he espouses. It is particularly necessary in these days, when narrow and rigid empiricisms are again in fashion, that empirically-minded persons who defend the right to speculate about the meaning and ground of the whole of things should carefully define their methodology. It seems to me that Bertocci permits himself too great latitude in the use of analogies from human experience in interpreting facts in the extra-human world. This may be seen, for example, in the case cited above and in his discussion of panpsychism.

It is regrettable that the many excellences of the book are somewhat obscured by its unnecessarily difficult style. The typography and proofreading are almost unexceptionable; but Ward's *Naturalism and*

Agnosticism was published in 1899 (p. 93), and "superfluous" is misspelled on p. 260. The index is very thorough and useful.

JOHN M. MOORE

Hamilton College

The Riddle of the World. By D. S. CAIRNS. New York: Round Table Press, 1938. vi + 378 pp. $3.00.

Many Christian theists in Britain and America today are concerned lest the new impetus which Continental thinkers have given to the discussion of purely theological problems should lead to a neglect of philosophical apologetics, and a forgetfulness of such gains as have been made in the controversy with naturalism and humanism. Principal Cairns' latest book indicates that he is representative of this attitude.

His criticism of naturalism and humanism, to which the opening chapters are devoted, is distinguished more by vigor and suggestiveness than by originality. The author's thesis is that man's capacity to acknowledge and embody value makes it impossible to explain him in purely naturalistic terms. Many readers who find themselves in agreement with this thesis will nevertheless be disturbed by the looseness of some of the ways in which Principal Cairns states it. For example, he writes: "All these (naturalistic) writers oscillate between describing Nature as morally evil and morally indifferent. Further, they all imply that man is objectively a nobler being than Nature. That is to say, they do not think good and evil, right and wrong, are merely human illusions. I submit that these two positions are in fundamental discord.... You cannot have an absolute standard of right and wrong emanating from a morally evil or indifferent universe" (p. 20). Obviously such words as "objectively" and "absolute" import into the naturalistic position affirmations which are not there.

The author goes on to argue that the findings of science cannot be taken as the sole basis for constructing a metaphysic, because by their generality and abstractness they leave out significant aspects of reality.

He then tries to show that the moral consciousness is a legitimate "pathway to Reality," which provides adequate grounds for a teleological view of history and for belief in human freedom. This is supplemented by the contention that mathematical structure and beauty also afford evidence of an objective order which must be the work

of Mind. Throughout the whole discussion runs the conviction that we discover, rather than create, standards of value; if knowledge of value merely reflects what we find useful in the struggle for existence, the same must be said of our scientific knowledge, and the result, Principal Cairns suggests, is a skepticism which undermines the foundations of naturalism along with everything else.

The case for the "objectivity" of value is stated rather baldly: In "moral goodness . . . we have something as objectively present as sun or moon or star. . . . It is 'out there' quite independently of our own judgments, whether we recognize it or not" (pp. 106 f.). These sentences are, of course, lifted out of the context of an extended discussion. Nevertheless, they suffice to indicate that the author has ignored the possibility of doing greater justice to the half-truth contained in "relativistic" theories of value. For example, Archbishop Temple suggests "that appreciation brings to actuality a quality of the object which previously belonged to it really, but potentially and not actually . . . for value is 'objectively real, but subjectively conditioned.' " (*Nature, Man and God*, pp. 211 f.). Such a statement safeguards what Principal Cairns desires, while describing the value-situation more accurately.

Frequently, however, the author makes his points directly and cogently. His gifts as a polemical writer are shown to good advantage when he examines the naturalistic assertion that belief in providence leads to an apathetic attitude toward social reform. On the one hand, he can show that the great prophetic figures simply do not fit into the assertion; and on the other hand, he can confront the naturalist with the difficulty of combining confidence in human progress and an energetic optimism with the view that ideals are without cosmic support.

In attempting to meet the last obstacle to theism, the problem of evil, Principal Cairns supplements his case by an appeal to special revelation. All along he has regarded the "natural characters of the universe, and those judgments of conscience which have brought us . . . to a spiritual interpretation of the world" (p. 180), as revelation in a legitimate sense. However, he regards the Bible as containing the record of God's self-disclosure in a higher sense—a sense which is missed by the theory of literal infallibility on the one hand, and by treating the Bible as merely a collection of human insights on the

other. This revelation is fulfilled in Jesus who stands, to be sure, as the culmination of a long religious development, but cannot be regarded merely as a human prophet.

Now, what bearing does such a belief in special revelation have upon the problem of evil? The concluding chapters, which answer this question, must be regarded as a significant effort to bring philosophical theism and Biblical theology into a fruitful relationship. The author indicates briefly (pp. 154 ff. and 364 ff.) why the protests of Karl Barth, whose Gifford Lectures were recently delivered in Principal Cairns' own University of Aberdeen, do not deter him from making an effort of this kind. He puts forward the suggestion that theodicy is much more widespread in the Old Testament than is sometimes supposed. It is traceable in the conviction that some all-justifying purpose is being fulfilled through human suffering and tragedy; and in the resulting view of history, which points forward to a culmination, instead of falling into some form of cyclical theory. The Jewish view received its completion in Jesus' conception of the Kingdom of God; and one of the central issues in a Christian apologetic today, the author contends, is to set this Jewish-Christian view of history over against both a sanguine belief in indefinite progress, and a pessimistic conviction that value will ultimately be annihilated. He proceeds to this task by making several points concerning the problem of evil which are familiar, but persuasively stated: Humanists reject belief in a loving God because they falsely assume that happiness is the goal of human life; but if moral character be taken as the goal instead, then freedom, together with the possibility of evil action, is seen in a new light. Admittedly human freedom involves some conception of divine self-limitation; but this is preferable to the alternatives of either denying the reality of evil, or regarding God as its cause.

Unfortunately Principal Cairns dismisses somewhat hastily the objection that if sin is the result of freedom, and freedom is the gift of God, then an unresolved dilemma remains for theism. He calls the objection a "man of straw" (p. 273), and apparently assumes that only writers like Mr. Julian Huxley could take it seriously. Nevertheless, as profound a thinker as Nicolas Berdyaev (*The Destiny of Man*, p. 32) regards the same objection as so unanswerable for traditional theism that he looks elsewhere for a theodicy. In fairness to Principal Cairns it should be added, however, that he carries his discussion over

into another chapter (x); there he develops the Christian conceptions of vicarious suffering and eschatology in a manner which goes far toward meeting the above dilemma.

The concluding chapter of the book brings together the whole preceding argument, and centers it around the relationship between modern thought and Christian conceptions of the Person of Christ and of the Holy Spirit. Instead of developing his theme dogmatically, the author tries to show the inadequacy of a humanistic, immanental attitude toward these Christian conceptions. Over against such an attitude, he places the conviction that in the Incarnation God has taken the initiative in coming to man, who, by reason of his sinfulness and finitude, cannot alone bridge the gulf between them. Here the mediating position which is characteristic of the whole book receives perhaps its clearest expression. For Principal Cairns succeeds in putting forward a forceful interpretation of the uniqueness and soteriological significance of Christ, while at the same time he expressly repudiates the doctrine of total depravity and the notion that God is *totaliter aliter*.

Both those who agree and those who disagree with the central theses of the book, cannot but be grateful to its author for having drawn so generously upon the rich store of his wide reading, long reflection and courageous wisdom, in dealing with the most important spiritual and intellectual problems of our age.

David E. Roberts

Union Theological Seminary

The Case for Theology in the University. By William Adams Brown. University of Chicago Press, 1938. v + 124 pp. $1.50.

This is a small but highly important book. It presents a problem in education that will bring extended discussion from widely differing standpoints, involving an issue that cannot be settled until it is settled right. The writer of this review would like to invite the contributions of those who may desire to express their opinion concerning it.

The arresting proposal made by Professor Brown is, that theology should be restored "to the central place which it once held in the curriculum of the university" (p. 1). And in this book, which contains the lectures delivered by him at the University of Chicago, he gives the reasons for making this recommendation. He states that he was prompted to select his subject upon reading the lectures of Presi-

dent Hutchins of that University on *The Present Crisis in University Education.* The crisis therein referred to is, that the modern university has no unifying principle to give definiteness and consistency to its policy, such as was formerly supplied by theology, but which, it was argued, is now to be sought in metaphysics (p. 3).

In a manner farthest removed from dogmatic imposition, Professor Brown believes that theology, rightly comprehended, is best capable of furnishing "a unifying philosophy of life which would bring meaning and consistency in our conception of education as a whole"; further, that it would strengthen confidence and freedom in intellectual activity as well as present a goal of individual and social life (pp. 3, 118 ff.).

It is realized that this claim for theology may seem to many "an attempt to revive an issue which for our American universities, at least, has been settled once for all." There has been "no formal decree of divorce between theology and the university." It still retains its modest place in a professional school. "But theology in the sense in which the great masters have understood it . . . as a unifying philosophy of life has been quietly bowed out" (p. 2).

A candid examination is made as to how "it has come about that a way of thinking that has unified the intellectual life of the university for so many centuries should have fallen to the low estate in which we find it today" (p. 23). One explanation is in the familiar fact that with the separation of church and state, and in the presence of many denominational divisions, it was found necessary to exclude all formal religious instruction from state-supported schools (p. 23), a principle to which the American people are firmly committed as indispensable to religious freedom as well as beneficial to general education.

There has also been the growth of professional schools, theology being one with those of law, medicine, engineering, education, journalism and business, so that the university has become a place "where, if you know what you want, you can go and have it supplied to you" (p. 40). Increasing specialization has been an influential factor. "In the complicated world of today one must divide to conquer, and of division there is no end" (p. 37). Thus an immense power of specialized knowledge and of technical skill has been put into the hands of men, with scant attention given to the need of a unifying principle and of a dominant aim.

Added to these causes making for a decline in theological interest, there has been, and there still is, a misconception as to the real meaning of theology, its purpose and methods. There is here much need for clarification. "Theology may mean the science of revealed religion, understanding the word 'revelation' in the Barthian sense to mean a communication of truth by methods wholly other than those open to man in other fields of knowledge. Truths so revealed, it is obvious, have to be received solely on faith, 'faith' meaning in this case acceptance on external authority of facts or truths otherwise unverifiable." Professor Brown agrees with President Hutchins that, in this sense, "it is futile to look to theology to unify the modern university. Faith in the sense of the acceptance on external authority of unverifiable presuppositions has no place in the program of a great university and ought not to have" (p. 11).

The significance of theology for education which Professor Brown advocates is stated thus: "We may mean by it the philosophy of the Christian religion, or, in other words, the sum of the attempts to use the clue which Christian faith provides to bring unity and consistency into man's thought of the universe. This is what theology meant in its palmy days and still means in those circles which have not lost faith in the possibility of a unifying philosophy" (p. 13). While theology is spoken of as a philosophy, Professor Brown proceeds to make clear wherein theology has its distinctive role and character. Its higest meaning is found and expressed in worship of God (pp. 66 ff.). "It is because theology is concerned with all aspects of the life of man that it is so much needed in the modern university" (p. 69).

With the recognition of the need of a unifying principle in education, signs of a reviving interest in theology may also be seen. And tentative, but positive and constructive suggestions are made as to how theology may be restored to its place, and as to where to look for the theology that is needed (chapter III).

President Hutchins has written a gracious and appreciative introduction. He feels that this book will stir up controversy. But if subsequent discussion is carried on in the spirit of the author, it will shed light and not heat.

RAYMOND C. KNOX

Columbia University

Symbolism and Belief. By Edwyn Bevan. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. 391 pp. $5.00.

Dr. Bevan is lecturer on Hellenistic History and Literature in Kings College, London. He is author of many works whose general scope is indicated by the title of one of them, *Hellenism and Christianity*. The book before us deals with sixteen lectures given on Lord Gifford's foundation, 1933-4. It omits the four lectures that deal with image worship, which later may form a complementary work. The title is a misnomer; for the inquiry deals only with certain Christian symbols so far as these rest on mystical experience of God's presence and of His "infinite transcendence." With this understanding of the book's real scope and purpose the reader may better enjoy Bevan's singular clarity and grace of expression, his dialectical skill, the orderly sequence of his thought, and his selection of apposite material from the store of his vast erudition. This review seeks to present Bevan's argument, and then to criticize his position in terms of the *general* relation of symbols to religious belief.

With Rudolph Otto, Bevan assumes that religious advance depends upon initiation by God "of certain peculiarly endowed individuals, to intuitions which at the outset they had and other men did not have." This intuition, or mystical experience, is "the perception at one intense moment of Some One not themselves there and speaking to them." The great majority of men, however, must depend for religious experience—at least for Christian religious experience—upon "sacred acts and sacred objects" of a symbolic character, which mystics find serviceable for conveying their experience to non-mystics. These, then, the great majority that is, will experience not so much the perception of God as the perception of the Divine. In either case, in such experiences Christian beliefs about God "run together" with such experiences "into a single unity," with the result that these beliefs have the "unshakable certainty" of an immediate perception (pp. 56, 352, 354).

Now of such symbols of mystical experience there are two kinds: those that awaken feeling only, and those that convey a conceptual meaning which can not be had, by the non-mystic, through any other means. Music, bells, and "smells in incense," are examples of the former. Of the latter, Bevan selects for detailed study five: Height, Time, Light, Spirit, and the Wrath of God. Incidentally he refers

to other symbols of this general type, such as Love and Will. Height (the sky) symbolizes "what is sublime, wonderful, worthy of admiration," but especially God's transcendence and otherness. Time signifies the standpoint of the changing and imperfect toward that which is changeless and perfect. Light stands, indeed, for salutary knowledge and security from hidden perils; but above all, it symbolizes the "glory" of light's transcendent source. The symbol, Spirit, to Christians is akin, not to the pervasive *pneuma* of the Stoics, but to the Hebrew *ruakh*, the wind-like power proceeding from God. The Wrath of God is a symbol with a most regrettable history, to be sure. But we must not allow anthropologists to "intimidate" us; for Christians need this symbol of "a transcendent Being whose condemnation our wrong doings rightly *deserve*."

That these symbolized conceptions of the divine nature are all anthropomorphic, Bevan concedes. But, "to make the division between right and wrong anthropomorphism where it ought to be made—that is the main problem for all philosophy of religion" (p. 26). These symbolized conceptions are all *analogical;* that is, "if we *could* know the nature of God we should see that these symbols are the best way of saying what that nature is in human knowledge" (p. 332).

This "analogical" view of Christian symbols Bevan contrasts with that which I shall call *metaphorical*. For example, bells ringing, flags flying, trumpets blowing, do not give us fresh information about the nature of the occasion we celebrate, but through their metaphorical reference to that occasion they make us all aware of it and stimulate our feelings concerning it. To confuse these two kinds of symbolization is "a real menace to religious belief." For instance, Marcel Hébert held that the idea of the Virgin Birth symbolizes impressively "for simple hearts" the luminous superiority of that union of the divine with human nature which is Jesus Christ. Here Hébert seems to hold that the symbol, the Virgin Birth, tells us nothing about that Union that we did not know before. The symbol here stimulates feeling but conveys no information.

But, says Bevan, in fact the symbols of the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection, in some way we do not fully understand, do inform us about the Reality they symbolize,—Jesus as a personal Spirit in living communication with the spirits of men now. These symbols therefore are "analogical." And, though we should always try to

change our symbolized conceptions into adequate apprehension, yet, at this time, these symbols give us information that is closer to the Reality they symbolize than any other information we have.

In his interpretations of these "analogical" symbols Bevan consistently finds them pointing to the transcendence,—the "infinite transcendence" of God. The "real alternatives in religion are Monism, exemplified in the Hindu-stoic religions," and that Dualism, exemplified in Christianity ("and in other semitic religions") which contrasts the "spiritual world" with "the world of every day that we grasp intellectually." "To suppose these alternatives compatible with each other shows an undiscriminating woolliness of thought" (pp. 75, 295). However, to show that these types of religion are mutually incompatible does not, of course, show that they are alternatives, much less that they are "the real alternatives," that is, that they exhaust the possibilities of choice. For the ways in which one thing transcends another are, I suppose, beyond count. Dr. Bevan's assumption, here, that cleavage of thought upon religious questions must follow the line with which his own thought is familiar, is but one illustration of the narrow, self-imposed confines within which his argument moves.

Long exercise in verbal distinctions leads Dr. Bevan throughout this work to abstract from each other factors in experience that in fact are confluent. What is meant by a "'Spiritual Reality" apart from the spirit or attitude with which that Reality is perceived? Or by an "infinitely transcendent" Being who none the less impresses his nature upon certain privileged people, and is more or less known by them. Especially I find it difficult to realize Christian beliefs as factual propositions apart from such acts of devotion and consecration as bring them within the domain of religious experience. The actual effect of the argument, whether intended or not, is a somewhat precarious support of authoritarianism in religious affairs. For, to "the great majority," religious experience is reduced to a vicarious foundation.

If we examine in the most *general* terms the relation of symbols to belief, we may attain a juster view of this relation as it concerns the Christian outlook. There are symbols that *denote* only external correspondence between themselves and what they symbolize: e.g., a letter symbolizes a sound. And there are symbols that *connote* correspondence between the constituents of what is symbolized and its symbol: e.g., clouds connote rain; an arrow, love; and his staff, the

leader of a band. Either type of symbol may be evidential; neither need be.

Religious beliefs concern what we wish to occur, whether it occurs in fact, or not. Such wishful thinking is religious only when it concerns allegiance to a cause, or, in less simple words, when it involves harmonizing one's own purpose with what one judges to be a cosmic purpose, subordinating the former to the latter.

Denotative symbols are, if evidential, *indicative*: a name on a box shows whose box it is. Non-evidential denotative symbols are *implicative*: 5×4 implies 20. Non-evidential connotative symbols are *metaphorical*: Cupid's arrow on a valentine does not give evidence of love. But the fact that much or little money is spent upon the valentine is some evidence. It is a connotative, evidential symbol. It is *analogical*, for, other things being equal, warm lovers spend more on the beloved. So also, clouds and rain are *analogical* symbols of each other; also trumpets and trumpeters. They involve each other.

In themselves the symbols that Bevan calls analogical are not so in the sense above defined, which accords, I think, with common use. In the sky, apart from mystical experience, there is no evidence of Transcendant Diety; nor in Time, nor in Light, nor in Spirit, nor in The Wrath of God, so called. The analogical symbol is the mystical experience itself. The analogy is between an experience that is private in the sense that I can not submit it to public inspection, or insure that others have an experience approximately like it, and my ordinary *public* acts of observation, which I myself can observe, and others also, and which I can in some measure reproduce in others. In both types of experience there is awareness of personal presence. In so far as the experiences are comparable, I infer that the presence was actual. How conclusive this evidence is, in any case, is a detail that does not concern us here.

The Virgin Birth and the Resurrection are analogical symbols only so far as they are accepted as actual, historical facts; for, only as such facts, have they evidential value.

Dr. Bevan has shown in this work how easy it is for others, for instance Hébert, to confuse the metaphorical with the evidential, analogical use and worth of religious symbols. It does not at all detract from the interest of his book, if I am right in supposing that he himself has not kept the distinction clear. The confusion of the two types of

symbols often has seemed to give weight to arguments that, in fact, are without cogency. Yet it is obvious, I suppose, that only by observing this distinction can we maintain the subordination of our purpose to the "cause" we hold cosmic. Without that subordination our allegiance sinks from the level of religion to that of gang loyalty.

PERCY HUGHES

Lehigh University

Religion in Essence and Manifestation. A Study in Phenomenology. By G. VAN DER LEEUW. Translated by J. E. TURNER. (Sir Halley Stewart Publications, v.) New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. 709 pp. $6.75.

This is a little encyclopedia, containing brief articles with authoritative references (up to 1933, when the German edition appeared) on almost every conceivable subject related to religion: a combination of Fraser's *Golden Bough,* Chantepie de la Saussaye's *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte,* and Söderblom's and Otto's theories of religious experience. Its materials are taken largely from the standard histories of religion, with an emphasis on Western religions and those of Ancient Greece, Egypt, and the Near East. With the exception of scattered references to Brahmanism and Buddhism, the Far East is quite neglected. The author does not aim, however, at an all-inclusive account of religious phenomena, but at a "systematic discussion" of them. As a phenomenologist he professes to derive the outlines of the system from the phenomena themselves; the work is supposed to be an empirical typology. Under these circumstances, the reader's and reviewer's interests are naturally centered on the author's organization of his material, rather than on the material itself. There is little new in the subject-matter, but it is treated with unusual competence, for the author has made noteworthy contributions to the psychology and history of religion. In this volume he tries to free himself from philosophical theories about religion and to substitute a pure description of "objective meanings," i.e., to describe, not the multitude of religious facts, but their forms.

The organization is not primarily historical. Van der Leeuw has reacted so strongly against evolutionary theories and other philosophies of history, that he gives only grudging admission to temporal forms and makes no attempt to "comprehend" phenomenologically, as in

strictness his method would require, the historical appearances and disappearances of religions and their careers in time. Admitting that the problem of the origin of religion or of primeval religion is largely futile, we still have on our hands important historical structures (even among primitive religions, which the author dogmatically calls unhistorical). It is true that, under the heading of the "dynamics of religion," he gives brief and cursory accounts of syncretism, transposition of meanings, missions, reforms, and revivals, but there is little attempt to relate such temporal structures to the larger processes of religious history. Above all, there is too scanty a recognition of the individuality of religions and their cultural environments. The historical religions are identified under the following scheme of so-called historical forms:

The religion of struggle—Zoroastrian dualism.
The religion of repose—mysticism.
The religion of unrest (synthesis of struggle and repose)—theism.

And, in more detail, the religions of:

Remoteness and flight—China and atheism (though the latter can not be said to have a historical religious form).
Strain and Form—Ancient Greek.
Infinity and Asceticism—Brahmanism.
Nothingness and Compassion—Buddhism.
Will and Obedience—Israel.
Majesty and Humility—Islam.
Love—Christianity.

Such generalizations may not be without value for a rough typology, but as "historical forms" they are "unhistorical," to say the least. These attempts to characterize the chief religions are, however, little more than an appendix to the phenomenology; the greater part of the work is devoted to forms that find illustration in more than one religion.

The basic categories which underly the phenomenology are Power, Will, and Form, and the organization of the material under these concepts certainly is not so philosophically innocent as the author would have us believe. Religion is, first of all (not in a temporal sense) concerned with power. All power is sacred, because man is naturally most susceptible to exhibitions of power, the more powerful a thing is, the more numinous. "Dynamism" is the "initial state"

(again, not temporal?) of religion. This thesis is far from convincing or clear, and I can but cite a typical passage to illustrate the way in which the author tries, by his emphasis on power, to reconcile the various theories of the "Other," the supernatural, the fearful, and the sense of dependence:

> . . . the first affirmation we can make about the Object of Religion is that it is a *highly exceptional* and *extremely impressive "Other."* Subjectively, again, the initial state of man's mind is amazement; and as Söderblom has remarked, this is true not only for philosophy but equally for religion. As yet, it must further be observed, we are in no way concerned with the supernatural or the transcendent: we can speak of "God" in a merely figurative sense; but there arises and persists an experience which connects or unites itself to the "Other" that thus obtrudes. Theory, and even the slightest degree of generalization, are still far remote; man remains quite content with the purely practical recognition that this Object is a departure from all that is usual and familiar; and this again is the consequence of the *Power* it generates. The most primitive belief, then, is absolutely empirical; as regards primitive religious experience, therefore, and even a large proportion of that of antiquity, we must in this respect accustom ourselves to interpret the supernatural element in the conception of God by the simple notion of an "Other," of something foreign and highly unusual, and at the same time the consciousness of absolute dependence, so well known to ourselves, by an indefinite and generalized feeling of remoteness (pp. 23-24).

Having worshipped Power, man is next able to add to it the concept of Will; this gives us animism. Then, to Will he can add Form; this gives us myth and theism. The various gods and rites of religion are then explained as derivatives of Power, Will, and Form in varying combinations. This may be an ingenious philosophy of religion, but it is certainly not pure phenomenology.

Another invasion of philosophical presuppositions into what purports to be phenomenology is made in the very first paragraph:

> That which those sciences concerned with Religion regard as the *Object* of Religion is, for Religion itself, the active and primary Agent in the situation, or, in this sense of the term, the *Subject*. In other words, the religious man perceives that with which his religion deals as primal, as originative or causal; and only to reflective thought does this become the Object of the experience that is contemplated. For Religion, then, God is the active Agent in relation to man, while the sciences in question can concern themselves only with the activity of man in his relation to God; of the acts of God Himself they can give no account whatever (p. 23).

This transformation of God from subject into object, though it is admittedly a violation of the religious facts, is made necessary by the procedure of phenomenology in general, and by its positivistic framework. This apparently innocent starting-point transforms the whole analysis of religion into an analysis of religious experience in a subjective sense. To introduce subject and object into the analysis at the start is as artificial as to begin with the distinction between natural and super-natural.

In general this volume illustrates the vices as well as the virtues of phenomenology. Its analyses are not only excessively formal, but superficial. For example, the one term, which certainly needs careful analysis in this subject-matter, is "the sacred"; yet it is introduced much too casually. We are given excellent little essays on sacred space, sacred time, sacred this and sacred that, but what "sacred" means remains quite vague, and certainly remains couched in philosophical theories. As a science, phenomenology seems to me neither objective nor critical; if it were content to be a description of particulars, it would be more useful, for it might be less prone to arbitrary "forms."

The translation is conscientious but clumsy, and adds to the difficulties which most English readers will have in reading the book sympathetically. Nevertheless, the patient reader will be well rewarded, not only by an immense mass of critical information, but by brilliant bits of insight and generalization in unusually succinct form.

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER

Columbia University

Modes of Thought. By ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. viii + 241 pp. $2.50.

This book consists chiefly of six lectures given at Wellesley College in 1937-38, and two lectures given at the University of Chicago in 1933 (previously published as a pamphlet entitled *Nature and Life*). As a whole, it forms perhaps the best introduction to Whitehead's philosophy, since it is freer from extreme technicalities of science than most of his other works and makes practically no use of his elaborate philosophical terminology—thus suggesting how far Whitehead is from confusing ideas with words. Not many philosophers, it seems to me, have presented their doctrines in such a variety of lights, and with such a variety of methods. This book sums up, in simple pro-

fundity, the methodological conceptions which the author sees as separating him from his predecessors and many of his contemporaries, and shows the basis in science and everyday life of his chief convictions.

The book contains a brief discussion of the idea of God, perhaps the simplest and clearest of Whitehead's treatments of this theme, which in my opinion was hardly clear to the philosopher himself in *Science and the Modern World*, or in *Religion in the Making* (valuable as that book is), and is difficult to disentangle from the technicalities of *Process and Reality*. It agrees well enough with conceptions of God held by Ward, Pfleiderer, Bergson, Tennant, and others in recent decades, but is given in Whitehead its amplest philosophical setting. In vivid, elementary fashion Whitehead shows how the excitement of the Greeks over a mathematics which had not discovered the creative aspect of transition and becoming inherent even in mathematics itself led (with other non-religious factors) to a theology of the timeless absolute, the sheerly infinite being. In consequence, "our whole conception of knowledge has been vitiated" by the implied "abstraction from action," while action itself was made trivial, as dealing" with a world of shadows." "Importance rises from . . . fusion of the finite and the infinite. The cry, 'Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die,' expresses the triviality of the merely finite. The mystic, ineffable slumber expresses the vacuity of the merely infinite. Those theologians do religion a bad service who emphasize infinitude at the expense of the finite transitions within history." Deity is the universe so far as having unity of aim at the ideal, and the ideal is, even for God, the partially unactualized. (Whitehead thus would agree with Dewey's objections to a God in whose eternally complete actuality the distinction between ideal and real disappears.) God is immanent in us through "intuition of the universe as everlasting process, unfading in its deistic unity of ideals." Without this (usually subconscious or dim) intuition, we should be unable even to see other things as equally real with ourselves, for then "there would be no standard of comparison." Thus, as Whitehead has said elsewhere, God's life is the supreme Adventure, containing and cherishing the values of our little adventures, assigning them their relative places, and not an adventureless being to which we must be wholly superfluous.

Undoubtedly Whitehead's doctrine of God needs elaboration. But

I am persuaded that the doctrine, sketchy as it is, furnishes a far more serviceable basis for theological speculation than those of Aristotle, Philo, and Plotinus, which so long fascinated religious thinkers. Christian philosophers had no difficulty in removing certain obviously irreligious features of the Greek heritage, but some of the subtler ones seem to have escaped their notice. Whitehead may be primarily concerned with the "secular functions" of God, but if these as he states them do not explicitly involve the religious functions, neither do they, even implicitly, deny them. Those who feel otherwise have either, I cannot but think, mistaken his meaning, or else have unwittingly confused religion with an intellectual tradition which is as secular as any other in origin and import.

CHARLES HARTSHORNE

The University of Chicago

BOOK NOTES

Himalayas of the Soul. Translations from the Sanscrit of the principal Upanishads. By J. Mascaró. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1938. 93 pp. $1.25.

The series of "The Wisdom of the East" presents this stimulating little volume of new translations of a few of the best known Upanishads, mainly the shorter ones. Sr. Mascaró, who is Reader of English in the University of Barcelona, has gotten two well-known and important scholars to write short prefaces to his translations. Sir S. Radhakrishnan stresses the "artist's skill" of Sr. Mascaró, though he says that "the delicate allusiveness of the original is an almost insoluble problem for the translator." And E. J. Thomas is pleased by the "freshness of an early world" which he finds admirably expressed and transmuted into English by Sr. Mascaró.

Any new, bold attempt to present a fresh, up-to-date translation of ancient texts confronts us with the problematical character of such an enterprise. We discover, time and again, the fact that the so-called strictly verbal translations do not at all present the spirit of the original, which often can be approached much better by a roundabout way of re-thinking its basic ideas, and putting their meanings into a new and more adequate form of expression.

Sr. Mascaró has tried to go this way of correctness through freedom, in order to achieve what he calls the "sublime simplicity" of the original, just as Yeats did in his recent Upanishad translations. Both attempts are equally bold and remarkable in a few single passages, but they fall back into the conventional method in certain parts of their translations. In this respect Yeats seems to this reviewer even more disappointing than Mascaró.

To mention some instances of remarkable translations: in the well-known sermon of Vajñavalkya (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1, 3, 28), he says, "In truth, it is not for the love of a husband that a husband is dear; but for the love of the Soul in the husband that a husband is dear. . . ." Generally, however, he prefers to render "ātman" by "the own higher self," instead of by the traditional "soul." On the other hand, sometimes Mascaró's choice of words seems to be more definitely determined by Christian thought than is proper, e.g., when *Prajapati* simply becomes "a creator," when *brahman* and *purusha* are both rendered "spirit," *vidya*, "vision," and *tapas*, "purity."

Friedrich Spiegelberg

Die Werke Philons von Alexandria. Sechster Teil. Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. I. Heinemann u. Prof. Dr. M. Adler. Breslau: Jüdischer Buchverlag Stefan Münz, 1938. Pp. viii + 278. RM 14.

Volume VI of the German translation of Philo contains the *De Congressu* rendered by Hans Lewy, *De Fuga* by M. Adler, *De Mutatione Nominum*

by Willy Theiler, and *De Somniis* I and II by M. Adler. As in earlier volumes, the translators have not only given accurate and fluid renderings of Philo's intricate Greek but have also contributed valuable notes dealing with Philo's relation to Hellenistic and rabbinic thought. Each treatise is also provided with a useful analysis of contents. As the translators and editors had before them the excellent English translation by Colson in the Loeb Classical Library, it is interesting to compare the two versions and see where the German scholars differ either in reading or interpretation. Such divergence benefits the critical student of Philo.

The reviewer finds himself disagreeing here and there with a rendering or explanatory footnote. To select one passage at random, the translator has missed the point of Philo's (phantastic) etymology of the Hebrew name Arpachshad as "he disturbed affliction." Philo bases his etymology on the two arbitrarily selected elements *'rb* and *šdd*. A glance at Hatch-Redpath's Concordance to the LXX shows that *talaṭpōria* usually renders Hebrew *šdd*.

Of the general excellence and usefulness of this volume, as of its predecessors, there can be no question. The reviewer sincerely trusts that Volume VII, advertised as being in press, will soon appear and thus bring the distinguished German translation of Philo to a happy conclusion.

R. M.

Twenty Centuries of Jewish Thought. By ADOLPH LICHTIGFELD. London: Edward O. Beck, Ltd. [1937]. 168 pp. 2*s*. 6*d*.

This anthology of brief selections descriptive of Jewish thought, from the Bible through Henri Bergson, Franz Rosenzweig, Mordecai M. Kaplan, and Claude G. Montefiore, is more an attempt to sketch the major problems lying at the core of Jewish religious philosophy than it is a systematic compilation designed to provide an answer to any of these problems. Since this is so, it becomes significant as an indication of the direction and nature of Jewish thought that more than one third of the book is given over to a discussion of a problem more ethical than theological, that of the relation of the Jew to his fellow-Jew and to his fellow-man under the Torah, and, more specifically, under the Decalogue. Further, there is a discussion of the Talmudic regulation of moral duties, and a brief discussion of man's duty in the world, which, while, to some extent, concerned with the question of worship, i.e., with man's specific religious duties, is even more concerned with man's duties as a citizen of the world. Thus, the predominantly ethical tone of Jewish thought receives substantial demonstration in this brief work.

The current problems of Zionism, and of Orthodoxy and Reform are dismissed summarily in three pages at the end. For this reader, this was the greatest weakness of the book. Much of the vitality of contemporary Jewish thinking has centered in the attempt to reach a satisfactory solution of these two problems. Undoubtedly, there is far more significant thinking

on these problems than on the question of the exact implications of the epithet *ger*, to which the editor devoted some five pages.

A further weakness lies in the extended quotations from the editor's earlier *Philosophy and Revelation in the Works of Contemporary Jewish Thinkers*, and from Waxman's *History of Jewish Literature*, which replace selections from the primary sources, particularly in the latter part of the book. The editor might have performed more of a service by bringing us exact quotations from the works of men known to American and English students largely through secondary sources, such as S. R. Hirsch, N. Krochmal, S. Formstecher, Samuel Hirsch, S. L. Steinheim, and Franz Rosenzweig, rather than simply repeating summaries of their ideas. This might have been done even if it had meant the sacrifice of some of the more familiar and more easily accessible passages from Maimonides, Crescas, and Spinoza.

The bibliographical references are inadequate and inconsistent in form, and there is a more vital inconsistency in the use of quotation marks which creates some difficulty in discovering where the words of the editor end and those of the original source begin.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

Du groupe ethnique à la communauté religieuse: le problème sociologique de la religion d'Israël. By A. CAUSSE. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1937. 243 pp. Fr. 50.

This essay on the ancient history of Israel attempts to analyze the transformations which took place in the moral structure of the people as it passed from the primitive tribal rites and magical sanctions of solidarity to the individualistic "humanism" of the Wisdom Literature and of the diaspora. Though the author relies largely on the theories of Lévy-Bruhl and on Durkheim's sociology, he applies them critically, and avoids many of the earlier pitfalls of anthropological speculation by beginning his analysis, not with the "origins," but with the Mosaic period and primitive Jahwism. For his interpretation of this age as a typical primitive tribal society and of its theory of the Covenant as a magical bond, he has considerable evidence in the literature. The break-up of this social organization produced the prophetic movement and the Deuteronomic Reform, a reform which in this account amounts to a radical revolution in the moral structure of the people. History supplants magic as the method of God's rule, the written Torah supplants the traditional tribal rites and laws, the nation among nations gives a new and "moralized" form of solidarity, and the Covenant becomes one of the future rather than of the past. This national religious community is then undermined by the diaspora and Hellenism until the religious individualism of the later prophets and of the Wisdom Literature seems all that is left of Jewish piety. But the resurgence of nationalism, traditionalism, and messianism puts an end to social scepticism and ushers in another type of religious community. The analysis of this type, the medieval Jewish community, is not carried out in this work,

and the reader is left curious to know how this combination of sociological method and protestantism would interpret later Jewish history and society.

H. W. S.

What We Mean by Religion. A Modern Interpretation of the Sabbath and Festivals. By IRA EISENSTEIN. New York: Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1938. xiv + 145 pp. $1.50.

This is a popular exposition of the meanings for modern life embodied in the chief festivals of Judaism. At the same time the book is a summary of Jewish modernism as formulated by the followers of Mordecai Kaplan, indicating the difference between the ancient and contemporary meanings of Judaism, as well as the continuities of national tradition and ideals. The modernists of the type of Rabbi Eisenstein are making a thoroughgoing attempt to "reconstruct" the agricultural and historical themes of the festivals into the contemporary themes of social justice and freedom. Though this volume is excessively simple, being adapted to childlike minds, it is by no means superficial in its treatment of Jewish history.

H. W. S.

Das Mysterium Christi: Eine Studie zu Mt. 11. 25-30. By TOMAS ARVEDSON, Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln, 1937. xvi + 254 pp.

The famous passage in the synoptic tradition is subjected in this monograph to a searching investigation from a somewhat unusual point of view. The problem is not Christological; it is the concept of the relation of discipleship, and is part of a larger treatment of that problem in the Synoptic Gospels which the author has in mind. The more such passages are analyzed and compared with material in other religions, the more complicated and mystical the "Jüngerbegriff" appears to be. It is not merely the Johannine use of "Son" and "Father," nor the gnostic sounding "know" of verse 27, that gives this passage in Matthew and its parallel in Luke 10:21 f. an appearance of developed Christian experience. The *religiongeschichtliche* parallels to nearly every phrase in it, whether taken from the Wisdom of Jesus ben Sira, from Apuleius, from early Christian writings canonical or gnostic, or from more remote and primitive religions, are marshaled to indicate the cultic character of the passage. Topics dealt with include: liturgy of thanksgiving, praise at accession of a king, address of mystagogue, invitation, Son of Man, Wisdom as teacher, the yoke as figure of discipleship, the rest as figure of gnostic marriage.

Not all the categories brought to bear upon the text of the monograph are equally convincing, but in a field where the fantastic is altogether too easy the author moves with a commendable lucidity and restraint. He claims, to be sure, that the passage is a liturgy originally intended for a celebration of a Mystery, the central point of which was the enthroning of Christ. The first part, a hymn of thanksgiving, including several current

motifs, is written apparently in the speech of Hellenism. The second part is, in the main, typical of "Wisdom" material. It is this character that makes the second part seem more "Johannine." The fusion of the two—Wisdom and syncretistic mysticism—had taken place in part prior to Christianity. Their union in a passage admitted early among the sayings of Jesus shows how nearly contemporary with the rise of Christianity such influences really were.

The book should be read by all who wish to place Christianity in the background of its original mental environment, and by those who wish to supplement the emphasis of modern "form criticism" upon the specifically Christian environment. Not once does the author raise the question whether the saying is a genuine word of Jesus, or whether it is derived from genuine sayings (Cf. p. 172, n. 6). Readers whose interests are only in the historical Jesus will therefore find little to their purpose here.

HENRY J. CADBURY

The Voice of the Cathedral: Tales in Stone and Legends in Glass. By SARTELL PRENTICE. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1938. xvii + 307 pp. with 65 plates, 11 cuts in text. $3.50.

In view of this writer's discussion of Dr. Prentice's companion volume, *The Heritage of the Cathedral* (*Review of Religion*, 1 [1937], pp. 398-400; 402-403), its successor may be considered more briefly. Here emphasis is no longer on the cathedral's architecture, but on its art and the meaning of that art. The general outline, with the substitution of art for architecture, is the same; and the sprit throughout is the same. The non-Christian background of early Christian art is traced; its indebtedness to Syria and Greece, to Babylonia and Assyria, to Scythia and Sarmatia—typified by the Three Wise Men, Balthasar, Melchior, and Caspar—and to Byzantium is shown, and the Dark Ages are described; the Romanesque period, with its contributions from monk and mason, and its views of beasts, ghosts, devils (and women) are set forth in cathedral art; then comes the Gothic period with its symbolism in art, its pictures of daily life, its tales and legends (especially the *Golden Legend*), and the influence of the pilgrim roads in the dissemination of artistry; and, finally, the decay of Christian art in the Neo-Paganism of the Renaissance.

A few minor corrections may be noted. There has been no church of S. Geneviève at Paris since the secularization of what is now called the Panthéon, and the sole relics of her Abbey are a few bits in the Lycée Henri IV and a fragment of her tomb in the church of S. Étienne-du-Mont (p. 88); the appearances of the Risen Lord in Notre Dame de Paris are not on the choir-screen, but on the wall of the ambulatory (p. 171; cf. p. 190); the text-description of Satan at S. Pietro, Toscanella (p. 241), does not exactly harmonize with the plate facing p. 223; it seems hazardous to date precisely the origin of the devotions of the Stations of the Cross

(p. 250); and 'give his soul repose' (p. 271) does not quite reproduce 'dona ei (sempiternam) requiem,' which is perfectly rendered by 'Rest eternal grant unto him' in the Proposed English Book of 1928—alas, that we must now make this prayer for the author himself, to whom mortal praise or blame—and it is praise that he has merited—are no longer of great import.

L. H. G.

Each with His Own Brush. Contemporary Christian Art in Asia. By Daniel Johnson Fleming. New York: Friendship Press, 1938. 85 pp. $1.50.

In this companion volume to his *Heritage of Beauty*, Professor Fleming has again opened a window for us through which we may gaze into a world of loveliness. The book contains sixty-five reproductions of paintings and sculptures from the Mission field illustrating Christian themes, and executed by native artists in native styles. There is a certain pleasurable shock which comes from seeing the old familiar stories in an exotic and unfamiliar garb—and fresh insight into meanings dulled by our too conventionalized representations. The Parables, particularly, spring into new life under the skillful brush strokes of a Chinese artist. The Foolish Virgins, vainly lamenting outside an elaborate Chinese door; a dainty Chinese lady searching for her lost coin; and the Good Samaritan, in an exquisite and typical Chinese landscape setting,—all these are rendered with grace and charm. As one would expect from the Chinese, nature plays a far greater part than in Western representations. The Madonna and Child is treated with exquisite tenderness by all the Oriental artists, but the Life of Christ is greatly weakened by too lyrical a treatment, as a rule. The Japanese artists, as one would also expect, are partial to the grimmer aspects of Christianity: Gethsemane, Calvary, and the Japanese martyrs, who met their fate in the true spirit of the Samurai. The examples of Christian art from India are in the *bhakti* tradition associated with the Krishna cult—the same pastoral settings, the same deeply indrawn ecstasy. A few extraordinary examples of African origin reveal the emotional intensity which we know so well in our own negro spirituals.

The brief, but informative, text is most helpful in its survey of indigenous Christian art in various countries—its history, and present status. And in it Professor Fleming successfully makes his point that Christianity no longer belongs to the West, but is truly at home in many lands and cultures.

M. B.

Pope Pius XI and World Peace. By Lord Conmore. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1938. xi + 306 pp. $3.00.

A not very effective piece of "special pleading," in which the author undertakes the defence of the late Pope in such highly equivocal matters as his policies with regard to the conquest of Abyssinia and the war in Spain.

In the former case he uses the ingenious argument that, since no appeal was made to him by the contending parties, the Pope had no right to interfere, in accordance with the treaty of 1929 (Article 24). But the author fails to comment on the fact that under this same clause the Holy See reserved "the right of making its moral and spiritual power felt" (p. 102), —a right which was not very adequately exercised, certainly, in the case of Abyssinia. The author's own point of view is sympathetic to Fascism. He says: "Later evidence seems to show that though on strictly legal grounds there was a case against Italy, on wider grounds there was much, some say more, to be said on the other side" (p. 103). His attempted defence of the Catholic Church in Spain is even less successful, and the Pope's benediction on "those who have assumed the difficult and dangerous task of defending and restoring the rights and honor of God and of Religion" leaves much to be desired in the way of "neutrality." But when we come to the Pope's social Encyclicals, we find ourselves on more objective ground,—for here, at any rate, the Pontiff proved himself the champion of the oppressed.

M. B.

A Vision. By W. B. Yeats. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. 305 pp. $3.00.

Here is a book about which there can scarcely be temperate opinion. It is a book to be either enthusiastically accepted or vehemently rejected. Its appeal is limited in several important ways. To like it one must, in the first place, enjoy accounts of purported communications from the spirit world. One must, further, share the special *weltanschauung* that results from compounding elements of German Idealism, Brahmanism, Neo-Platonism, Pythagoreanism, astrology and Spenglerism. And finally, one must be able to take seriously a construction of elaborate symbolism involving spirals, cones and wheels, and having to do with a metaphysical interpretation of man and the course of human history. Readers unqualified in these various respects may well be regarded by the qualified as woefully deficient. Certainly they are unlikely to be forgiven if, as a result of the perusal of this work, they formulate the following precepts: Let those who indulge in automatic writing refrain from the study of esoteric literature; and let those who are poets limit their public utterances to poetry. Yet the latter precept should not be altogether displeasing even to admirers of *A Vision*, for its author is not less a man than the lyric singer to whom we owe such things as *The Lake Isle of Innisfree.*

Helen Huss Parkhurst

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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